Strong common denominators

At the root of it all of these different influences that come from colonialism, migration, trade or invasion, there are some very strong common denominators that enabled the two oldest foundations and influences of Moroccan culture i.e. Amazigh and Jewish to persevere with their influences on culture and values until today. Morocco is widely known as an Islamic nation, but even before the arrival of Islam to Morocco in 694, the Amazigh tribal people were the main inhabitants of Northern Africa, in general.

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After the destruction of the second Jewish temple in 70 AD, the population of the area of Palestine, at the time, fled mostly to Northern Africa, besides other places such as Asia, Spain, and the Middle East, where they found a very friendly reception for their way of life and religion. They came to a Roman Occupied Northern Africa yet found mutual respect and understanding that resulted from the meeting of Jewish and Amazigh tribes and their related civilizations and were able to create a very strong and influential base to not only the Moroccan history, and way of life but, also and most importantly, to the Moroccan

culture of today. A lasting influence like this would not have been possible without the previous strong relationship and understanding that Jewish and Amazigh tribes had from the very beginning of their encounter. Comingling and coexistence were the beginning of the Judeo-Amazigh relationship that resulted in one of the most lasting bases and most transformative influences on Moroccan values and tradition even as we know it today and which will be known as: The Judeo-Amazigh Cultural Substratum.
However, for Norman Berdichevisky, the presence of Jewish people in North Africa is recorded in historical chronicles even before 70 AD which makes the substratum older than thought:

“At its height in the 7th century BC (a thousand, three hundred years before the advent of Islam and the expansion of the Arabs out of the Arabian Peninsula and their conquests in North Africa including Morocco), a vast overseas Semitic civilization was established by the Phoenician states of Tyre and Sidon in alliance with ancient Israel. All the petty states mentioned in the Bible shared a common Semitic language and related alphabets that were later borrowed by the Greeks and Romans. At this time, the Arab people, their language and pre-Islamic and non-literate culture were confined to the Arabian Peninsula, a cultural backwater remote from both ancient Israel and Morocco. “

The advent of the cultural communion and harmony

Before the arrival of any monotheistic religion to Northern Africa, there were many different Amazigh tribes that lived in the area, which did not really have an official religion but rather a tribal way of life that bonded them as a people. These Amazigh tribes have existed and thrived in Northern Africa for over thirty centuries and, therefore, tribalism bonded these people as the reigning social ideology and as a successful system of governance.

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This environment happened to be ideal and propitious for another group of tribal people who were fleeing their homeland in search for another welcoming environment where to live and prosper. After the destruction of the second temple in Palestine by the Romans, many of the surviving Jewish people decided to flee to Northern Africa where they found an already existing tribal way of life close to theirs. At the beginning, the Jewish people of Northern Africa inhabited rural areas like the mountainous areas of the north. They flourished in their surrounding because of the already existing tribal loyalties and respect for nature that is so prominent in both Amazigh and Jewish ways of life.

This transition to Northern Africa of the Jewish people, who represent a completely different religion and nation, could have resulted in conflict of some sort, yet they successfully settled down and flourished as a result of their strong sense of coexistence and comingling. Profession-wise, the Jewish people chose occupations of value and ended up becoming pillars of the community and some of its most trustworthy members.

They became itinerant merchants ( going from place to sell various things like utensils and cosmetics), weighers (people who had the skills in the market to weigh as scales were not widely available and only those who were highly trusted by the state were chosen to do this), ironsmiths, goldsmiths, local bankers (people who would lend money with interest, they were so popular in this profession not only because they were trustworthy but also because they wouldn’t ask for the money back, if not available, but just increase the interest), and they were also caravan leaders (this was also a profession few were trusted and only Jews would bother to pay the tax of passage—in fact, the word for guide in Amazigh is azettat which refers to the piece of cloth he would carry on a long stick, visible from afar to indicate he had paid the tribal tax). These professions were extremely useful and community.

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This transition and subsequent trust, in part, was inspired by the mutual understanding of a tribal way life as the two peoples functioned very similarly within their values, identity, and even traditions. Within the definition of tribalism there is an inherent loyalty that brings one to put community and family first in regards to responsibilities. The tribal system functions not only as a way of life but as a way of governance, as well. The first unit of both the Amazigh and Jewish tribal system is the family, the second unit being the extended family, the third being the clan and the forth unit being the tribe that banded together a limited number of clans (five clans in some cases.) In Jewish tradition, many tribes together become a nation whereas in Moroccan tradition many tribes together become a confederation or an alliance known as leff.

Not only were the tribal systems similar but the identities that held the tribes and their traditions together were, also, very close in regards to the fact that both social units being inherently democratic, possessed a strong work ethic, gave a large importance to women, and expressed their identity through tradition and language. Both Jewish and Amazigh tribes shared similar traditions of costumes, tattoos, jewelry and even rugs. These similarities led the way for a very positive and tight relationship and even to the conversion of some Amazigh tribes to Judaism. 

Commonality morphed into togetherness

The strong base that resulted from this special relationship, originated from mutual respect and commonality between both Amazigh and Jewish tribes that morphed each other’s social systems into a culture of togetherness and harmony that is the basis of the reputed Moroccan way of life and philosophy of tolerance of today. Many things that are now viewed as traditional Moroccan culture, today, are originally traditional Jewish traditions like the worship of saints sâlihîn or Amazigh practices like the reverence of the Hand of Fatima known as khmîsa or khamsa. 

Saint worship is even more unique because it is only found in North Africa, and is actually the unique contribution of both Amazigh and Jewish tribes to the religion of Islam in Northern Morocco as Judaism brought the practice and many of the most worshipped saints were Amazigh figures. This is one of the most lasting and profound effects of this special relationship on Moroccan Islam and on society as a whole. These two cultures continued to build each other into stronger presence in Moroccan identity even before the Islamization of North Africa.

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This relationship provided not only a strong base but, also, a strong inspiration to keep and maintain tribal culture strong and flourishing. So much so that when Islam came to Northern Africa there was a very fierce resistance against this encroaching new force.

There are many Amazigh folktales that have emerged from this time but the most infamous is that of Princess al-Kâhina, also known as Dihya. Princess Al-Kâhina was an Amazigh princess of Jewish faith, yet claimed as a heroine by Amazigh peoples, Arabs, Jews, Christians, and even Muslims—she was also known to be a sorceress and she supposedly lived for 127 years and ruled for 65 years and had three sons. She was even documented by one of the most famous Arabic historians, Ibn Khaldun—lauding her as an “Amazigh Knight”—highlighting her courage, beauty and sense of tolerance.

She led a very fierce resistance against the forces of Islam and it took them about twenty years to defeat her. After the defeat of Princess al-Kâhina, though, those who were bringing Islam to Northern Africa realized they made a big mistake in how they were going about spreading Islam in the area and, thus, changed their ways in Islamizing the area in that they decided to accept local traditions and decided, also, to accept Judaism and tolerated it, therefore. Yet, still many pagan traditions survived in the mountains, till today, due to the obvious geographic obstacles, like the mystic music and dance of the world-famous Master Musicians of Jajouka in the Rif mountains.

Princess al-Kahina’s fame, also, alludes to the value placed on women by both Amazigh and Jewish tribes and her story represents the respect the women enjoyed, then. Throughout their common history it never ended up being Jewish against Amazigh tribes, yet they did band together as a confederacy under a Jewish- Amazigh Princess against the harsh Islamization of Morocco. So, the Jewish-Amazigh relationship and cultures both stood tall and continued to gain ground in their influence of Morocco and even North African Islam as a whole, for many centuries since. 

For Haim Zafrani, this commonality gave birth to a rich oral literature, besides:

“Oral literature is an immense subject and difficult to define. It concerns folklore but also comes under the head of sociology, ethno-anthropology, and even history. Everything that has been said and then gathered up by collective memory belongs to this vast domain. Generally described as popular, it is constantly enriched by the work of scholars and very rapidly assimilates it. It is therefore legitimate to infer from this that popular literature preserves and transmits the creations of historic civilizations as well as the heritage of prehistoric cultures. However, its survival and transmission conform to certain rules and are subject to the operation of popular mentalities. The similarity of the mental structures of the Jewish and Muslim-Arab and Berber populations gave birth in the Maghreb to a literature and a folklore where the Jewish cultural substrata and the Arab-Berber heritage were united in an original creation.”

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Cultural contributions

The Jewish people who were in the midst of this transition were able to take advantage of their situation of their easy adaptability, not only forwarding themselves in Moroccan culture but, also, making significant contributions to advance it as whole and leaving lasting legacies on both Judaism and Morocco. One of the reasons that the Jewish people and even the Amazigh people were able to flourish under Islam in Morocco was, also, because they were treated badly under the Romans, not to say they were literally emasculated and enslaved and the Arabs changed and abrogated this status in their approach to the Islamization of Morocco. All of the contributions that both Amazigh and Jewish people have made to Moroccan identity and society are the result of this strong foundational relationship.

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Jewish people contributed largely to what is known, today, as Moroccan culture by taking advantage of their situation and adapting to whatever cultural standards they were surrounded by and also enhancing the economy. Thinking about Moroccan art some of the first things that comes to mind is the zellige mosaic work found in architecture, as well as, in the motifs of the Amazigh rugs made in the mountains and sold all over the country. It actually happens that these famous rugs come from the Jewish tribal tradition—women would begin weaving the carpet upon the beginning of their pregnancy cycle and use themes that represent Kabbalistic motives and the life cycle which, also, happens to be the theme in which zellige tiles are created.

In Moroccan society, the Amazigh rug has lost its Jewish affiliation, yet is still used as a symbol of motherhood. The zellige tiles have, also, lost all of their affiliation with Judaism and have instead become a symbol of traditional Moroccan architecture. As well as this, Fez became one of the most artistic capitals of Morocco as it was known for its Jewish crafts guilds which, then, later, became Muslim as more and more people converted to Islam.

The Jews even developed their own idiom known as the Judeo-Amazigh/Berber spoken in southern Morocco whereas Judeo-Arabic was the language of the Jews of coastal towns. In this regard Joseph Chetrit argues:

“Despite the lack of walled quarters or distinct streets for the small Jewish populations, varieties of Judeo-Berber clearly developed in some rural and isolated communities of the High Atlas, among Jews who settled in the Ait Bu Ulli tribe near Demnat to the north of Marrakech, and among those who lived in the Tifnout region near the Ait Wawzgit (Ouaouzguite) tribes of the Moroccan Anti-Atlas range, at least during the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries. For these small communities, Judeo-Berber was the principal and often the only language used by Jews, not merely in their interactions with neighboring Berber Muslims, but also within the Jewish family and in communal institutions. Many testimonies of Moroccan Jews who visited such communities in the 1930s and1940s, which were recorded in our fieldwork, as well as a Hebrew chronicle from1899–1902 (Chetrit 2007a: 230–232), attest to these monolingual uses. This linguistic situation lasted until the French Protectorate developed practical roads and paths between 1920–1940, which opened and strengthened the contacts between isolated rural Jews and urban Jews and progressively led monolingual speakers of Judeo-Berber to adopt Judeo-Arabic also and to become bilingual. “

After the second expulsion from Spain in 1492, about 50,000 more Jews came to Morocco. Because of their adaptability, during this time, Jewish scholars who learned Arabic in Andalusia resumed their admirable work of translating books from Greek into Arabic and into Hebrew—which in turn ended up kick-starting the European Renaissance. They, also, brought with them something that is now called “the culture of expulsion” which basically refers to the Spanish and Sephardic influence that these newcomers to Morocco had on music (Andalusian music known as tarab al-andalusî, a very popular classical music in addition to tarab cha’bî, pop music interpreted by the Botbol and Pinhas families of famous musicians of the 20th century), food, dress, and even economy.

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Firstly, their impact on food from this period is still very prominent today-the strong use of garlic and fish and many of their salads like tomatoes and cucumber, and even one of the most popular dishes commonly called za’look which is made from roasted eggplant and red peppers and considered a real delicacy.

In addition, under the Saadi Dynasty Jewish people prospered economically thereby gaining the name of “the golden banking state” for Morocco. This was the result of the fact that the Saadi sultan gave Jewish people the monopoly of maritime trade and banking-and they took it in stride and kept the monopoly on the tea business until 1960. As for the sultan Sidi Mohammad ben Abdullah, he gave Jewish traders special privileges and so they moved to port cities like Tangier and Essouria (known, then, as Mogador) from whose ports they conducted international trade. Further, under the sultan Moulay Abd Abderrahmane, the Jews gained a whole monopoly of commerce with Europe and further developed the system of Tujjâr as-Sultân, which means the King’s Merchants. As a result of these two strategic business accomplishments, there are still many famous cities for either their current Jewish presence or their lasting Jewish legacies of coexistence among many other things such a famous food, dress or industry.

The French traveler Chenier attests to the great ingenuity of Moroccan Jews of the time of his visit to the Empire of Morocco (18th century):

“…the Jews have many advantages…: they better understand the spirit of trade; they act as agents and brokers, and they profit by their own cunning and by the ignorance of the Moors. In their commercial bargains many of them buy up the commodities of the country to sell again. Some have European correspondents; others are mechanics, such as goldsmiths, tailors, gunsmiths, millers, and masons. More industrious and artful, and better informed than the Moors, the Jews are employed by the emperor in receiving the customs, in coining money, and in all affairs and intercourse which the monarch has with the European merchants, as well as in all his negotiations with the various European governments.” 

Moroccan Jewish legacy

Jewish people have managed, through either profession or innovation, to influence deeply the Moroccan identity in even its highest functions through politics, diplomacy, trade, scholarship or even farming. From the beginning they were able to take advantage of their reputation as trustworthy people to become the closest advisors to the king, even until today. After the Islamization of Morocco, they became the King’s “shadow cabinet” known as Hukamâ’ (wise people) listened to their military and diplomatic advice and this tradition was copycatted by Arab emirs in Spain during Muslim rule (711-1492).

Further, they were always chosen for positions of political power in many dynasties as a result of their intellect and trustworthiness. And using their economic success to their advantage, the Jewish people produced many famous diplomats that can be partly credited with Morocco’s success diplomatically then and today. In 1608, Samuel Pallache arrived in the Netherlands and signed the first pact of alliance between Morocco and a Christian country. Also, using their influential positions within the young republic of the United States, Isaac Nuves and Isaac Pinto were fully responsible for signing a friendship treaty with the Empire of Morocco in 1787. 

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Al-Qarawyyin University in Fes has, also, produced many great Jewish scholars who still contribute to today’s society with their lasting intellectual legacies. Rabbi Isaac Alfesi wrote the most famous early Talmudic commentaries after having studied at al- Qarawyyin University. Moshe Ben Maimoun, although born Jewish in Spain, came to Fez with his son as a guest of the Almohad Sultan and taught medicine and comparative religion at al-Qarawyyin University, at the same time producing some of his best theological and scientific work.

Moshe Ben Maimoun is better known as Maimonides and he is now known to rectify Aristotelian beliefs. As to what concerns Jewish theology, he is well known for his thirteen principles in his commentary of the Mishnah which he wrote mainly in Arabic. Maimonides and his work are largely recognized as symbols of the reconciliation of Muslim and Jewish scholarship and cultures. In fact, if we take the combined works of the many great minds and diplomats of this time and even today, there is no way to deny the unique and diverse quality knowledge, experience and expertise brought by Jewish peoples’ migration to Morocco under the Roman Empire and invigorating its civilization and way of life.

Moroccan proverbial tolerance

While the Jewish community of Morocco has mostly vanished in the 70s of the last century, it has, undeniably, left a positive legacy for what we now know of Moroccan identity and culture. This is evident in many aspects of Morocco’s political and cultural persona today like Morocco’s notorious tolerance to many different religions let alone different kinds of Islam and even uniqueness and exception in the Middle East and North Africa region. Morocco has always maintained a good relationship with its cultural bases-being both the Amazigh and Jewish people.

The Amazigh nationalist wave happened all across Northern Africa, along with other protests for government reform mainly the Arab Spring and King Mohammed VI took the initiative from those who were demanding reform and promoted a new constitution to Morocco that recognized the Amazigh language and culture as a core component of Moroccan identity. King Mohammed VI, also, recognized many Jewish contributions to this identity as a part of the 2011 constitution, as well, and restored one of the ancient synagogues in Fez. 

Even during World War II, Morocco was known to be a friendly place for Jewish people to flee to. After the creation of Israel, the Jewish population of Morocco decreased dramatically yet their presence and legacies and the warm reception Moroccans have to them has never left. It lives on through Morocco’s unique and multifaceted identity, Amazigh political activism, and even constitutional reforms made from a tolerant King.

Judaism in today’s Morocco

The coastal town of Safi, home to the shrine of Rabbi Abraham Ben Zmirro, remains a pilgrimage site for Jews from around the world. The western Moroccan city of Essaouira, home to the tomb of Rabbi Pinto, a venerated rabbinical judge who died in 1845, also attracts hundreds of Jews every year for a four-day celebration of his legacy.
Though many Jews immigrated to Israel, France, Canada, and elsewhere beginning in the 1940s:

“The Moroccan government, for its part, has embraced those who remained, and its support of the community has been held up as a symbol of Arab moderation and tolerance” (The Forward)

There are an estimated 3000 Jews currently living in Morocco, and there are synagogues in Casablanca, Essaouira, Marrakesh, and Fez, with over 15 active synagogues in Casablanca alone.

Today, Serge Berdugo and Andre Azoulay, prominent members of Morocco’s Jewish community, serve as Ambassador at Large and Counselor to King Mohammed VI, respectively. Ambassador Berdugo is also the elected President of the World Organization of Moroccan Jewry. In April 2016, Casablanca hosted the country’s first Jewish film festival. Nearly 500 people attended three movie screenings on subjects relating to the Moroccan Jewish diaspora.

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Morocco is engaged in a large-scale project to refurbish synagogues and other Jewish monuments to preserve the unique and historic aspects of Moroccan culture. Morocco’s “Houses of Life” project, launched in April 2010, restored 167 Jewish cemeteries across the country, installing 159 new doors, building nearly 140,000 feet of fencing, and repairing 12,600 graves. King Mohammed VI has said that this project,

“is a testimony to the richness and diversity of the Kingdom of Morocco’s spiritual heritage. Blending harmoniously with the other components of our identity, the Jewish legacy, with its rituals and specific features, has been an intrinsic part of our country’s heritage for more than three thousand years. As is enshrined in the Kingdom’s new Constitution, the Hebrew heritage is indeed one of the time-honored components of our national identity.”

In February 2013, the 17th century Slat al Fassayine Synagogue in Fez reopened after two years of restoration. In a message for the inauguration ceremony, King Mohammed VI said,

“I am committed to defending the faith and the community of believers, and to fulfilling my mission with respect to upholding freedom of religion for all believers in the revealed religions, including Judaism, whose followers are loyal citizens for whom I deeply care… The Moroccan people’s cultural traditions, which are steeped in history, are rooted in our citizens’ abiding commitment to the principles of coexistence, tolerance and harmony between the various components of the nation.”

In April 2013, the Casablanca-based Museum of Moroccan Judaism, the only institution of its kind in the Arab world, was opened to the public. The museum displays photos of synagogues from across the kingdom, Torah scrolls and Chanukah lamps, gold embroidered caftans, jewels, ancient rugs, and other objects of the Jewish-Moroccan cultural heritage. King Mohammed VI has, also, funded the preservation of Jewish burial sites in Cape Verde, once home to a vibrant Moroccan Jewish community.
Adopted by referendum in 2011, the Moroccan Constitution states that the country’s unity “is forged by the convergence of its Arab-Islamic, Berber and Saharan-Hassanic components, nourished and enriched by its African, Andalusian, Hebraic and Mediterranean influences,” and emphasizes Morocco’s attachment “to the values of openness, of moderation, of tolerance and of dialogue for mutual understanding between all the cultures and the civilizations of the world.”

In a March 2009 speech launching the Aladdin Project for intercultural dialogue, King Mohammed VI called the Holocaust “one of the most tragic chapters of modern history.” This was the first time an Arab state had taken such a clear stance on the Holocaust. In a message on the occasion of the International Day in Memory of the Victims of the Holocaust held at the United Nations on January 27, 2010, Morocco’s King Mohammed VI said that remembering the Holocaust,

“strongly imposes ethical, moral and political standards which will, tomorrow, be the true guarantors of this peace – based on equally-shared justice and dignity – and for which most Palestinians and Israelis yearn.”

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Conclusion

When looking at culture from an anthropological or even sociological standpoint, there is a very strong trend of the influence that other cultures have on each other from many sources—be it globalization, technology, conflict, migration or religion. So, in the face of all of this influence, what makes a culture unique to any certain place? It is the way in which a group of people or a nation uses the influences that may come from religion, war or invasion to make traditions and an identity-almost like a personality-that is indeed specific to the place and the people.

This is what fascinates, attracts, and even confuses about Morocco. It is a place that has managed to do all of this and is still growing in many ways. The tolerance that has resulted from such a diverse past is evident in the paradox of Moroccan society today—the most unique Muslim country known to be a safe haven to the Jewish people. Even further, Moroccan Jews are the witnesses of a possible peaceful and beautiful coexistence between Arabs and Jews as evidenced by the depth of Moroccan culture today. This depth, beauty, and tolerance of Moroccan society is a sure one because it is a learned human experience.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Amazigh World News’ editorial views.

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Importance of land among the Imazighen

Though the modern Amazigh renaissance has centered on language, territorial integrity has emerged as a critical aspect of cultural and lingual preservation. Customary land ownership and management practices, however, have always been contested by central authorities throughout history. Bruce Maddy Weitzman notes in The Berber Identity Movement,

“In Morocco, the authorities, whether French or Moroccan, are depicted as running roughshod over Amazigh communal rights and tradition.”

This paper will examine how Amazigh land ownership and management have been impacted by Roman imperialism, Arab-Islamic acculturation, French colonialism, and modern politics. Subjugation to an imported social and political power has exacerbated tensions between the central authority and the Imazighen in the past and present; however, many customary rights and beliefs are still widely acknowledged and observed by Amazigh communities today.

Land tenure or tamazirt is often referred to as al-asl— origin and ancestry— because of its spiritual and economic importance. For most Imazighen, land tenure represents “the founding pillar of law and tradition, azarf.” Land ownership in Amazigh society deals with communal, tribal, and familial rights—most of which have been entrenched for generations. Customary law defines land as a communally-owned good distributed among members of a tribal unit. According to Pedro Fiz Rocha Correa:

“Traditionally among nomads, land is not commercially transacted and is property of the tribe, while tents and animals are recognized as private property.”

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Customary procedure for assigning land involves the zouja, which divides land based on the terrain rather than by fixed area size. A zouja indicates the amount of terrain that can be cultivated by a span of draft animals, while a zorija is a living unit of roughly 30 to 40 acres. Although the Imazighen do not believe in the transaction of land, the rights to manage a given parcel of land can be used as collateral in exchange for a monetary loan.

This pledging of land is referred to as rahn, “a loan of land in exchange for allowing usufruct rights for a money loan over a determined period of time.” Amazigh customs also dictate that land should not be divided. Hsain Ilahiane observed that the land tenure code of Ait Atta, as reported in their oral tradition and written documents, prohibited the fragmentation of land and denied individuals outside of the tribal unit the rights to use land.

Families retain the rights to use land within the tribal parcel of land since usage rights are inherited. It is difficult to determine whether land was inherited through the patrilineal or matrilineal line prior to the arrival of shari’a law. Most evidence suggests that the Imazighen passed down usufructuary rights through male agnates, often the ten closest paternally-related male relatives known as the ait ashr’a, who “share with him [the subject] rights over brides and property.” In fact, scholars note that the Amazigh viewed female inheritance, loosely prescribed under Islam, as a “threat to lineage interest” and “avoided it in practice while allowing it in theory.” Male agnates also have the right to dictate how their kinsmen used their land. Under shafa’a or preemptive rights, any man of age can object to the transfer of usage rights by one of his agnatic kinsmen. This would later contrast with shari’a practices that did not extend this authority to all agnate relations.

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Roman imperialism

Prior to the arrival of Islam, customary land tenure practices were already challenged by Roman imperial acculturation. Primitive land ownership patterns in North Africa were inherited from the Roman and Byzantine Empires. Vast domains of land were exclusively owned by the emperor and ruling elite and managed by native tenant farmers who paid rent based on the harvest. While the elite in coastal provinces were primarily Punic, the elite in inland metropolises like Volubilis consisted of assimilated Imazighen who ascribed to Roman customs and laws. Romanized Amazigh tribes and individuals adopted imperial concepts of central authority and land ownership by assuming monarchial power and ownership over large territorial entities. For instance, Masinissa, the first King of Numidia and son of an Amazigh chieftain, held large private estates and left 10,000

plethras of land to each of his sons. Individual private ownership and inheritance conflicted with customary Amazigh practices whereby property was considered a public good that is collectively owned and equally shared among members of a community.

Roman land management replaced customary practices even in regions where central authority was weak. Large Amazigh tribes and confederations in the south, which have always contested one another over pastoral grazing and land rights, implemented the Roman practice of sharecropping by exploiting the black, Tamazight-speaking haratin. This servile relationship was referred to as khamas whereby the haratin would work for a meager one-fifth of the harvest.

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The Amazigh share many similarities and differences with Arab Bedouins in terms of customary land tenure law. Much like the nomadic tribes of North Africa, the Bedouin did not believe in private ownership of land as each tribe controlled its pastures and water sources communally. For Ruth Kark and Seth J. Frantzman:

“In general, they recognized a tribal dira, a communal held territory that encompassed seasonal grazing areas, rather than individual ownership.”

Similarly, the zouja unit of measure observed in Amazigh society replicates the feddan in Bedouin society, which is a measurement of a share of land that varies in size from village to village and may vary annually within the same village.

Islamic authority

In the early stages of Islam, land tenure involved a confluence of these nomadic and sedentary belief systems; however, as Islam spread west, land tenure reform would be used by the conquering power to cement central authority and sedentary civilization.

In its immediate aftermath, the 8^th century Arab conquest of North Africa scarcely impacted land tenure and property rights. Maya Shatzmiller argues that:

“Land ownership patterns of antiquity remained in place—large estates cultivated by an agricultural slave labor force and tenants.”

The conquest itself was described in kitab al-amwal as chaotic and erratic;as a result, documentation of land ownership prior to the conquest and immediately after it remained scare. Yet, unlike Roman imperialism, the Arab conquest held religious underpinnings, namely the introduction of shari’a law and Islamic jurisprudence. Arab-Islamic jurists believed that the conquest de facto entitled the state to the divine right over the land, and believers of the faith were allowed to hold private land. Maya Shatzmiller goes on to say:

“The right to land was invested in the state by God, since the Islamic State was the embodiment of the religion…. However, there was still a need to establish land ownership in cases where the rights of the central authority conflicted with the rights of previous owners.”

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who chose to either retain their religious beliefs or convert to Islam.Naturally, those who chose to retain their faith would face state seizure of their land, while the fate of converts to the faith depended on whether the conquest was interpreted as peaceful, sulhan, or forceful, ‘anwatan. 11^th century philosopher al-Dawudi argued that if North Africa was conquered and settled through sulhan, new converts would retain private ownership; on the other hand, if the conquest was viewed as ‘anwatan, the rights to land ownership would be entirely with the state.‘Abd al-Halim, an Islamic juror from the 10^th century, defined the status of Amazigh lands around Marrakesh as neither sulhan or ‘anwatan because the Amazigh inhabitants converted to Islam and retained their rights to private land. The confusion regarding conquered land would impact future claims by the state over Amazigh territory.

            The Arab conquest led to a noticeable shift away from customary law and towards Arab-Islamic concepts of legal and political thought especially with regard to land. This shift included changes in the definition of private land, mulk, and public domain, jaza, as well as the addition of the state’s land or domain, makhzen, and endowed land, habous or waqf. For Maya Shatzmiller:

“The evolution of landholding patterns in the Maghreb had little to do with the conquest, and everything to do with the new legal system and the nature of the state’s power.”

Each successive conquest of Morocco—especially under the Marinids, the Alaouite dynasty, and the French—would subsequently result in reforms to property law. 

Marinid rule accelerated acculturation to Arab-Islamic norms and institutions, constructed a unified legal system, but also led to decentralized land ownership. The Marinid state, much like other Islamic states at that time, sought to organize and monopolize land and mineral wealth. Cultivation of the domain was organized through renting or share-cropping with the makhzen assuming the role of legal partner with individual tenant farmers. The treasury thus considered itself a shareholder in all revenue recovered from any portion of the domain’s land. However, the Marinid state lacked an organized system to regulate and administer land registration titles, making it difficult for the state to claim a share in the land and its assets. In fact, under the Marinid state, in the words of Maya Shatzmiller:

“the land which was rented out to cultivators began to disappear into the private sector, as renters began to sell the land they cultivated under the assumption that they owned it.”

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The Marinid dynasty experienced limited peasant revolts and Amazigh discord because of a shift from public ownership to private, tax and land concessions to Amazigh elite, and the limited use of habous. Under the Marinids, large, publicly held estates were gradually subdivided into small private land plots, allowing for more communal and tribal ownership. The Marinids also built a patronage system under which land concessions and tax grants were awarded to Amazigh tribes to earn their allegiance. Soldiers, however, were not awarded land concessions—a practice that contrasted with longstanding Muslim approaches employed in the Middle East proper in which land concessions were used to maintain a standing army. This policy certainly reduced friction between the Amazigh tribes and the makhzen. Habous, or the seizure of land for religious purposes, rarely included agriculture land. This suggests that the Marinids were not interested in manipulating habous to seize arable lands from the Amazigh for the state, but rather for the specific purpose of promoting Islam. 

French protectorate

French control over Morocco contested Amazigh land ownership and management practices through public land seizure, private colonialism, and land grants.   Official colonization, which began in 1918, brought almost 700,000 acres, or 2.5% of Morocco’s land, into the hands of 1813 colonizers by 1931. The French seized almost half of its colonized lands from the public domain and military tribe lands; however, they gradually would expropriate more and more land from tribes (roughly 26%) and private landowners (20%), causing resentment and occasional militarization among the Amazigh tribes.

To aggravate matters further, all French colonized land lay within the fertile lands of Morocco’s breadbasket and assisted private colonization, whereby expatriates purchased or seized tribal land with the support of the Protectorate. The introduction of European expatriates into Moroccan society emerged as source of friction between the central authority and the Amazigh. Nearly a million acres were acquired by private colonization through 1934. Since Moroccan ownership was poorly documented, it was easy for the French to seize lands from tribes and redocument land under foreign ownership.

An additional colonization program called the Perpetual Alienation of Usufruct (APJ) allowed colonizers, namely imperial companies, to the perpetual rights to use tribal land with just compensation, which averaged a miserly 68 francs. The French also provided territorial grants to Amazigh tribes in exchange for military and political cooperation. On several occasions, the protectorate authorities bought out prominent Amazigh figures, including Mouha U Hamou Zaiani, one of the leading qaids, who was granted the lands of neighboring tribes in return for his agreement to acquiesce to the French.

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In the later years of colonization, the French chose to reverse their official position on the Amazigh and sought to instead preserve Amazigh customs and societal structures. Such policies that supported Amazigh autonomy were the first to be repealed by the post-colonial authority. For instance, the customary jemaas, which oversaw governance and resolved disputes, were increasingly invested in by the French Indigenous Affairs office as a way to pacify the Imazighen, and French or state law represented an alternative to shari’a law in this regard. 

Alaouite dynasty

Many of the Protectorate’s policies regarding Amazigh land rights persisted under the modern Alaouite dynasty. Tribal lands were often seized by the government habous and domaine. Habous involves the seizure of land for religious purposes, while domaine, much like imminent domain in the United States, involves land seizure for public use with due compensation.

The most notable changes under the modern central authority involved the use of qadis and qayds to Arabize the process of land dispute resolution. Prior to French colonization, the Sultan delegated his religious authority to the qadis; however, the qadis lacked clearly defined jurisdictions and were in fact appointed from among the tribesmen in bled al-siba. Following colonization, the makhzen sought to regain control over Amazigh territory by providing the qadis with more political and judicial authority.

 Katherine Hoffman explains how legal recourse changed under the modern Alaouite dynasty:

“While customary courts oversaw property, inheritance, civil, commercial, and personal statute cases among those groups following customary law, all of these areas were divided, in groups following Islamic law, between qadis on the one hand, whose sole role was legal, and pashas or qayds on the other, who exercised legal and political and administrative powers.” 

The intervention of qadis and imposition of shari’a presented a source of tension between the makhzen and the Imazighen as the latter felt the judicial structure under qayds and qadis leadership threatened the traditional structure of society.

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The confiscation of Amazigh land and the disregard for customary property law under the modern regime has had a negative impact on Amazigh social and cultural life. Territorial integrity has emerged as a central component of cultural identity. As the economic and social foundation of a civilization are removed, so too will the language and culture start to decay. Fortunately, despite the efforts of the post-colonial central authority to abolish customary law in rural regions and implement shari’a law, customary law with regard to land tenure is still widely practiced among Amazigh tribes. For instance, it [customary law] still regulates [land] inheritance within households and among households of different lineages.

The customary practices of shafa’a and rahn are still practiced in the Rif region even though they contradict shari’a law. Hsain Ilahiane wrote in 1995 of how shafa’a was invoked in land transfers between Berber and Arabs alike. For Hsain Ilahiane, Shafa’a has

“become a clever strategy used… to block the economically rising haratin from having access to land”

and

“keep land within ethnic lines since the member’s offer and status override that of the outsider.”

In many respects, though shari’a law is practiced in theory, customary law still retains legal authority over property matters. The notable anthropologist and Amazigh scholar E. Adamson Hoebel wrote,

“Today it is custom and not law or a combination of both that has teeth, teeth that can bite if need be, although they need not necessarily be bared.”

Conclusion

Despite Roman imperialism, Arab-Islamic acculturation, and French colonialism, Amazigh land tenure practices have adapted to the central authority and largely remained in place.

Follow Professor Mohamed CHTATOU on Twitter: @Ayurinu

References available upon request.

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Plural Morocco

This unusual cultural infusion which is at the origin of the Moroccan proverbial sense of tolerance, communion and togetherness is reflected in the Moroccan hospitality concept mrahba and acceptance of the other in his otherness. Over 5,000 years of its known history, the country has always been the crossroad of many cultures and religions that it has adapted in its millennial civilization with a great sense of pride. In the northeastern part of Morocco, in the village of Tatoft, there lives a music “rock” band: The Master Musicians of Jajouka, considered to be 4,000 years old and the infusion result of Greek and Roman deities, pagan in nature, Judeo-Amazigh mystic trance music and Islamic Sufi influence. Today, Jajouka, an icon of world music reflects faithfully the plural aspect of Moroccan culture. But that is not all, this multiculturalism has been inscribed in gold in the post-Arab Spring constitution of 2011 through the integration of ethnic communities:

Preamble:

« A sovereign Muslim State, attached to its national unity and to its territorial integrity, the Kingdom of Morocco intends to preserve, in its plentitude and its diversity, its one and indivisible national identity. Its unity, is forged by the convergence of its Arab-Islamist, Berber [amazighe] and Saharan-Hassanic [saharo-hassanie] components, nourished and enriched by its African, Andalusian, Hebraic and Mediterranean influences [affluents]. The preeminence accorded to the Muslim religion in the national reference is consistent with [va de pair] the attachment of the Moroccan people to the values of openness, of moderation, of tolerance and of dialog for mutual understanding between all the cultures and the civilizations of the world. »

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The Moroccan cultural pluralism is reflected faithfully more in the religious attributes of the monarch. He is and has been, since the Idrissid dynasty of the 9^th century, amir al-mu’minin « Commander of the Faithful » and not the « Commander of Muslims » exclusively, as one would probably expect :

Article 41 :

« … The King, Commander of the Faithful [Amir Al Mouminine], sees to the respect for Islam. He is the Guarantor of the free exercise of beliefs [cultes]. He presides over the Superior Council of the Ulema [Conseil superieur des Oulema], charged with the study of questions that He submits to it. The Council is the sole instance enabled [habilitée] to comment [prononcer] on the religious consultations (Fatwas) before being officially agreed to, on the questions to which it has been referred [saisi] and this, on the basis of the tolerant principles, precepts and designs of Islam. The attributions, the composition and the modalities of functioning of the Council are established by Dahir [Royal Decrée]. The King exercises by Dahirs the religious prerogatives inherent in the institution of the Emirate of the Faithful [Imarat Al Mouminine] which are conferred on Him in exclusive manner by this Article. »

Accompanying this diverse population of people were the religions of Islam, Judaism, and to some extent repercussions of Christianity from Europe. Because these cultures and religions coexisted in close proximity for such a long period of time, in the long run they came to share mutual practices that all sects claimed to own; one major area which shared commonalities among the different religions and peoples are Morocco’s saints and spirits.

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When the Megorashim Jews were kicked out of Spain after the Reconquista, they were received with open arms by the Amazigh dynasty of the Wattasid bearing in mind that Morocco was already the home of the Tovashim Jews that came in the year 70 AD, after the destruction of the Second Temple by the Romans. These early migrant Jews were welcomed by the Amazigh/Berber native inhabitants with whom they shared such social traits as tribalism and matriarchy. The Jews soon “melted” into the Moroccan culture and, as a result, of their tolerance and togetherness, they are responsible with the Amazigh/Berber people for the inception of values of tolerance, still strong today, thanks to the Judeo-Amazigh Cultural Substratum, a cultural concept unique to Morocco in the region.

On the Moroccan religious tolerance and the endeavors of the country to rehabilitate its Jewish legacy , The Economist writes:

« When Jews were expelled from Spain and Portugal in the 15th century, many fled to Morocco. The Jewish population in the kingdom rose to over 250,000 by 1948, when the state of Israel was born. In the ensuing decades, as Arab-Jewish tensions increased, many left. Fewer than 2,500 remain still more than anywhere else in the Arab world.

No Arab country has gone to the lengths of Morocco to revive its Jewish heritage. The kingdom has restored 110 synagogues, such as Slat Lkahal, which opened in Essaouira during the festival. A centre for Judeo-Islamic studies is set to open in the old kasbah later this year. The kingdom also boasts the Arab world’s only Jewish museum. “We used to have a six-pointed star on our flag and coins, like Israel,” says Zhor Rehihil, the curator (who is Muslim). “It was changed under French rule to five.” »

Shared mysticism

Two major religions that shared spiritual and cultural practices and still continue to do so today are Islam and Judaism. Although in the 20^th century many of the Moroccan Jews moved out of the country to either Israel to Europe, they still maintain rich cultural traditions that date back to ancient times in Morocco. According to Moroccan Muslim collective memory, Moroccan Jews are native to the country, pre-dating the arrival of Islam, and essentially going back to the beginning of recorded history, a status rarely enjoyed by Jews elsewhere. The ancient history of Jews of North Africa, in general, and Morocco, in particular, is underpinned by a corpus of legends drawing on very old and rich oral traditions.

One major area in which Judaism and Islam shared commonalities and still do today is in the arena of spirituality and sainthood. These common attributes are visible in numerous ways, including mystical practices, the worshipping of saints, as well as Moroccan folklore; they are all evident amongst the Arab, Amazigh/Berber, Gnawa and Jewish populations. The analogous mental structures of the Jewish and Muslim (Arab and Amazigh/Berber) populations have given rise, in the Maghreb, to a literature and a folklore in which the Jewish cultural substratum and the Arab-Amazigh/Berber heritage combine together in an original creation.

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Today, saints are still a popular part of Moroccan culture, and many saints are shared in both the Islamic and Jewish traditions; presently, Moroccans worship over 100 saints that are considered holy in Islam and Judaism and whose origins can be traced from Jewish tradition. One great example of this phenomenon that still exists today is a Rabbi of Moroccan origin that is credited with founding the Chavrei Babakuk community, which transformed into a Jewish religious sect called Moroccan Hassidism; this group is still present in Israel today. This Rabbi is considered a saint in the Moroccan Hassidic tradition, and Jews as well as many Muslims consider him as holy, for he “embodies simultaneously images of Moroccan saints and Ashkenazi Hassidic rabbis”.

One interesting aspect of this saint in particular is the culture of pilgrimage that surrounds his followers both in Morocco and Israel.

“Moroccan and other North African Jews developed a special tradition of pilgrimage  and hilluloth [memorial feasts] at saints’ graves. In Israel, Moroccan immigrants have preserved and revived this tradition”.

Moroccan saint’s shrine

Although it is not explicitly stated that this rabbi is a declared saint in the Islamic tradition, many aspects of worship that surround him in the Muslim community are common to the worship of other Muslim Moroccan saints. Additionally, the concept of the veneration of saints is common to both Jews and Muslims in Morocco, and the way the practice is carried out is explicit and unique to North Africa. In order to fully understand this concept of saints and veneration, it is important to define what a saint is in Moroccan culture, in order to not confuse this conception with other interpretations of sainthood in different religious traditions:

“Veneration of saints plays a central role in Moroccan Jewish life and is an important component of their ethnic identity… [a] saint possesses supernatural powers which enable him to influence events and people and to intercede with God on their behalf. These powers do not fade when the saint dies and can continue to benefit his adherents. Among Moroccan Jews, faith in saints is strongly entwined with the Jewish mystical tradition and with the Maraboutistic element that characterizes North African Islam. What differentiated these… from ordinary mortals was their ability to perform miracles; to cure the sick, eliminate danger, protect, and rescue. A person who had received a miracle often became the saint’s ‘slave’: that is, a special relationship developed between the saint and the “slave” who submitted completely to the saint and accepted his every pronouncement”.

An example of the good interfaith dialogue and understanding in Morocco can be witnessed in the city of Sefrou, situated thirty kilometers south of Fes. In Sefrou, Muslims and Jews lived side by side in harmony for centuries, and often practiced their religious rituals in such harmony with each other that it was difficult to tell what was Islamic and what was Jewish.

They even venerated the same man, whom many considered a saint, buried in a grotto in a neighboring mountain. The site was tactfully called Kaf al-moumen (the grotto of the faithful) because it was a religious sanctuary for both Muslims and Jews, and times for worshipping in this area were equally divided, the year around. However, many local people believe that it is the same saint and not two different saints and this examplifies beautifully the sense of togetherness and communion among the two religious communities As such, the Amazigh/Berbers, Arabs and Jews of this mythical city and capital of religious coexistence are the forfathers of the Judeo-Amazigh/Berber cultural substratum, which is origin and inspiration of the Moroccan tolerance.

The example of Sefrou is not unique; it is found in other places such as Debdou, Azrou, Fes, Rabat, Meknes, and Marrakesh, among others. Communities of Jews lived and practiced their faith in all these places in complete peace and harmony. They were, in principle, full Moroccans, and as such enjoyed the full rights and obligations like their Muslim brethren.

In what regards such aspects of tolerance and coexistence Hind Al-Subai Al-Idrisi writes in Qantara :

« Morocco is considered one of the most stable countries of the region, with more or less peaceful co-existence between the various religions and cultures that make up the Moroccan social fabric. As a testament to this, the city of Fez, classified by UNESCO as part of the global human heritage, held a significant event on 13 February 2013: the inauguration of the newly renovated Fez Prayer Synagogue.

The celebration was headed by Morocco’s prime minister and leader of the Justice and Development Party, Abdelilah Benkirane. He pointed out that: “The event underscores the identity of Morocco as a land for peace, tolerance and peaceful co-existence between followers of all divine religions and is a lesson for the 21st century, which Morocco sends to all the world.” »

Relevance of saint reverence: maraboutism

In his article regarding saint shrines throughout Morocco, Paul Freeman from the University of California names this culture of sainthood as “The Marabout Cult in Morocco.” He further explains in his essay that Marabout shrines are common sights when traveling in Morocco, and are located in cities, mountains, villages, and along rivers that lead down towards the Sahara. These shrines are identifiable due to their uniform appearance, which is that of a small and windowless white dome that often is surrounded by a wall.

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“They are… sacred spots, where a holy man has spent time or is buried… [people] go there to pray and make offerings in hope of receiving baraka, the power of grace from God.”

People travel to these sights to visit for days or weeks at a time, and often many of these visitors suffer from physical or mental disease; these calamities are thought to be caused by evil forces, so the afflicted visit these shrines in hopes of gaining the grace needed to ward off the evil spirits and therefore become healthy. Today, many of the saints that are worshipped by both Jews and Muslims are located in cities that historically had large Jewish populations, like Fez and Marrakesh. However, the tombs of many deceased saints can be seen in numerous cities throughout Morocco, including Rabat.

In addition to pilgrimage being a unique aspect of spirituality in Morocco, the veneration of saints also plays a large role in Moroccan sainthood. In his article about saint veneration among the Jews in Morocco, Issachar Ben-Ami states that he has found 25 female saints throughout the country that are mutually celebrated by both Muslims and Jews. One thing that both Judaism and Islam share in common regarding Moroccan saints is the categorization of said saints into three groups. The first are saints that are declared as saints only after they have died; the second are saints who were canonized while still living, and the third are saints who appeared to people in dreams and other forms after death and were therefore declared holy.

Other than this categorization, there is also a hierarchy of saints regarding their locations within the country. There are local saints, who are worshipped by small villages that historically hold a special connection and affinity for this person; after this there are regional saints who are worshipped by a number of villages or an entire city, and finally there are national saints that are venerated uniformly by all Jews and a large number of Moroccan Muslims, and many people from all around the country go on pilgrimages to venerate their graves. Because of this shared hierarchy and types of saints, the concept of sainthood has been crucial to both Muslims and Jews living within the region; due to this fact, both religions tend to claim ownership of the saints in their respective religious traditions.

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Importance of Gnawa Culture and trance music

Another party that plays a large role in the belief of spirits and thus has influenced Jewish and Muslim culture in Morocco is that of the Gnawa people. Although they do not have much influence in regards to sainthood in Morocco, they have heavily influenced the spiritual culture that exists among different religions and cultures in the region. These people are indigenous to Africa and were forcibly brought to Northern Africa from Timbuktu in the sixteenth century as slaves; thus many of them settled in Morocco. This ethnic group of people did not adhere to Islam, although once living and assimilating to Morocco many of them did convert. Despite this fact, the Gnawa people did not abandon many of the cultural practices and beliefs they had held for centuries, including that of spirits.

“They combined Islamic belief with pre- Islamic African traditions, whether local or sub- Saharan West African. Gnawa ‘spirit possession’ practices were not fundamentally outside of standard Moroccan Sufi practices, because firstly, the notion of a ‘spirit world’ is accepted in Islam- namely angels and jinns…and secondly, most sufi orders sought a form of spirit possession through study and meditation”.

The Gnawa people often expressed their belief in spirits through their infamous musical genre of “Gnawa music”. This music is characterized by its rhythmic and repetitive beat and is often referred to as trance music because listeners have been known to enter into a transient state while listening to it. The trance begins as a type of invasion, like an unwelcome visitor that violates and takes over the person’s body.

In her article about Gnawa trance music, Margaret A. Mills explains that this spirit possession “invokes the historical affliction of slavery”, this affliction being the slavery and emasculation of the Gnawa people.. However, after this initial affliction the person begins to understand how to master the spirit successfully in order to enter into a transient joy instead of spiritual torment.

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Gnawa music and spiritual traditions not only had an influence on Jewish mystical practices, but they, also, had a profound impact on Sufi practices within the region; in fact, many of the people that adhere to Sufism listen to Gnawa music for its trance effects. Considered the mystical side of Islam, Sufism is known for its many ritual practices that have affected the spiritual landscape of Morocco for centuries.

“Sufism is one of the most dynamic and interesting dimensions of Islamic religious and cultural expression…[it] refers to a number of schools of Islamic mystical philosophy and theology…they have exerted considerable influence over the varied expressions of popular piety and devotion to shrines found throughout the Islamic world.” 

Infusion of mysticism

A perfect example of the infusion of Sufi mystical practices, Gnawa music, Jewish tradition, and Islamic practices all into one entity can be found in the historic city of Fez. Every year Fez holds an annual Sufi music festival called “The Festival of World Sacred Music” in which numerous musical talents from around the world perform. The festival is in honor of Moulay Idriss who founded Fez in 809. There is a traditional Moroccan gravesite to commemorate the sainthood of Moulay Idriss in Fez, and this is particularly interesting because Fez was a historically Jewish city. Among the groups who perform include specialists in Gnawa music, and additionally Sufi recitations of the Koran called “dhikr” are among the music selection; this process of recitation is strikingly similar to Gnawa trance music, for the participants are known to enter into a state of ecstasy as the music and chant increases in time, tempo and rhythm.

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In addition to Fez, each year there is a similar music festival that is held in Essaouira, however the main attraction of the event is Gnawa music. Many Sufis attend this, as well, and the festival is widely known for its infamous trance music in which the audience gradually enters into a trance state while listening to the rhythmic beat of the music. Many people are unable to explain how this happens and attribute this occurrence to an unexplainable phenomenon, as stated previously, here above, by Margaret A. Mills in her article on Gnawa music.

Gnawa trance music

Morocco’s immense cultural history is evident in the Jewish, Gnawa, and Islamic population. Despite the diversity of the region however, all three groups share similar practices regarding spirituality that they have developed over the centuries as a result of coexisting together. Both Judaism and Islam share the same conception of sainthood, and even share many saints whose tombs can be seen throughout the country; both religions, also, share the concept of veneration and pilgrimage to these holy sites, as well as a belief in baraka. The best infusion of the different cultures and religions is evident in the Sufi music festival in Fez, a Jewish city, with Gnawa Music as one of its main attractions. History may never know where many of the saints and spirit beliefs originated, however they are fully aware that they have, equally, impacted all the cultures and religions of Morocco, a plural country, par excellence.

To conclude

Morocco, which has a long history of religious diversity and tolerance, is known and recognized for the harmonious coexistence of Muslims, Jews and Christians. The freedom of religion is guaranteed by the Constitution and religion embraces all cults and all races in a framework of fraternity, love, respect, tolerance, forgiveness, human rights and freedom, values that the Kingdom has been appropriating for ages and continues to promote today.

Very much like Islam, Judaism has left an undeniable and indelible imprint on the subconscious and conscious cultures and way of life of all Moroccans. Jews have left Morocco in the 20^th century but their cuisine, music, embroidery, celebrations, beliefs, monuments are part of the Moroccan spirit known as tamaghrabit, for life. The Jews have moved physically to others lands but their spiritual presence remains very strong in Morocco and part and parcel of Morocco for eternity and that is the best example of religious infusion and coexistence.

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Characteristics of Amazigh identity

Similar to the way in which Amazigh carpets tell a story, the Amazigh flag speaks to the most sacred characteristics of Amazigh identity (nature, land, and community) and reflects the ostensibly perpetual struggle to maintain them.  Through focusing on this struggle using a linguistic lens, the fluidity of Moroccan identity will be called into question; however, in order the analyze the problematic qualities of Amazighness, we must understand the nature of language with relation to culture, history, religion, and ethnic identity, followed by a more chronological discussion of the evolution of Tamazight before, during, and after the French colonial occupation of Morocco.

A language, especially one that is exclusive to a minority group concentrated predominately in a defined area, functions not only as a means of communication, but as a signifier of identity, culture practices, customs, beliefs, and heritage.  According to Herder, a group’s language is considered to be

“the ‘treasury of the thought of an entire people’ and the mirror of its history, its deeds, joys, and sorrows”. 

What complicates the notion of a single language representing the Amazigh people is the tolerance of this group, which permitted linguistic adoptions of features of Arabic and French, allowing these three languages to build upon one and other and co-exist.  Although approximately 40% of the Moroccan population speak Tamazight, it is obvious that its use is decreasing dramatically despite recent reforms.  The fear that Tamazight will ultimately be forgotten is a valid one in Morocco, as Arab and French colonizers have been exercising linguistic imperialism over the Imazighen for centuries. 

Herder equates loss of language to loss of identity, but this statement is not as direct as it might appear, for inability to speak the language of one’s ancestors or relatives does not necessarily suggest that one will stop identifying oneself as a product of that culture, as Amazigh.

But, according to certain anthropologists:

“the most prominent index to ethnicity is linguistic. People define themselves as Imazighen once they speak the Amazigh language. This is not surprising since language does in general constitute a very strong factor in group identity.”

By contrast,

“the supra-tribal, collective nature of Berber identity,”

enables

“many Imazighen [to] view themselves as Arab-Muslim-Imazighen.” 

Evidently, the issue of speaking Tamazight plays a major role in determining whether or not one is deserving of identifying oneself as definitively Amazigh; nevertheless, the tension between this absolute indicator of Amazighness, or mono-nationalistic perspective, and the all-encompassing tendency of Amazigh culture challenges the conventional definition of identity all together.  If language is not the source or motivation of identity for the Imazighen, then what is? 

Revisiting the symbolism of the Amazigh flag, it appears as though

“the primary factor in determining identity is not language, per se, but land, around which society is organized.” 

Teaching Tamazight

Then, if Amazigh identity is connected to land or territory, the systematic denial of the Imazighen as a valid people with a concrete identity with regard to the agendas of both the Arab and French colonial projects is clear.  Before a more in-depth discussion of the adverse effects of the French Protectorate on the Imazighen and their language, a brief examination of the Arab occupation of North Africa with respect to religion is crucial in understanding the antagonism between Tamazight and Arabic, then French.

Even though,

“The greatest impediments for the recognition of Amazigh as an official language in Morocco and Algeria have more to do with an identity conflict than with Islam as a religion,” 

the inherent qualities of Islam relating to the Arabic language have resulted in the degradation of Tamazight to an inferior language. 

Arab denial

The Arabization movement of early Muslim conquerors in North Africa purported the notion of

“Arabic as the most eloquent language,” 

for it is the language in which Allah passed the words of the Holy Qur’an to the Prophet Mohammed, emphasizing the fact that other languages used for Islamic purposes are illegitimate.  Additionally, we find a

“historical dimension [of the existence of the pre-Islam Imazighen which] constitutes a direct challenge to the precepts of Islam, which stipulate that the history of any Muslim begins with Islam; before Islam was the period of ignorance and savagery.”

Therefore, the istislam (or submission) of the Imazighen to Muslim colonizing forces supported the

“seemingly natural superiority conferred on the Arabic language, the language through which God’s word was transmitted and subsequently interpreted by the doctors of the holy law.” 

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French Protectorate denial

However, during the period of French colonization, the Arabic language’s immediate tie to Islam became a source of friction that certainly affected the position of the Imazighen and led to even greater contention between the three groups.

Of course, the basis of the French colonial occupation was dictated by France’s classic civilizing mission:

“the Berbers are depicted as semi-savage outsiders requiring a civilizing hand.” 

Initially, the French committed a grave misjudgment, assuming that the Imazighen would be their potential allies throughout the French occupation, for the Amazigh

only

“seemed superficially Islamized, [and] ancestrally related to Europeans,”

and that they

“would eventually assimilate to French civilization or law as opposed to Arab.”

Undoubtedly, it was

“the early Amazigh writers [who] were among the most ardent opponents of French colonialism,”

due to their close ties with their land and environment.  An infringement by the French upon these core Amazigh values would not be tolerated, as evidenced in the idea of bled al-makhzen and bled as-siba.  Bled al-makhzen connotes the Moroccan government’s land, and therefore that of the French as the Makhzen were considered to be but valets of the colonizers.  Concurrently, bled as-siba indicates Amazigh land.  The French employed techniques of management of difference and language planning to create inequality among the Amazighs and Arabs, to drive a wedge in between these two groups in order to direct attention onto a conflict that does not involve the French themselves. 

A manifestation of this strategy was the French’s desire to focus more on Tamazight in the realm of education rather than Arabic, because Arabic was directly associated with Islam. 

This rift between the Arabs and Amazigh was exacerbated by the common knowledge that the Makhzen acted as puppets of the French colonizers, but also by one of the main items of the Dahir berbère of 1930, which stated that Amazigh regions were subject to customary or tribal law (‘urf/azref) and the rest of Morocco to shari’a.  This strategic decision on part of the French manipulated the existence of the

“entity called Amazigh [and transformed it into] an ideological weapon to rule Morocco more efficiently.”

The unequal treatment of the Imazighen versus the Arabs upset Arab nationalists to a great degree, and likely contributed to the fervent Arabization movement at the expense of the Imazighen following Moroccan independence.

After the French removed their colonial forces in 1956, Arab nationalists called for mono-lingualism and were therefore suspicious of those who desired to protect heritage languages, enhancing the divide between the Imazighen and Arabs.  The Imazighen felt as if their cultural and linguistic identity was being compromised as Arabic began to usurp the political and educational spheres in which French was previously employed. 

Unfortunately, Arabic continues to gain more territory in the countries of the Maghreb at the expense of Tamazight, namely in Algeria and Morocco. The authorities in these two countries are so reluctant, if not hostile, to any claims regarding raising the status of Tamazight to that of an official language.

Urgent need for development of the Amazigh hinterland

It should be noted here that in countries like Tunisia and Libya, once homelands of the Amazigh language, Amazigh speakers have been reduced in number to a few thousand, indicating the completion of the Arabicization process.

The period following France’s withdrawal from Morocco was characterized by a pressure build up on the part of the Amazigh, whose rights grew significantly more subjugated by the overall transition from French to Arabic.  However, in 1994, the late King Hassan II declared in his August 1994 Throne Day speech that Amazigh dialects were one of the components of the authenticity of Moroccan history and should in theory be taught in public state schools.  This recognition marked the beginning of progress regarding the formalization of Tamazight in the realm of education and politics; however, this development was nonetheless impeded by certain events, and it was not by any means smooth. 

Amazigh activism

Moroccan activists tended to focus on the formal, constitutional recognition of Tamazight and its inclusion into the Moroccan school system, essentially the

“institutionalization of language and culture, instead of pleading for regional cultural and linguistic autonomy,”

which has much to do with the organization of the language itself, meaning its alphabet, Tifinagh.  This alphabet is believed to have been descended from Libyan script, and although throughout history the Imazighen have used the Latin alphabet to transcribe Tamazight. The popularity of Tifinagh can be considered an index of the desire for an autonomous identity symbol. Tifinagh is an indigenous writing system, and as such is void of the negative connotations that the other two scripts have: Latin and Arabic were once the language of the conqueror.

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The use of Tifinagh script was therefore extremely controversial in both Morocco and neighboring Algeria; the Moroccan state in fact imprisoned people throughout the 80s and 90s of the last century for using this script:

“seven teachers, most of whom were members of the Amazigh association Tilelli (Freedom) from the southeastern oasis town of Goulmima, were arrested after their participation in a May Day parade in nearby Errachidia for carrying banners written in Tifinagh.”

Due to this political dimension of the utilization of Tifinagh script, the alphabet has come to represent another feature of Amazigh identity and adds to the concept of resistance that is characteristic of this people’s constant struggle to sustain their unique culture.

Amazigh cultural revival

More recently, attempts have been made by the Moroccan government to further solidify the historical, cultural, and linguistic significance of the Imazighen.  On October 17, 2001, under the decree of King Mohammed VI, the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture (IRCAM) is dedicated to the progression and encouragement of the Amazigh language and culture as well as the development of Tamazight in an academic context, especially in public schools.  In September 2004, students of major Tamazight speaking regions of Morocco were required to study Tamazight in school; this modification is representative of the first notable policy change of IRCAM. 

Additionally, in an

“attempt to garner an equal representation of activists from the three major Berberophone regions in the Rif, the Middle Atlas and the Sous. Amazigh militants with technical training and advanced degrees have likewise been incorporated into the institute’s seven research centers charged with linguistic standardization, pedagogical development, artistic expression, anthropological analysis, historical preservation, translation and media promotion, and communication.”

However, some claim that IRCAM has only worsened the

“fragmentation of the Amazigh movement,”

and its establishment has become a controversial issue. The administrative and research centers are fabulously equipped with the latest technology, and the library has actively acquired printed and audiovisual materials. Regardless of any actual policies put in place by IRCAM, such expenditures constitute a bold public relations gambit, performing the commitment to transparent cultural human rights demanded by US and European interlocutors who hold the purse strings for development aid and could recommend admittance into the European Union.

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This so called performance signifies that there exists an agenda behind the creation of IRCAM, that if the Imazighen are superficially granted the linguistic rights of which they deserve, the Western world will consequently view Morocco as a more democratic and modern nation. 

Similar to the way in which the French manipulated the use of Tamazight to further the colonial project, some see the establishment of IRCAM as functioning in the same way: to use Tamazight as an instrument of representation rather than a sincere attempt to integrate the language and people into society.

Institut Royal de la Culture Amazighe -IRCAM- in Rabat, Morocco

Despite IRCAM’s inception in 2001, the issue of Tamazight and recognition of Amazigh identity remained a point of contention throughout the February 20 revolution that shook Morocco in 2011.  Although the February 20 movement is to some considered part of the Arab Spring, Morocco was most certainly not hit as hard as some of its fellow nations in the Arab world with regard to this event.  The demand of Moroccans during the protests most related to the Amazigh cause is language recognition. 

Concessions granted through the constitutional referendum of 2011 following the revolt included a series of reforms, one of which allowed Tamazight the status of an official language of Morocco.  Additionally, Morocco is the only country to have given Tifinagh official status as well.  The primary manifestation of these linguistic reforms is the appearance of Tamazight on government signage; therefore, some might consider the efforts of the Imazighen during the February 20 movement as a failure. 

Some even have a cynical perspective with regard to these changes, and view them as an

“objectification of their culture as an endangered natural resource: an ambivalence between forms of self-primitivism and claims to modernity.”

Many Amazigh activists view this constitutional change as a token reform, an attempt to quiet the Amazigh voice.  In 2005, the Parti Democratique Amazigh Marocain (PDAM) was established only to be formally disbanded in 2008, due to it being a race-based party.  To this day, the Imazighen still have no legal representation in Moroccan politics.  Part of the tension stemming from the implementation of these reforms and the general dissatisfaction of the Imazighen activist public is the domain in which Tamazight is used.

The employment of Tamazight is comparable to that of Moroccan Darija, which is exclusive to everyday interaction rather than formal contexts.  Therefore, because Tamazight is not a language of the same status, as in level of standardization, like French or Arabic, the demand for officialization of the language is a difficult one.  But whether or not these reforms prove to be ostensible or genuine, their presence is still symptomatic of attempts at fairness and justice for these people, even if there is a hidden agenda.

Conclusion

After the historical analysis of the evolution of Tamazight and as a result, the Imazighen in general, it is clear to see that the issue of identity a dynamic one, dependent upon factors of language, interactions with other cultures, and contemporary politics.  The systematic othering of the Amazigh language, culture, and people represents the effect of building a multilingual society; all languages are not created equal, therefore social marginalization of a group is inevitable.

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In this regard Reed Wester-Ebinghaus in Ancient History Encyclopedia argues:

“The Berbers have occupied North Africa, specifically the Maghreb, since the beginning of recorded history and until the Islamic conquests of the 8th century CE constituted the dominant ethnic group in the Saharan region.”

The Amazigh cultural revival was a highly decentralized social movement that evolved into its full force during the 1970s. Its complete roots stretch far back before North African independence from colonialism, all the way back to the invasion of Roman and Arab-speaking warriors in Berber regions, over the span of 2000 years; but for the purposes of the contemporary movement, the past 150 years suffice as its impetus.  Spurred by decades, if not centuries, of invasion and oppression, a Pan-Amazigh movement began to form around the desire to revive a largely undocumented yet present culture across North and Saharan Africa.

Amazigh identity

Amazigh identity is formed largely by its language awal, Tamazight. Language is the marker of all cultures, but particularly so with Amazigh civilization. Tamazight Is being recognized by both Morocco and Algeria as an official language in their respective constitutions. This recognition came about after a long period of denial from the governments and society about Tamazight and its connection to Amazigh identity. It ran into several issues. Besides the multiple dialects of Morocco and Algeria, Tamazight was unwritten in the recent past except among the Tuareg in the Sahara. 

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The first task of the officially recognized Amazigh cultural team in the government was the selection of an official alphabet for Tamazight in Morocco i.e. Tifinagh. Unfortunately, the language has interacted with Arabic for so many years that the two have intermixed. In 2005, a movement was started to teach Tamazight in Amazigh areas. This called for the creation of textbooks and a curriculum to be taught by teachers in Tamazight. Although the governmental ministries dragged their feet in this endeavor, Tamazight TV 8 was created as an Amazigh cultural channel. Clearly, language is a definitive element of Amazigh cultural identity in Morocco and the same applies in Algeria.

The next major defining aspect of Amazigh culture is land akkal. Land has been historically and culturally significant to the Amazigh people. Land conservation is taken very seriously and land ownership balances the fine line of being communal with private property. Additionally, disputes can arise over land ownership. However, a census taken in Morocco in 2014 was controversial to the Amazigh because of the composition of the population as well as Amazigh land location and territory. 

The land on which the Amazigh live extends all the way from Egypt to the Canary Islands. This land is called Tamazgha, and the Amazigh believe that it belongs to them. Thus, there are some issues surrounding Amazigh land today since it is such a large component of Amazigh identity and culture.

Another theme central to Amazigh identity is the idea of blood ddam. Family to the Amazigh represents cohesiveness of their culture. Solidarity with other Amazigh people denotes the recognition Amazigh feel in addition to a sense of belonging. Additionally, blood represents sacrifice in Amazigh culture. This sacrifice can represent the earning back of honor, repayment of other sorts, or recognition of significant events. The Amazigh believe that an issue is resolved only once sacrificial blood is spilled. As such, blood is a very important aspect of Amazigh identity and was used in the Amazigh cultural revival movement.

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Altogether, the Amazigh cultural revival movement called for a definition and recognition of the Amazigh culture. This movement drew upon the components of language, land, and blood to unite the Amazigh people. In terms of language, Tamazight was decided upon as the official language of the Amazigh people. Another identifying aspect of Amazigh culture is land. The Amazigh see land as central to their society and thus sought governmental protection for their lands. Finally, the cultural concept of blood brought them together for the cultural revival movement. United by blood, the Amazigh people sought governmental recognition of their lands and the official use of Tamazight in the Amazigh cultural revival movement.

On the issue of Amazigh struggle for recognition in Algeria, Amir Akef writes about this country’s recent official change of heart towards Amazigh culture in The Guardian, in a piece entitled: “Algeria proposes constitutional reform.” He first details the official recognition of the culture since 2002:

“Amazigh was granted “national language” status in 2002 and its recognition rewards the efforts of a long campaign hinging on the definition of Algeria’s national identity. In 1949 the issue triggered a serious crisis in the Algerian independence movement. The controversy was papered over when the war of independence started shortly afterwards, but resurfaced when independence was proclaimed in 1962. Hocine Aït Ahmed, one of the original leaders of the independence movement, advocated a democratic state guaranteeing political pluralism. But his ideas were soon thwarted by the authoritarian Pan-Arab credo that prevailed under presidents Ahmed Ben Bella (1963-65) and Houari Boumédiène (1965-1976).

The campaign in favour of the Amazigh language dovetailed naturally with the broader struggle for civil liberties, gaining fresh impetus in the 1980s with the Berber cultural movement. In the early 1990s the authorities grudgingly started to acknowledge its importance. “It took almost half a century, starting from the crisis in 1949, for the Algerian constitution [of 1996] to begin to draw up a more balanced, realistic map of the nation’s identity, though there is still a great deal of ambiguity,” the nationalist militant, then leader of the Algerian Communist party, Sadek Hadjeres, wrote in 1998.”

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And later on moves on to discuss the constitutional reform:

“The plans for constitutional reform include setting up an Algerian Academy of Berber Language, tasked with consolidating its new status as an official tongue. Supporters say it would put an end to a pointless source of division, giving rise to various political ills the country could well do without.”

Amazigh struggle for full recognition in Tamazgha

For decades, the Amazigh community has been trying to penetrate into relevant life and culture within North Africa. Their focus on language, land, and blood have had ties to the land and people for thousands of years. The unwritten culture they have built and passed down through generations has shaped every aspect of life. However, since the Arabs have controlled the region, they have historically been ostracized and ignored, being pushed aside while the dominant Arab culture and values have received all the credit and in the process marginalizing Amazigh freedom, standards, and lifestyle. Over the years the Amazigh cultural revolution has been met with obstacles, oppression, and ignorance while trying to gain recognition for their influence on culture and existence as an ethnic group. 

In the 1970s more and more Amazigh voices were being projected, arguing for less oppression, more rights, and acknowledgment of the Amazigh culture and ethnicity. These underground activists continued to gain support in the following years, finally breaking through in 1980 with the Amazigh Spring in Algeria: tafsut Imazighen. The Amazigh Spring created widespread awareness within the region. While it may have only been a “Spring” in Algeria, its influence did not go unnoticed in Morocco. The Spring sparked even stronger hope and strength within the Amazigh fight. Supporters of the Amazigh cause were fighting harder than ever for their voices to be heard, their history to be recognized, and their culture to be acknowledged. The flame continued to light the way for more activism in the years to come.

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In 1994, the Amazigh movement finally had some acknowledgment by those in power. During a protest on May Day, Amazigh supporters marched with a banner written in the Amazigh language. The activists were arrested and taken in by police. Such an act created outrage within all of Morocco. The media followed the trials and the situation closely, leading the movement to gain national support for Amazigh rights. The nation was finally starting to recognize the Amazigh community’s battle within the country. 

The beginning of the revival was in Algeria: tafsut Imazighen

Algeria in response to the aggressive Arabization efforts of the FLN regime which aimed to suppress the Amazigh identity by banning activities by Amazigh militants and the use of Tamazight and its variants, people voiced their discontent publicly.

In this context, many Imazighen in Algeria began to push boundaries in their respective fields in the late 1970’s. A primary example of this rests in the album “A Vava Inou Va “ that the late musician Hamid Cheriat, also known by his stage name Idir, produced in 1976, in the period leading up to the Kabylie Tafsut Imazighen. “A Vava Inou Va “ was the first internationally released album by an Amazigh musician in Tamazight, and this artistic creation led to the blossoming of Amazigh music throughout North Africa. The revival of Amazigh literature also coincides with the same period, and the demand that it created for a written medium for Tamazight aided the adoption of the Tuareg’s Tifinagh script and added legitimacy to the movement to recognize Tamazight as a national language in 2001 in Algeria and as an official language in Morocco in 2011.

On March 10, 1980, a conference at Mouloud Mammeri Hasnaoua University in Tizi-Ouzou featuring a Kabyle activist by the name of Mouloud Mammeri was suppressed and the pushback from Amazigh activists led to the mass arrests of its main players on April 20, 1980. Though the Algerian FLN government violently suppressed the strikes following from these events, and the movement did not succeed immediately, it became the critical rallying point for the formation of civil society organizations such as the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) and the Berber Cultural Movement (MCB), which both advocated for greater recognition and acceptance of a distinct Amazigh cultural and linguistic identity and the protection of Amazigh human and legal rights. Later, Tamazight was recognized as one of Algeria’s national languages and these developments also had the collateral effect of adding strength to the general push for the protection of human rights in Algeria. A second political push came during January 2011 as the Arab Spring pushed through the Middle East and North Africa, and this momentum strengthened the social, political and cultural institutions created by the first Tafsut Imazighen.

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Tamazight revival in Morocco

In response to the outpour of Amazigh support across the nation and the cries for more Amazigh rights, King Hassan II publicly spoke about the need to teach Tamazight in schools in a speech on August 20, 1994. He stated that the Tamazight language was important to Morocco’s past and culture. Within this speech, King Hassan II was the first Alouite king to finally acknowledge the Imazighen’s importance to Morocco and its development. 

In this regard, Karima Ziamari et Jan Jaap De Ruiter write :

« Le discours du Trône du 20 août 1994, à l’occasion de la fête de la Révolution du Roi et du Peuple, est considéré comme un tournant. Dans ce discours, le roi Hassan II annonçait, dans un certain sens, l’ouverture du pays aux trois variétés de berbère. Il se montrait favorable à l’enseignement de ces langues, et, immédiatement après ce discours, les stations TV et radio commençaient des bulletins d’information en tarifit, tamazight et tachelhit. »

However, the battle for rights and recognition still continued into the new century. In 2001 King Mohammed VI declared in his Royal Decree that it was finally time to support the Amazigh cause and therefore created the Institut Royal de la Culture Amazighe -IRCAM-. IRCAM was formed to increase awareness and support for the Amazigh around the country. It standardized the Amazigh language, agreeing to slowly integrate it into schools and the media. Not only did it officially aid the Berber cause, but it also raised even more national support, acknowledgement, and acceptance of the Amazigh identity as being a key player in shaping Moroccan culture. Even with its improvements there was still doubt unto how helpful IRCAM actually was. Some even argued that the organization only limited the Amazigh identity into a small box, not allowing for different forms and less common aspects to flourish. That being said, the main Amazigh movements agreed with the creation of IRCAM and its push for more recognition of Berber identity within Morocco.

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 While IRCAM agreed to promote the Amazigh culture through schools, the official start of Tamazight being taught in schools did not happen until 2005. The government’s promise was long overdue, being dragged out despite the King’s decree. Even with this, the language was only taught in Berber speaking areas. Nonetheless, the integration of Tamazight into public schools was a huge step for the Amazigh cultural revolution. With Tamazight came textbooks, curriculum, and teachers that all embodied the acceptance and promotion of Amazigh culture. 

As Amazigh cultural activism increased, their presence in the political sphere increased as well. Throughout the 2000’s multiple parties have attempted to form on the basis of their common Amazigh identity. Unfortunately, the government has shut those parties down due to illegality of formation of parties based on ethnicity — with Amazigh considered an ethnicity. Even so, there were ways around the ethnic clause. The Movement Populaire (MP) was formed in 1959 to represent the Amazigh, rural and poor Moroccans in parliament and act as a check to the Arabist Istiqlal Party which was hoping to take over power and become a unique party in Morocco, along the communist paradigm. With this in mind, the MP worked closely with Amazigh activists and has mobilized support for the Amazigh movement across the country, advocating for their cultural practices, rights, and recognition. The party have even gained a significant amount of seats in parliament, becoming a strong influence and legitimate party that has direct advocacy for the Amazigh cultural cause. 

Following the greater influence of the Amazigh in politics, an unlikely coalition formed between them and trade unions and the Islamists, in 2011, calling for greater rights, freedoms, and respect. The support for this coalition came to a peak on February 20, 2011 when the Amazigh were able to mobilize thousands of supporters to protest and rally for their cause. King Mohammed VI quickly responded to these outbreaks —afraid of what was happening across the region with the Arab Spring — and announced that a new constitution would be created. In this the Amazigh gained many rights, with more protections, cultural rights, and more regional governance. One of the biggest feats was that in the new ratified constitution, the Tamazigh language finally became an official language of Morocco. The support from other groups and by thousands of people in 2011 continued to aid the Amazigh in gaining the strength to no longer be pushed aside or ignored. Even to this day they are gaining more influence, credibility, and cultural rights.

From the early 1970s until present day, the Amazigh have vigorously fought for the freedom and recognition of their culture. The cultural revolution has proven that it will not back down until the Amazigh culture is fully recognized and cherished as one of the most important parts of Moroccan history.

Cultural revival is a grassroot movement

In Morocco, one could point to the recurring maltreatment by both the French and the Arab political powers as instigators (the unbalance created by the French Berber Dahir in 1930 and the opposition of the Arab-nationalist Istiqlal party providing merely two examples). Even though they were still legally prevented from identifying as Berber, a magazine defending Amazigh rights began circulating in the 1980s (named Tamazight). By 1991, thirty cultural associations were working in Morocco, each aiming to attain recognition of cultural rights for Amazigh people, their language, and culture.

The cultural revival can be described as a grassroots movement, as it developed on an individual and community level, gradually gaining more political influence and voice. As the cause gained national and international attention, North African governments have found it more difficult to ignore the calls. 

But in Morocco, the shift from grassroots activism to government backing may be stalling advancements. Many Amazigh activists feel that the adoption of the Tifinagh script over the Latin script is a subtle way of further separating Berber-ness from Arab-ness in contemporary Moroccan society (many of whom are taught to read and write French before Arabic). Meanwhile, the activists who support government involvement (referred to as makhzenisé by their former colleagues-in-arms), feel these might be small prices to pay for ultimate acceptance.

As far as political implications, the current situation is bittersweet. If states of North Africa want to achieve peace with their Berber populations, they need to not only accept the Berber culture as their own culture, but part of the greater countries’ culture as well. This overlapping identity is still a new idea that is just starting to take seed, and if the gap can be filled between government rhetoric and individual activism, acceptance and fair treatment can be achieved.

What good is it to have 
Freemen who sleep in this world of suffering 
Wake up, my people 
Straighten up, my people 
Confront the difficulties of your current situation 
A long road awaits you 
What good is it to have 
Freemen who sleep in this world of suffering…
My friends, my friends 
Never forget what 
We learned from our parents 
My friends, my friends 
Let us not forget this heritage 
That our parents have left us 
Let us keep it fondly 
This heritage is our identity. . .
Omara “Bombino” Moctar (Album: Nomad, 2013)

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Today, the official IRCAM is in full decline, over the years the Moroccan establishment has used it extensively to subdue the Amazigh and keep at bay the vociferous voices who call for full recognition of Tamazight cultural rights. It is mostly staffed by people from the Association Marocaine de Recherches et d’Echanges Culturels –AMREC-, who have from the very beginning been used as the Amazigh arm of the Moroccan establishment to further its own vision of Amazigh culture: obsequious and subservient. 

Since the recognition of the Amazigh language in the constitution of 2011 first in the Preamble:

A sovereign Muslim State, attached to its national unity and to its territorial integrity, the Kingdom of Morocco intends to preserve, in its plentitude and its diversity, its one and indivisible national identity. Its unity, is forged by the convergence of its Arab-Islamist, Berber [amazighe] and Saharan-Hassanic [saharo-hassanie] components, nourished and enriched by its African, Andalusian, Hebraic and Mediterranean influences [affluents]. The preeminence accorded to the Muslim religion in the national reference is consistent with [va de pair] the attachment of the Moroccan people to the values of openness, of moderation, of tolerance and of dialog for mutual understanding between all the cultures and the civilizations of the world. 

And also in Article 7:

Arabic is [demeure] the official language of the State. The State works for the protection and for the development of the Arabic language, as well as the promotion of its use. Likewise, Tamazight [Berber/amazighe] constitutes an official language of the State, being common patrimony of all Moroccans without exception. 

An organic law defines the process of implementation of the official character of this language, as well as the modalities of its integration into teaching and into the priority domains of public life, so that it may be permitted in time to fulfill its function as an official language.

Ircam was, ultimately, downsized and runs, at the time being, illegally without a governing board (Conseil d’Administration) and it seems that the Makhzen is violating flagrantly its own legislature for such institutions.

In an article entitled: « L’Institut royal de la culture amazighe (IRCAM) va-t-il disparaître? » Reda Zaireg of the Huffpost Maroc Argues :

Dans le projet de loi organique relative à l’amazighe, seules trois institutions sont évoquées dans le projet de loi : le Conseil supérieur de l’éducation, de la formation et de la recherche scientifique, le ministère de l’Education nationale ainsi que le Conseil national des langues et de la culture marocaine.

C’est dans l’escarcelle de ce dernier Conseil que l’IRCAM pourrait tomber. En effet, le projet de loi organique relative au Conseil national des langues et des cultures devrait doter ce dernier d’une super-compétence en la matière, et sera “chargé notamment de la protection et du développement des langues arabe et amazighe et des diverses expressions culturelles marocaines”, selon l’article 5 de la Constitution, qui dispose, aussi, que le Conseil “regroupe l’ensemble des institutions concernées par ces domaines”.

La possibilité que le Conseil national des langues et de la culture regroupe la totalité des institutions concernées par les langues et la culture semble déplaire au directeur de l’IRCAM Ahmed Boukous:

“Nous considérons que le Conseil national des langues et de la culture doit garder l’IRCAM en l’état avec ses missions, son statut, son règlement intérieur, ses moyens financiers, ses ressources humaines, si on veut que cette institution continue de faire le travail qu’elle fait, de manière tout à fait respectable depuis sa création”.

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Final word

To conclude, the importance of the recognition of Tamazight as a national language in Maghrebi states previously suppressing it is monumental, given that language is one of the primary tools that the governments and European colonial powers used in Arabization and development to stamp out Amazigh identity. In fact, all political movements to advocate the Amazigh nation can be traced back to language, be it through song, academic discussion, or literature. This ties directly with a primary tenant in the triage of Amazigh identity, language, and also with the importance of all aspects of oral literature in the transmission of Amazigh culture. Thus, the political movement of the Tafsut Imazighen has both propelled forward and gave birth to important cultural vestiges of the assertion of Amazigh identity, leading to the positive developments of the Royal Institute for Amazigh culture (IRCAM) in Morocco, the creation of Amazigh radio, news, and fine arts outlets in theater, literature, and dance and the full recognition of language and civilization in Algeria, as well. Incorporating Tamazight and other aspects of Amazigh identity has occurred since the first recorded colonization attempts by the Phoenicians, and it has survived in this way to the present day, and so it is important to celebrate the appreciation for Amazigh arts in popular culture today in tandem with positive political developments, because their interaction is dynamic.

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Salient Aspects of Amazigh culture

The most popular and easily identifiable aspect of the culture is the language known as Tamazight. Tamazight is widely spoken across Morocco, however for decades was not recognized as an official language or used by the government or media for coverage of events or important documents. When in 1980 the “Berber Spring” in Algeria sparked more support for the Berber cause in the MENA region, the fight for Tamazight recognition was finally more widely acknowledged by society. However, at this time, the Moroccan government still did not make any changes or pay much attention to the fight for Tamazight legitimacy. In 1994, after a widely publicized arrest of Amazigh protesters, King Hassan II publically declared that Amazigh dialects were an important part of Moroccan history and culture. He even admitted that that should in theory be taught in state schools. This was the first time a King directly confirmed and acknowledged the importance of the Amazigh culture and language. 

A few years after King Hassan II’s speech, a Royal Decree was written to create the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture (IRCAM). The IRCAM was meant to ease the protests and Amazigh activists. Its main duty was to promote Amazigh language and culture within Morocco. It was to standardize Tamazight with the hopes of slowly introducing it into public schools and the media. However, the integration of Tamazight didn’t occur until a few years later in 2005 and only in Berber speaking areas. Even with the government dragging their feet, the Amazigh community still had many feats that were not seen as possible decades before. 

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In 2011 there were demonstrations across the country demanding for more changes in Morocco. King Mohammed VI quickly responded to the protestors and publicly promised that there would be sweeping changes. At this time, a new constitution was written to give more freedoms and social protection to citizens. In the contestation Tamazight was finally legitimized as a national and official language of Morocco. This was a huge step for Amazigh activists. The new constitution has set a new path for the Amazigh activists to follow and improve their standing and recognition in Morocco as a legitimate source of history, knowledge, and culture. 

Anti-Amazigh sentiment 

Today, the Amazigh community still faces many problems that are rooted in the anti-Amazigh sentiment across Morocco. For one, with the Tamazight language, while it is now recognized as an official language, there are still many problems with how it is being used and received. The government uses French (not even an official language) and Arabic for all their documents. Many times documents are not published in Tamazight and therefore leave the language still at a standstill and behind Arabic in its legitimacy to to the country. 

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There is also the problem of the lack of implementation by IRCAM in integrating Tamazight into state schools across the country. While some areas may teach Tamazight, others do not. It is not uniform in the enforcement of promoting the language. IRCAM has been notoriously known for being a governmental department without actually doing substantial work. People have accused the government of using IRCAM as an excuse to show the population that they “care” about the Amazigh culture and language. 

Overall, there is still widespread denial from the Arab society and the government that Tamazight is an important and “true” language. Because Tamazight was historically oral, its unwritten past is seen as illegitimate. In addition, the belief in the Arab world that Arabic is the language of paradise, automatically places Tamazight behind it in importance. 

There is also the modern issue of representation of the Amazigh community within the Moroccan government. Since the new century and the new constitutional reforms, the Amazigh community has grown more and more politically active. In 2005 they even created an official Amazigh party, The Moroccan Amazigh Democratic Party (PDAM) intended to campaign for political secularism, Amazigh Rights, and cultural recognition. However, soon after the party was formed, the Moroccan government banned the party from participating within the government due to the Moroccan law that strictly forbids the formation of parties on ethnic or religious principles. Because of that, the party was dissolved in 2007. Even after 2007, Amazigh activists still found ways to campaign for their rights and recognition. 

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Today, there are now Amazigh based parties formed on the lines of rural areas and marginalized populations. These parties heavily support the Amazigh fight. The largest of these parties is the Mouvement Populaire (MP). In 2007, the MP claimed over 9 percent of votes, putting them in the top three largest parties within the Moroccan Parliament. This is a start to more and more support by the government of the Amazigh cause, hopefully improving Amazigh involvement, influence, and legitimacy in Morocco. 

While there have been many efforts by the Moroccan government to subdue any Amazigh influence and parties within the government, they have still been able to make their voices heard. While it is a long process, the Amazigh fight is slowly gaining more support within society, but more importantly within the government itself. The activists will still have to keep pushing for governmental control, more autonomy, and more recognition of Tamazight, but they are on their way. Politically, the Amazigh now have their foot in the door, hopefully over time, opening it more to become a main influence on Moroccan policy and therefore improve Amazigh conditions. 

Amazigh media

Lastly, one of the biggest problems the Amazigh are facing today is the lack of true recognition by the media and civilians of the importance of the Amazigh culture and language to modern Moroccan society. While society has more openly accepted Amazigh as a historically important culture, there is still some resistance and hesitance by society to allow it to blossom as much as it can. After the new constitution in 2011, there have been many reforms and creation of TV channels and newspapers that are in Tamazight.

Tamazight 8 is the most popular Amazigh TV channel, playing TV shows, movies, and newscasts in the Amazigh language. However, there are still problems. This is the only channel on TV that officially broadcasts in Tamazight. All other channels are either in French or Arabic. The access of this channel is also limited by the fact that shows and broadcasts are not always in Tamazight at all times of the day. There is still some sprinkling of Arabic involved in the channel. Such intermingling and lack of full access to Tamazight prove that the community at large has still not fully accepted Amazigh culture and the Tamazight language into Moroccan society. Even with other media outlets, there is still limited supply and access of Tamazight and Amazigh newspapers, films, music, and publications. While these media outlets are beginning to become more popular, there is a lack of means to support their growth and promotion.

As time continues the Amazigh community hopes for more governmental support in promoting these media outlets in advocating for the Amazigh cause and educating the public on the Amazigh community. 

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Final word

Overall, the Amazigh community’s fight for recognition and equality is still not complete in the 21st century. They have faced many obstacles through the lack of governmental and societal support. However, their fight for recognition in all aspects of society, advancement and teaching of their language, and improved representation in government has not burned out their drive to be acknowledged as a respectful and legitimate part of Moroccan society. 

Follow Professor Mohamed CHTATOU on Twitter: @Ayurinu

Although Amazigh leadership can only be generalized, in most cases leaders regardless of position arose through a combination of group consensus and religious legitimacy and enforced their responsibilities through persuasion rather than force. The basis of Amazigh leadership is the different levels of the tribe, acting as the figurehead and protector for those lower in the hierarchy. In the leadership gaps where merely tribal allegiances cannot provide, namely in regions where tribes are living in shared environments, geographic leadership plays an important function. Acting within and between these two forms of leadership are religious leaders, who provide an alternate and potentially sacrosanct channel for decisions. With the coming of first the French and then an independent Morocco, external leadership structures have been forced into Amazigh regions, creating parallel but contesting centers of legitimacy.

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Tribal Leadership

The tribe could be said to be the glue that holds Amazigh society together, connecting members of the tribe permanently with certain shared interests, and at the forefront of every section of a tribe is the tribal leader, or amghar. Just as a tribe has a different purpose than a confederation, stemming from its size, composition, and organization, the leader of each level of tribal hierarchy is established and exercises his position depending on the level of the structure that he is in charge of. However, the responsibilities of a tribal leader can be generalized before continuing to the specific levels. Internally, the leader should act as a focal point for agreement and as a mediator. The leader is traditionally only a first among equals so his decision only carries weight because of his image—he would not have been chosen for the position if his constituent tribe members did not trust him—and because he is acting in the best interests of the tribe. Thus he needs to build consensus and hold dissenting units together. Stemming from his position, he also is an important intermediary between disputing parties, trying to leverage his importance to keep feuds from starting or growing and disrupting tribal life. Externally, his role is predominantly that as a figurehead of his group. This can exhibit itself in multiple circumstances: in daily life, when he might interact with passing tribes; in politics, when a sub-tribe leader will represent it in front of the tribe and a tribal leader in front of the confederacy; and in war, where the tribal leader is responsible for initiating, negotiating, and ending war.

Toward the lowest level of the tribal hierarchy is the tigemmi, or tent encampment, which might be composed of one or two dozen families (Venema and Mguild, 107). The leader of the tigemmi would most likely be the patriarch of the family and would probably acquire the position due to lineage and reputation. But due to its insignificant size, the encampment leader lacks most power except for guiding the lives of encampment members and acting as the tigemmi representative to the clan.

Sub-tribes, or taqbilt, are made up of extended families and in turn provide the actual human element upon which the larger, outward-facing tribe is based. The chief of the taqbilt, the amghar n-tmazirt, is elected in a rotation by all of the member families (Dunn, 69-70). Ideally, leadership would pass equally between each clan so if there were four clans to a taqbilt, then each would provide a leader once every four years to ensure that each is fairly represented and that no group gains unfair control. Elections consisted of the clan representatives, generally the patriarchs or wiser members of the family, going and electing a well-regarded representative from the clan whose turn it was to provide a leader, with the clan itself sitting out of voting to prevent feuds or pressure to vote a particular way. Once elected, the choice is ratified by the tribal leadership to convey authority and legitimacy.

The amghar n-tmazirt is largely responsible for appointing clan leaders and assisting in solving the daily affairs of those under him. He would also presumably help select which members of the taqbilt went on to represent it in tribal gathering. Yet because of his position of authority, between the more authoritative position of leader of the family and the more consequential leader of the tribe—for the taqbilt in itself did not have a noteworthy ability to play a role outside of its own affairs—the amghar n-tmazirt was only as powerful as his clans allowed him to be. At any

one time, his family would only compose a fraction of the total taqbilt and thus he could not force his opinion without widespread consensus. Because of the small size of his leadership base, he also could not exercise his power outside of the taqbilt.

The tribal level sees an important change in the leader’s responsibilities.

The amghar n-ufilla, or supreme chief, is elected relatively the same way as the taqbilt’s chief, with the position rotating between the sub-tribes to ensure an equal distribution of power (Dunn, 68-9). Similarly, just as the amghar n-tmazirt is only as powerful as his clans allowed him to be, so is the amghar n-ufilla. Coming from only one of several groups, the chief never has the sufficient power to cement his reign past the next election and is only retained for as long or short as desired. But a key difference is that the amghar n-ufilla was given broader powers than

leaders lower in the tribal hierarchy, even if he was in a position no more powerful than others. His duties include acting as mediator between different portions of the tribe and between disputing parties, being the figurehead of the tribe for relations with other tribes, coordinating the tribe’s migratory patterns, and organizing the tribe during times of war. However, one point in reference to the latter is that while the amghar n-ufilla would be in charge of preparing the tribe for war that did not necessarily mean he would assume the position of leader during that war. Such a position would probably be specially elected during a meeting in preparation for the fighting and would choose someone, the amghar n-ufilla or not, best seen for his warrior prowess. Such a leader would then immediately lose his power after his objectives have been fulfilled, in part because the warring tribal factions will fall apart, returning to their ordinary lives and looking to a return to a more egalitarian leadership structure.

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The basis for this greater range of powers is that the leader is no longer responsible solely for his “flock,” instead having to act as a point of coordination between the many units of the tribe with the units of other tribes to reduce the friction that will inevitably develop by living in close proximity with opposing interests. Additionally, what flock he does have would now be much larger as compared to the other leaders, thus creating more cases that he would have to mediate to prevent the tribe from shattering into feuding factions.

The highest level of the tribal structure, the confederation, is also perhaps the weakest position of leadership. The confederation is predominantly several tribes united under one banner in the name of defense against other Amazigh groups and invaders (Hagopian 1963, 71). Action on the part of the leader is utilized in times of war or resistance while the tribal leaders retain their autonomy in times of both war and peace. Any action on the part of the confederation would involve taking the opinions of each of the tribal representative’s views into account so what decisions did occur would have been bulky. Instead, it is likely that tribes continued to function as independent military units during the fighting, instead using the confederation’s leadership as a conduit for coordinating actions to their best effects. Consequently, the confederacy’s leadership, when or if there is any, functions on a very weak basis as a nature of its basic function as a vehicle for defense of common interests and little else.

Geographic Leadership

However, tribes do not live in complete isolation from one another; it would be unrealistic and unsustainable for each clan to live in a different hamlet and each tribe in a different valley. Multiple lineages might share the same valley or live in the same village because of business interests and patterns of migration and immigration, among other things. As a result, if leadership in Amazigh society was based solely on lineage, intertribal relations would be strangled by the need to coordinate everything through the amghar and life would not function smoothly. While hostilities will break out regardless of efforts, due in part to the vengeance nature of Amazigh tradition, geographic forms of leadership came to play an important intermediary role for situations where tribal leadership was not suitable.

At the basis of Amazigh geographic leadership is the jema’a, or council, of a village. The basis for the jema’a extends back to Roman times, when particular villages were permitted to elect councils of elders, seniors, who amongst themselves would pick a chief and handle the affairs of the village (Brett and Fentress, 63). The members of a jema’a are elected by men who are of free descent and capable of wielding a weapon (Venema and Mguild, 107-8). Once elected, members are primarily concerned with handling local disputes such as arguments over family, land, or business. Its duty, in essence, is to ensure the relative complacency of the village and to make sure that conflicts do not spread out of the village and into situations that cannot be controlled. Because the village as a social unit has no war-making purpose, village leaders are not responsible for organizing it for such, although they could presumably take charge during times the village is under attack. With this in mind, though, the jema’a largely functions as a mediator between the diverse residents of the village and are expected to maintain unity, not take control of events.

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Fulfilling the geographic equivalent of the tribal confederation is the leff. By definition, each region can only be composed of two leffs, or agglomerations of villages, of approximately equal capability. The purpose of the leff is to act as an alliance between the disparate units in times of conflict (Hagopian 1964, 48). If a dispute arose, the leaders of the leff would dispatch representatives in an attempt to find common ground. In better scenarios, a solution would be found and bloodshed over the matter could be avoided. If not, then the two sides come to war but should theoretically be better balanced to limit the total harm done by the matter.

A clear difference between tribal and geographic leadership is the entity responsible for providing it. In the tribe, the focus is on the individual. Councils come together to elect and guide the leader, but it is still the amghar, patriarch, or war leader who is imbued with the responsibilities for command. But in the case of geographic leadership, the entity involved is often a council or several people who are responsible for the overall leadership of the group—in the village, it’s the jema’a, and in the leff it is a group of representatives. The basis for this difference rests on who is being led. In the case of the tribe, all of its members are technically related and should share interests by nature of that bond. Thus, one leader is suitable because there should be no significant conflicts of interest or unrepresented views. But there are multiple interests present in a village or collection of villages, so it is not possible for one figure to fairly represent multiple, potentially irreconcilable views. As a result, having a council so that each lineage or each interest group can make its voice heard is necessary to bestow legitimacy upon the leadership. Both types of leadership have similar roles, namely solving disputes and acting as a focal point for interests and communications with other groups. Both also ultimately reserve most power from the leader, assuring that the leadership is still accountable to his or its constituents at all times.

Religious Leadership

Finally, both taking part in and bridging the gaps between tribal and geographic leadership is the marabout, or igurramen (sing. agurram), as a religious leader. The religious leader is the most versatile of the three types of leaders in that he can fulfill two positions at the same time, using them to reinforce the legitimacy of each other, or can choose to place himself above the fray of politics and take a special role that only a religious leader can fill. The igurramen cannot easily change roles by being neutral one day and a war leader the next; instead, he aligns himself as his predecessors traditionally have done. The ability of the religious leader to assume this multitude of roles stems from his baraka, which gives increased confidence in any decision he hands down to his followers and gives it more weight than the decision of a regular leader would carry.

By residing within another leadership structure, the igurramen can offer what other leaders can—being a figurehead and mediator—with what they cannot—divine authority. In the tribal structure, the agurram could become an amghar or an amghar’s counselor, achieving a prominent position in the tribal hierarchy (Hagopian 1964, 48-50). This is possible because some tribes have a maraboutic sub-tribe or clan within them. The agurram would be an ideal leader during war because he could bring God’s will to his faction, hopefully giving it an advantage over the other side. In geographical leadership, the agurram can become another member of the jema’a, adding weight to its judgments. In both cases, the agurram plays the standard role that the leader would but has an added authority to his decisions. Nevertheless, just like traditional leaders, the agurram is rarely able to accrue enough power to truly control those under his leadership. In some cases, his followers will splinter, leading to the rise of competitors and weakening his base.

However, it is also possible for the agurram to exist on the fringes of socio-political units, acting as a buffer between them. In its original sense, an agurram was someone who had renounced his attachments to society, removing himself from all traditional leadership structures (Brett and Fentress, 143). Instead, in the word of Brett and Fentress, it became his duty to maintain “equilibrium” in society using his unique position of not being tied to any particular interests. Like other leaders, the neutral agurram finds his primary responsibility in adjudicating disputes and dispensing advice. But as a source of stability, the agurram does not intervene immediately; instead, he waits until the issue has gone through standard tribal or geographic conciliators and only then, if the issue is brought to him, does he impart his judgment on the given case (Hagopian 1964, 48).

Additionally, while he can take part in conflicts that would fall within the normal boundaries of dispute resolution leadership, he also plays the special role of helping with issues that strain traditional methods, namely those between tribes or villages. While confederations and leffs do exist to address these issues, the confederation is established more for war-making than for peacekeeping, and the leff could be an unwieldy instrument between two untrustworthy sides. The agurram brings two aspects to these cases that other leaders cannot. The first is his baraka, which gives added pressure to accept his decision and presents a face-saving way to avoid a feud. The second is that as the agurram is unattached, and often resides on the fringes of societies, he is in a prime place, physically and mentally, to adjudicate between opposing sides. His territory would provide a neutral meeting place under a mediator who does not have a stake in either side.

Elements of Amazigh Leadership

There are three central characteristics that have been touched on during the exploration of these different leadership positions. To differing degrees, each tends to be guided by the Amazigh society’s emphasis on egalitarianism, persuasion, and religious legitimacy. Before continuing on to how traditional leadership structures have been affected by the coming of the French and the modern Moroccan government, it is beneficial to further analyze the effects of these features, which might not be inherent in all leadership positions but which nevertheless form the foundation for many.

Egalitarianism forms one of the bases of Amazigh social relations and such a belief extends up through the ranks of leadership. Egalitarianism manifests itself on leadership through the aversion of having a single strong leader. In the tribal structure, the leader is regularly changed and is guaranteed to represent only a portion of the group, preventing him from remaining beyond the time that he is elected to stay there. The leader is also treated as only the first among equals, restricting the voice and the image of the leader from overtaking those of his followers. According to one observation on the Aith Waryaghar, “The egalitarianism of individuals and of segments or groups acts as the effective check on the power aspirations of one and all” (Caton, 95). Similarly, the geographic hierarchy focuses on elections of multiple people to guarantee that a majority of voices are heard. There are no direct methods of power over the constituents of a jema’a and debate is accepted. The exception to egalitarianism is the agurram, for while baraka can be transferred, doing so often lays in the hands of the agurram himself. Thus, he cannot easily be dismissed or ignored because of the importance of his position in society. At the same time, it is possible for the agurram’s followers to break off and form a new, opposing zawiyya, and it is possible for the baraka of a agurram to be reasoned away for one reason or another, leaving a certain amount of fluidity in following and obeying him.

As a result of the egalitarianism, all three types of leaders are required to rely on their ability to persuade instead of using force. As established before, this is because none of the leadership positions is able to accumulate enough supporters to be able to force his will on others. But as a consequence of the inability to acquire force, Amazigh leadership had to define itself some other way or else it would contribute nothing to society. As evident from all three types of leadership, such a role was found as being a mediator, whether between individuals or villages, over who owns a cow or which tribe is in the wrong for their actions. The ability to persuade became the power for leaders that force is in many other societies (Caton, 80-1). It presents the way for them to influence those lower in the hierarchy while still maintaining the first element of egalitarianism.

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The third aspect that is prominent throughout Amazigh leadership structures is the importance of religious legitimacy in establishing authority. Central to this are the igurramen. The benefit from having baraka is evident through the ability of a agurram to potentially fill any of the three types of leadership. Religious legitimacy is an obvious prerequisite for religious leaders and having a tribe with either an agurram as leader or in one of the clans can give the tribe added confidence, but one structure in which religion’s role may not be immediately clear is in the jema’a. An agurram can belong as a member of the jema’a. More to the point, though, by having a combination of lineages present in the jema’a, it gains baraka and becomes a justified source for the village’s social order (Venema and Mguild, 108-9). In reality the basis for its actions still rests on consensus, but in the matter of justifying those decisions and accepting the jema’a’s role in daily affairs, religious legitimacy no doubt makes it more palatable to the population and gives it a sustained place in their lives.

Amazigh Leadership and Central Government Authority

Historically, the Sultan of Morocco always attempted to project his influence into the mountainous Amazigh regions, which have been categorized by modern scholars as the bled as-siba, or land of dissidence—as compared to the bled al-makhzan, or land of the government, composed of the rich plains which have sustained royal power for centuries. But while the Sultan was occasionally able to temporarily impose himself upon a region by using massive amounts of force, his power was only in the ability to collect taxes, and even that would disappear when he would inevitably have to withdraw his troops to pacify the next region. As a result, the Amazigh leadership structures have always remained independent, maintaining their traditional powers and roles.

Since the initiation of the French Protectorate in 1912, the traditional leadership structure began to be slowly but surely eroded. The French first worked to pacify the bled as-siba, which it accomplished only after approximately two decades of using superior numbers and weaponry against the Amazigh warriors. However, the very idea of the Protectorate was that Morocco would still largely be responsible for its own governance. Not wishing to strengthen the Sultan, who served as both a point of legitimacy and opposition to the French Protectorate, the French did not want to bring the newly pacified territories under his command. Doing such, in the view of the first French Resident-General, Marshal Hubert Lyautey, would unbalance the traditional power structure (Bidwell, 51). Thus, upon achieving supremacy, the French opted to impose indirect rule on the Amazigh, leaving the traditional structures intact as a vehicle for which to assist their rule. The elected position of the amghar was replaced by that of the French caid, who was nominated by the Sultan, imposing central control next to the traditional (Bidwell, 52). The French-appointed leaders retained their traditional tasks but had to have decisions approved by the French (Gellner, 240-2). The leaders took on the positions of local representatives of France, carrying out its verdicts and acting as an information source who understood the natives. At the same time, the beginnings of an alternate power structure were evident through French outposts which also acted as mediator, cautionary measure, and a source of force when orders were not obeyed.

To a degree, such measures strengthened the traditional leadership position, giving it the ability to enforce its decisions through force. But it also destroyed the basic elements of Amazigh leadership. Egalitarianism is irrelevant if the French and the Sultan elect notables, persuasion is no longer necessary if weapons can be used instead, and religious legitimacy can be put into question if it is Christian foreigners who are behind the commands. As a result, while the face of leadership was strengthened, the actual institutions began to become irrelevant next to the new hierarchy.

With the independence of Morocco in 1956, the new Moroccan central government took control over the leadership structure that the French had instituted and began to seek to expand control further. At first, the government continued to select the caid from the local population, but the caid’s superiors were always Arab speakers from other regions (Venema and Mguild, 106). By the 1970s, even this had changed where the caid was now appointed from the outside, too, and disagreement between the caid and the locals could result in the intervention of higher authorities (115). The caid took on administrative tasks for the government, such as handling government registration (111), while the government sought to make courts rather than leaders the primary location for addressing disputes. An added complication for the Amazigh leadership is that new generations and outsiders had no respect for the traditional institutions; college educated youths might no longer see a point in supporting the amghar while migrants to a village might see the jema’a as being an unfair form of governance because it would not protect the Arab minority’s rights.

Conclusion

Regardless of whether the Amazigh leadership is tribal, geographical, religious, or some amalgamation in its basis, the pattern of Amazigh leadership is that all three rest on egalitarian ideals, the need to persuade rather than force followers, and the clout of religious legitimacy. Despite the numerous challenges to its existence, the traditional leadership structures do still exist to certain degrees. The Amazigh populace expects for its leadership, in whatever form, to protect its interests and to adjudicate its life. When the old hierarchy does this, it has been retained to the best of the population’s efforts. When it does not, namely in functions not historically filled by the traditional structure, the government has the ability to maneuver into the fold (Venema and Mguild, 104). Perhaps the weakest of the three leadership structures is the tribe: tribes may no longer be as of much importance, especially with the fragmentation of the family unit and migration out of the region, and confederations are largely antiquated because there is no longer a need for families to rely on each other for defense. But geographic and religious leadership are both still essential to Amazigh society. The roles that they once filled, primarily as mediators, advisers, and points of consensus, are still of consequence.

Follow Professor Mohamed CHTATOU on Twitter: @Ayurinu

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Let us start from the premise that each individual as born into a certain community, society, and culture, wants to be recognized for who he is. The idea of identity can be tied to an individualistic view of the world, focusing on the freedom to express one’s own individual desires and needs within the society. However, identity is a combination of layers, informed by individual needs and wants but also by the drive to belong to some sort of community, which is again informed by cultures. Those cultures might be based on ethnicity, heritage, and language representing an anthropological frame or they might be based on identification with a certain interest group, age group, etc. Identity can be a personal acknowledgement, however, in this analysis we shall focus on the outward expression of identity, specifically through the art of performance – dance, song and poetry.

In a struggle for identity recognition, the Amazigh people of Morocco and Algeria have been expressing thier cultural belonging through various art forms. Famous for their oral tradition, the Amazigh culture is rich in poetry, lullabies, songs of varying content, riddles, and enigmas. Looking primarily at Anglophone research work by Michael Peyron, Jane E. Goodman and Cynthia Becker, a picture of a distinct performative tradition arises notwithstanding the fact that all forms of expression discussed are subject to regional and situational variations. This research work should provide an insight into the changing scene of Amazigh poetry, as well as performance arts of the Kabyle people in Algeria and the Ait Khabbash tribe in Morocco, without necessarily holding them against each other in comparison. It shall demonstrate how traditional arts are an expression of identity and cultural belonging and shine light on usage of performance and song to struggle for the recognition of identity.

Michael Peyron, former professor of Amazigh History and Culture at Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane, Morocco is a connoisseur of Amazigh poetry and song. He describes the change of meaning Amazigh poetry has undergone:

“From what used to be a mainstream oral literature genre in late-19^th century Morocco, popular Tamazight poetry together with ballad-style epic and religious verse have, barely a hundred years later, definitely become an archetypal form of minority expression.”

His observation is a sign for the struggle of identity recognition of the Amazigh amongst the Arab-Islamic society. Often viewed as less cultured by the growing urban population, Amazigh people from the villages have resorted to expressing their resentment through poetry, recalling the “stirring achievements of their heroes, both during the resistance phase and in earlier centuries” . As Katherine Hoffman notes, the Ishelhin – the Amazigh people from the South-West of Morocco – use language differently in conversational speech than they do in poetic speech. A lot of value is thus given to poetic expression. Interestingly enough, the richness in expressions of poetic language has been preserved and continued in tradition  – a tradition mainly carried on by women who are endowed with passing down culture and tradition.

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Cynthia Becker’s extensive research on the role of women in Amazigh arts focuses specifically on the Amazigh from the Ait Khabbash tribe in Morocco. Her observations of the ahidous dance can be seen in the light of the earlier given framework of identity. Becker defines ahidous as a “collective performance at weddings and other celebrations that incorporate oral poetry”. This type of performance exists in many Amazigh groups, however varying in rhythm, steps, clothing and song techniques from group to group. She takes as an example the Ait Khabbash in comparison to the Imazighen of the High Atlas mountains; While the performances of the Ait Khabbash are initiated by men forming a line, women joining them in a parallel line facing the men, the performance of the Imazighen is organized in one line with men and women standing next to each other. This comparison makes clear that even though a group might identify with a vast culture in the anthropological sense, there are smaller entities of cultures that might have a tighter identity definition. In other words, the concept of belonging to a bigger entity of culture can be empowering – personally and politically, however it might also be less tangible due to little contact with members of the whole ethnic community.

One of the main reasons for the strong feeling of belonging to a smaller entity of culture can be the location. Since the ahidous are collective performances, they take place in the center of life in a village. Anyone in the village is invited to come – depending on the village it might even be an insult for the village community if somebody does not show up.

Also Jane Goodman, in her book: “Berber Culture on the World Stage – From Village to Video” makes a similar observation about the local wedding dance and its community value. She writes:

“The wedding or, more specifically, the evening dance known as the urar, is the only place where almost everyone present in the village shows up at the same time.” 

Even though the dancers and musicians can be subject to critique by their fellow dancers/musicians or the audience, the learning process is informal and ongoing. These observations suggest that the access to identity through performance and dance is a given due to the dances taking place in a public space and due to their invitation that extends to any member of the community.

During a trip to Zawyat Ahnsal, I observed and participated in a music and dance performance at the house of the local sheikh. The circle in which we danced was so tight that learning the steps was imperative in order to avoid disturbing the rhythm and flux of the dance. However, standing very close to the ladies in the circle, I also learned the steps quickly since I was literally taken by the shoulder, swayed up and down. The physical vicinity of people dancing clearly enhances a feeling of belonging, of metaphorically and literally breathing together. Quite interestingly, the local women of Zawyat Ahnsal built a second circle by themselves, not joining the already existing circle of musicians with little wooden framed drums. The circle of male musicians increased in size with every visitor squeezing in between local dancers – here not adhering to a segregation of gender.

Becker makes similar observations of gender segregation through dancing in different circles but also through a veil that covers the women’s faces. Becker links this phenomenon with the influence of the Arab world in the 1960s:

“. . . social pressure from Arabs in the 1960s and increased exposure to Islamic modesty requirements caused their previously nomadic ancestors to modify ahidous to include the head covering as a physical barrier between unrelated men and women facing each other during the performance.”

Becker also notes differences in dancing and suggests that the women originally took bigger strides in their ahidous dance but are now restricted by social conventions. She bases her assumption on the observation and comparison between the heavily populated area of Tafilalet versus more rural areas, imagining that the style in the remote villages has been better preserved from the past. Similarly, Goodman also notices gender segregation amongst the Kabyle Amazigh, where urars are watched by the audience divided into men and women sitting on different sides of the dance space.

Especially with the influence of a western dominated media blaming issues of gender inequality on Islam, Amazigh activists often stress the original matriarchal social order of Amazigh tribes. Therefore, supporting a struggle for identity recognition using Western agenda and reverting it back against the predominant Arab-centric Islamic interpretation.

However, in Amazigh culture, women still occupy a special place in society. Being the center of family life, women are also the bearers of culture and tradition, passing down to their children knowledge of poetry, folk tales and song. Similarly to men who can recite the entire Qur’an, there is a term for women who are well versed in Amazigh poetry. Women are the ones who are the main resources to researchers as well as Amazigh youth who have lost touch with their roots. Women are therefore very powerful in helping to preserve some of the oral traditions that are not completely noted down. Women are also active in writing poetry themselves. A valid example for women poets is Mririda n-Ayt ‘Attiq, from the Tassawt area in Morocco. French national René Euloge recorded and translated her poems into a book of poetry. N-Ayt ‘Attiq’s poetry reaches a wide arrange of themes, from love poetry to nature, human relationships, land ownership, conflicts, youth, marriage and death.

On the issue of gender, young Kabyle activists have been staging new kinds of theatrical performances. These performances center around everyday life activities such as meetings.

“For them, performances operated as sites of heightened reflexivity (…) through which they could critique prevailing forms of social organization and experiment with new identities.”

The development of using a Western narrative to address the need for the recognition of Amazigh identity and in some more radical cases, the longing for independence from an Arabic state can also be seen in Algeria. Goodman’s research on the Kabyle Amazigh of Algeria sheds light on political attempts to drift away from a leadership that patronizes Amazigh heritage, not considering it of high value. She points out the problems with the Algerian struggle for independence against the French colonial power:

“The longing for liberation of the Algerian people led the Front de Libération Nationale to stress a sense of unity and uniformity rather than individual identities of its diverse ethnic groups.”

In search for a purist Amazigh identity, not touched by foreign rule, poets have been retrieving old folklore. The revival of Amazigh song and its publication happened mainly through Amazigh radio stations. In her extensive research on staging Amazigh culture in Algeria Jane E Goodman detects a relatively young tendency for Amazigh activists to modernize Amazigh poetry and song while emphasizing their traditional value. She specifically looks at the work of two famous poets/musicians – Ben Mohamed and a singer by the artist name of Idir. In their political activism for the recognition of Amazigh identity, they molded traditional song texts into politically motivated texts, appealing to a new generation and motivating this generation to become politically active for their own cultural identity. Also the music itself was transformed in order to a younger style by “lightening up slow rhythms and tempos”.

What was of central importance to Idir and Ben Mohamed was certainly their extensive knowledge of traditional music as well as texts, a requirement to avoid distorting authenticity. Comparing song lyrics by Ben Mohamed to older versions of the same songs, Goodman notices the omission of religious connotations or religious phrases in Ben Mohamed’s new interpretations. Ben Mohamed believes that “the essential is said in two lines, then you start with a religious thing . . . and it’s just to garnish” . Due to a tendency for Amazigh activism to be less religiously motivated, Ben Mohamed’s response might be only a part of the real reason for his taking out religious phrases. Here again, the yearning for cultural and social appreciation without a religious connection becomes apparent and is a valid example for the struggle for identity recognition of an underrepresented ethnicity that is proud of their heritage, including Pagan traditions.

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The tendency for purism in Amazigh activism shines through in the extensive search for original words in different Amazigh dialects like Tashelhit and Tamazight. Even though village life has been dynamic and influenced by outside and inside changes, Amazigh activism very much focuses on anything ancient and sometimes outdated in actual Amazigh villages. Language used in revisions of Amazigh poetry is a clear indicator for this phenomenon. As a result, Amazigh poetry is replete with nostalgia for a past era. Ideas of life as it used to be are idealized and the idea of the village and typical Amazigh households have gained an almost mythical value. An idealized village is passed on as cultural heritage while its development plays a secondary role.

The purist idea of stripping Amazigh culture of foreign influences – mainly Arab-Islamic – stands in contrast to an observation of an Amazigh performance in the area of Azrou, Morocco. During a dance and music performance for the group’s entertainment, the dancer moved in a very particular style, with positions almost kneeling, holding his pose stretching his arms diagonal to the ground. Michael Peyron believes that the style is prevalent in the area of Azrou, Imzouane and Ifrane and relatively new invention by, The world-famed “Maestro” Moha Oulhoussain Achibane. Unlike the belief that Amazigh culture mainly lives in the past, the “Maestro” is proving the opposite mainly that the culture is alive and well, and even more: it is developing and in flux.

Also poetry and song are filled with new developments, not only by new interpretations of poets like Idir and Ben Mohamed. Improvisation is a very common occurrence in Amazigh performance. Since poetry, stories and songs are still orally passed down generations, Amazigh heritage is preserved while it is reshaped by the new generations. Frequent discussions during the performance of a song are common according to Goodman. She recalls:

“Between some verses [the women] briefly paused for discussion. At one point . . . one young women said: “That’s all”; the older woman disagreed and went on to sing several more verses.”

Also Becker denotes that there is a prevalence of the older generation being better at “playing” ahidous, the afore-mentioned dance performed at weddings and other celebrations amongst the people of the Ait Khabbash.

Conclusion

Ultimately, no matter what the connection may be, whether through dance, theater, song or poetry, Amazigh people deserve to be recognized as who they identify with, a unique and rich culture. The arts are a pathway to political activism, questioning notions of new and old changes, keeping the culture alive and dynamic.

Follow Professor Mohamed CHTATOU on Twitter: @Ayurinu

references available upon request

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The Amazighs claim a physical presence in the Maghreb that is more than five thousand years old. Their community covers almost five million square kilometers, from the Egyptian-Libyan border to the Atlantic Ocean and from the Mediterranean coasts to Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso. Their culture, identity and civilization have long been despised and ignored by Arab governments of the region in the past, their rightful cultural claims have first being assimilated to the “colonial party”, then later interpreted as a blatant form of secessionism. But with the crisis of Arab ideologies during the Arab Spring and the beginning of the ebb of radical Islamism, these important factors favored the recognition of ethnic and cultural particularisms in North Africa and led to a renaissance of the Amazigh movement, especially in Morocco and Algeria. 

Revival of Amazigh nationalism through culture and identity

In Algeria, the most determining event which made it possible for Amazigh culture to emerge is the Amazigh violent demonstrations of April 1980 in Kabylie that were caused by the prohibition of the conference of Mouloud Mammeri on the old Kabyle poetry. This ban was the trigger for the 1980 contestation movement which is known today as the Amazigh Spring (tafsut imazighen.) However, this historic movement has imposed Tamazight as a cultural landmark after many centuries of denial and rejection, throughout North Africa.

The Amazigh militants have fought since relentlessly, for full recognition of their culture, often risking their lives, against the dictatorship imposed by the Algerian regime upon independence of the country in 1962. The demand for identity, then, imposed itself as a benchmark for all the fightings that followed, be they for democracy, human rights, the fight against fundamentalism or all the struggles against oppression and regression of the present day.

For the Moroccan Amazighs, it all started about forty years ago with the creation of an associative network which demanded, as in Algeria, the recognition of Tamazight as an official language alongside Arabic. In 1994, after the end of the “lead years“, Hassan II dropped some ballast by launching televised news bulletins in different Moroccan Amazigh dialects. Nevertheless, it was until 2001 that Amazigh culture was officially recognized. Indeed, on that date the new sovereign, Mohammed VI, announced the creation of IRCAM, the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture in Morocco. He entrusted the management of this state organization to a recognized specialist on the issue, Mohammed Chafik, his former professor at the royal college.

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But both in Algeria and Morocco, the recognition of the Amazigh civilization is merely cultural, not to say symbolic, in so much as most of the Amazigh areas are still poor and under developped : lacking in schools, hospitals, roads, universities, factories, etc. The youth in these areas are jobless and the women illiterate and girls uneducated. From 1950 to 1900, the Amazigh population lived off remittances of workers in Europe but now because of economic problems there, they are not able to do that anymore and Morocco and Algeria have not been able or willing to adopt new models of developments in the Amazigh hinterland to fully develop these territories and empower their inhabitants.

Aspects of Amazigh identity

There are three major themes within the Amazigh culture, defined as the “trinity,” and easily recognizable in Moroccan and Algerian culture. The three themes have transcended Amazigh culture and have been accepted as the wider identity: The importance of language (Tamazight), the pervasiveness of the tribal democratic system and kinship system (ddm), and the strong connection to the land (tammurt).

• The importance of language (Tamazight)

The most obvious theme in the Moroccan and Algerian communities of Amazigh nature is the importance of language within society. When one looks at the Amazigh people, there is a clear correlation between the relevance of language and the preservation of the culture throughout time.

The Amazigh people’s history and belief system was preserved in oral or written fashion whereby one generation would pass the history, wisdom, and laws to another. Despite having several distinct dialects of the language, the history and laws of the Amazigh people synced and survived countless invasions thanks to their native language.

When the Arab conquest occurred, the Arabs brought a similar appreciation for the essential nature of language and the role that the elderly should play in the preservation of culture. Even if one were to overlook the fact that both Arabic and Tamazight, the languages spoken by the Amazigh people, come from the Afro-Asiatic language family, both languages place a heavy emphasis on elders to ensure the continuation of the language, either through writing or oral recitation.

Though the Arabs expressed themselves in more poetic and eloquent language, it is believed that they appreciated the way in which the Amazigh people used language as a uniting factor and a preservation element of their civilization.

The relevance of language as a binding element became very apparent when the Algerain government inscribed in gold the official status of the Amazigh language in the constitution in 2016 and the King Mohammed VI amended the Moroccan constitution in 2011 to include Tamazight as a national language. A new written language was formed in neither Arabic or Latin script but an entirely new alphabet—Tifinagh— (ancient Amazigh script) to ensure the preservation of Amazigh history, traditions, laws, and wisdom.

This recognition provided the Amazigh an even greater acceptance into contemporary Algerian and Moroccan cultures. Despite the similarities, the move to recognize the language was more a political gesture than an inclusion of Tamazight into the society at large, which probably will take, in the end, more time.

• Relevance of kinship

A second theme that one must look at when comparing Amazigh and contemporary Algerian and Moroccan cultures is the idea of kinship that spawns from the democratic tribal system.

The idea of a nation-state was a foreign concept from the West that both the Amazighs and Arabs rejected in the Maghreb.  For both these ethnic groups, there is an acceptance that similarities between people are not defined by imaginary lines but rather that a given identity stems from a shared language, a shared history, and a shared religion.

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This shared definition of identity resulted in a pervasive tribal system in both Amazigh and Maghrebi cultures. The tribal system is defined in terms of economically socialist but socially democratic system that can still be found in the world-famed hospitality of the North African peoples today.

However, the idea of kinship that accepts people of different backgrounds is a relevant distinction between Amazigh and Arab culture. Even though the tribal system places an emphasis on the matriarch among the Amazighs, Arab culture prefers an influential and all-powerful patriarch. The relevance of this is that there continues to be a disenfranchisement of the Amazigh people in the laws and politics of Morocco and Algeria.

• The centrality of the land

Finally, one must understand that the idea of a homeland resonates strongly with the Amazigh people. They have a unique relationship to the land that extends beyond the physical aspect and moves into the spiritual sphere.

The Amazigh viewed the land as a symbol that not only sustained life and beliefs but provided, also, protection from the imperialistic outside world.

The spiritual aspect of the land can be found in the Moroccan and Algerian Islam (closely related to Sufism) today and that there is a strong relationship between the people in the city and the people in the mountains.  This relates back to the idea that the Amazigh people accepted those who lived in the urban areas. The relevance of this relationship between urban and rural worlds emphasizes two distinct cultures in Morocco and Algeria that coexist and share similar linguistic and societal norms.

To conclude

The history of the Amazighs of North Africa is very vast and very rich. Their culture in its Mediterranean, African, Eastern, European or international influences, is particularly distinguished by :

– an unfailing link to the land tamurt/akal ;

– with a strong sense of the sacredness of the language Tamazigh/awal ;

– of great conviviality and sharing twiza ; and

– a great sense of community ddm/tghaghart.

The idea of an Amazigh nation is built on the model of previous national movements around a people, the Imazighen, a language Tamazight, and a territory, Tamazgha/North Africa. This mythical original link between the people and the land makes them an “indigenous” people in the sense defined by the United Nations as :

“social groups with a social and cultural identity different from that of the dominant society, which makes them likely to be disadvantaged in the development process.“

The Amazigh of Morocco and Algeria have a complex relationship with language, societal norms, and the land. However, if one were to remove any one of these Amazigh cultural aspects, it is fairly likely Morocco and Algeria would have a different set of beliefs and way of life, for sure.

Follow Professor Mohamed CHTATOU on Twitter : @Ayurinu

references available upon request

The Algerian Amazigh singer Hamid Cheriet, better known as Idir, died in France at the age of 70. The tireless champion of Kabyle and Amazigh culture died of a lung disease. Idir became internationally famous with his lullaby “A Vava Inou Va” in the 1970s and since then he has been, in a way, the standard-bearer of the Amazigh cause in North Africa, the Sahel and the Canary Islands, the millenary home of the Imazighen, these proud and free men. His flagship song has even become a kind of national anthem where the ogre represented the pan-Arab and non-democratic powers of the region, the little girl Ghriba the nascent Amazigh cause and the father (Vava) the ancestral Amazigh culture.

Undisputed Master of Melodious Lullabies

Idir grew up surrounded by the songs and rhythms of the Kabyle people, but he was studying to become a geologist until his fortuitous appearance on state radio in 1973. He replaced another singer at the last minute and his performance was widely acclaimed. But it was not until the end of his military service that he embarked upon a recording career, not in his native Kabylia oppressed by a patriarchal Arab regime, but in France, a country of freedom, democracy and human rights. 

The singer’s death was confirmed on Saturday May 2, 2020, on his official Facebook page, which read: “We regret to announce the death of our father (to everyone). Idir. Rest in peace.” The French media reported that he died of a lung disease after being hospitalised on Friday.  Idir was a national treasure in his native Algeria and a great symbol of Amazigh culture throughout Tamazgha (Amazigh territory).

In a tweet Emmanuel Macron wrote, in homage to this great singer : “A unique voice has died out. Idir sang of his Kabyle roots with the melancholy of an exile and the brotherhood of peoples with the hopes of a humanist. The poetry of his songs will long continue to resonate from one side of the Mediterranean to the other.“

For UNESCO, Idir was undoubtedly the ambassador of Amazigh culture to the world : “The Algerian singer Hamid Cheriet, better known as #Idir, died in France at the age of 70. He was one of the main cultural ambassadors of the Kabyle and Berber cultures.“

His compatriot Zinedine Zidane called him “Monsieur Idir“. Idir embodied both strength and tranquillity; his presence inspired the same respect one might have for an uncle. French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu understood the role that this Algerian singer, who spoke and sang in Kabyle, had in every Algerian family :

“He was more than a singer, he was like a member of the family.”

Born on 25 October 1949 in Ait Lahcene, near Tizi Ouzou, the capital of Kabylia, which was then part of French Algeria, he studied geology, but his life took a turn in 1973 when he was called on the radio to sing “A Vava Inou Va” as a last-minute replacement. It was a lullaby with the “rich oral traditions” of Amazigh culture and became a popular song in the country and around the world.

In the early 1970s, when he was still called Hamid Cheriet, a discreet geology student, he started singing in public. He composed his melodies and wrote his lyrics in Kabyle, inspired by verses from traditional songs he had rocked with as a child. Modestly, he chose a stage name, Idir, the name given to fragile newborns because it means “He will live”. Success came with the song “A Vava Inou Va” (“Little Father”). This melodic song is constructed like a dialogue between a daughter and her father who try to avoid with their words the coming of the devouring ogre, an allusion made here to the Algerian military regime devouring public liberties :

“Please, Father Inou Va, open the door! 
Daughter Ghriba make your bracelets jingle 
I fear the forest ogre Father Inou Va 
O Ghriba Girl I fear it too”.

Exile in France for activism and identity 

Idir then moved to France in 1975, after completing his military service, where he recorded his first album entitled “A Vava Inou Va” and a series of popular North African-style songs during the same decade. His style of music, with a solitary voice and acoustic guitar, defends the sounds of Kabyle music, and as such he is widely regarded as an ambassador of Kabyle and Amazigh culture.The Berber-speaking Kabyle people are a sub-group of the Amazigh ethnic population of North and West Africa in the broadest sense. 

So it was in 1973 that Algeria discovered this young Kabyle singer on Radio Alger. He wore flared jeans, long curly hair and the burnous of his ancestors. “A Vava Inou Va” went on to become an international hit. Described by some as “the first African hit“, it was broadcast in 77 countries and translated into several languages. It was followed by an album of anthology, “Ssendu”, a mix of soft, rhythmic melodies, with subtly committed and discreetly subversive lyrics. 

Make no mistake about it, Idir described the Algerian political situation using poetic but committed metaphors. Although he did not write any critical lyrics clearly opposing the government, like other Kabyle singers such as Mahtoub Lounes, Lounis Aït Menguellet and Ferhat Mhenni, Idir was equally critical. Poetic and political.

Idir took part in numerous concerts in support of various causes. For example, on June 22nd 1995, more than 6,000 people attended a concert for peace, freedom and tolerance given by the singer and his friend Khaled, initiators of the association “L’Algérie, la vie“. Idir also took part in the concert in memory of Lounès Matoub, the Kabyle singer assassinated by the Algerian authoritarian regime in 1998.

In 2001, Idir once again defended his national identity at Le Zénith in Paris at the “21ème Printemps berbère“, a celebration of Amazigh culture. On 8 July that year, he organised a special fund-raising concert in support of the population in Kabylia, at a time when anti-government riots were taking place in the predominantly Amazigh region. Idir was joined by a host of stars and thousands of Algerian and French fans who flocked to Le Zénith to support the population in Kabylia.

The first successes

His performance of the song “A Vava Inou Va” in 1973 on Radio Alger took listeners into an unknown dimension, but before it could savor his success, he was called up for compulsory military service. Idir thus became a household name, almost overnight, without him knowing it until his return.

From the outset, Idir refused to escape the rich and complex oral traditions of Amazigh culture, despite his often contested minority status within his nation. His soothing voice, acoustic strings and cultural pride resonated within and beyond Algeria’s borders, elevating him to the status of a symbol of much-desired musical diversity and a world champion of milticulturalism.

In 1975, he moved to France and, with great enthusiasm, began recording his musical works. Since then, his songs have continued to highlight, with charm and without detour, his under-represented and underestimated Amazigh community, particularly the Kabyle sub-group originating from the coastal mountainous regions of northern Algeria.

The following year, his debut album “A Vava Inou Va” was released to the public, focusing on the daily life and culture of rural Algeria, told through a certain separation, as if an old man were telling tales to his relatives.

His plea for multiculturalism

“Identities” is the name Idir chose for his long-awaited second album, born in 1999. This time round, his voice is in great company, bringing the whole world together on a single CD. To underline the unity in difference, this melting-pot project brings together Manu Chao, Charles Aznavour, Maxime Le Forestier, Gnawa Diffusion, Zebda, Gilles Servat and Geoffrey Oryema, all enhanced by the sounds of the Orchestre Parisien de Barbès.

Continuing in the same vein, in 2007, his album, an ode to minorities, “La France des couleurs”, came out in the middle of the French presidential election, dominated by passionate debates on immigration and identity.

Despite another major gap between projects, Idir returned to Algiers in January 2018 to perform at the Berber New Year “Yennayer” after an absence of 38 years. His show, whose appearance was carefully chosen, showed support for the popular uprisings that led to the resignation of long-time leader Abdelaziz Bouteflika.

“I liked everything about these demonstrations : the intelligence of the young people, their humour, their determination to remain peaceful,” Idir said in April 2019. “I admit that these moments were like a breath of fresh air. And since I have pulmonary fibrosis, I know what I’m talking about. “

Idir stigmatizes the military regime

Speaking of his Amazigh origin, contested in time by the pan-Arab Algerian military regime, Idir says emphatically to The Unesco Courier (The UNESCO Courier, 53, 4, pp. 26-27, port, 2000) :

“They give me an Algerian passport, but I have to get permission to speak my own language,”

which, like the great Martinican poet Aimé Césaire, he defends “those who have no voice“. It never occurred to him to write in French, the language of the colonizer in which he did all his schooling, up to a doctorate in geology, nor in Arabic, which was then taught as a second language in Algeria.

“If I hadn’t left my village, I would never have spoken a word of Arabic,” he says. “Kabyle is a language of feelings and stories that flows naturally into poetry,” he adds. It’s also the language Idir has chosen to use. “Singing in Kabyle is a militant act, a way of expressing my faith, of saying I exist,” he says.

“If I’d had another profession, I would have found other ways of expressing the same demands,” he says.

His natural science teacher taught him how to play the guitar. The future geologist began writing at the age of 16 and addressed the Kabyle people and their expectations in his popular poetry. In 1973, he was asked to replace the famous singer Nouara at the last minute, and he started singing live on the radio the lullaby he had written in his early days. Since then, this child of the Aurès has never ceased to celebrate Amazigh culture through music, continuing the work launched in the 1940s by great writers such as Jean Amrouche, Mouloud Mammeri, Mouloud Feraoun and Kateb Yacine. These pioneers had to use French to defend the Amazigh language if they wanted to be heard. As Amrouche said: “I think and write in French, but I cry in Kabyle.”

Idir went further: he advocated three languages for Algeria – Arabic, Amazigh and French in his interview with Unesco Courier: “I want Algeria to take into account those who live on its land, who love the country and want to build it, whatever their language or religion,” he says. He also told this media outlet :

“Islam should not be an official religion. Religion is for believers, not for governments.”

“I want Algeria to take into account those who live on its land, who love the country and want to build it, whatever their language, religion or origin,” he told the Unesco Courier.

“Arabic shouldn’t have a special status because it’s the sacred language of the Koran – especially classical Arabic, a sanitized language that ordinary people can’t understand and no language is more unhappy than another, even if Berber is the oldest in terms of number of years. Fate has put these languages on this earth and they must remain,” he added.

A rift between the state and refractory Kabylia continues to widen, a fact Idir will report on as he regularly sings the anniversaries of the 1980 Amazigh revolt known as Tafsut Imazighen (Amazigh Spring), whose reverberations were felt throughout Tamzgha. Despite his national and international prestige, the singer was always careful to keep his distance from the Algerian authorities. However, as soon as his death was announced, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune wrote in the middle of the night on his Twitter account:

“I learned with great regret and sadness of the news of the death of the late Hamid Cheriet, known by the artistic name of Idir, the internationally renowned Algerian art icon. With him, Algeria lost one of its pyramids.”

Discography :

1976 : A Vava Inouva  (Oasis, Algérie / Pathé, France)
1979 : Ay arrac nneɣ (Azwaw)
1980 : Récital à l’Olympia (Azwaw)
1991 : A Vava Inouva (Blue Silver)
1993 : Les Chasseurs de lumière (Blue Silver)
1999 : Identités (Sony Music)
2002 : Deux rives, un rêve (Sony Music)
2005 : Entre scènes et terre (Sony-BMG)
2007 : La France des couleurs (Sony-BMG)
2013 : Adrar inu (Columbia)
2017 : Ici et ailleurs (Sony Music, France / Izem Pro, Algérie)

Music Compositions :
1986 : Le Petit Village (Chorale Tiddukla)
1987 : Ml-iyi (Avec Ali Tiddukla)

references available upon request