One of the recurring misconceptions within the Amazigh community is that expressing their Amazigh identity puts them at odds with their Arab-identifying counterparts. This belief stems from a fear of conflict when interacting with Arabic-speaking peoples from other countries in the MENA region. Well-known Moroccan Islamic Scholar, Hassan El-Katani, once said; “What prevents peoples from reclaiming their pre-Islamic festivals and traditions is that we lose the factor of our unity, and the future of our children is wasted.” Along with historical pan-Islamist ideas, many Amazigh people have chosen to identify as Arab to avoid the very conflicts imposed by those who see the world through a purely Islamist Lens.

What more Amazigh people must know, is that they are not alone in their struggle for
recognition, the conflict-riddled Middle East, like North Africa, is home to a diverse range of groups, on ethnic, linguistic, and religious grounds, all of whom have suffered from similar political marginalization. The Maronites of Lebanon and their quest to preserve Lebanon’s native identity in the civil war of 1975, the Alawites in Syria, and their clinch to the Arab regime, to protect their religious status in the Sunni majority Syria, and Iraq, the Assyrian-Chaldean- Suryoyo peoples, have faced significant challenges at the hands of both Sunni and Shia militias, that have sought to overtake their lands by force.

Like Christian, Yazidi, and other non-Muslim populations, Amazigh people have been
marginalized and discriminated against during the period of Islamization, facing restrictions in learning their language, in favor of learning Arabic, the language of the Koran. Other cultural and religious practices that pre-dated Islam were also prohibited, such as Imazighen’s cultural tolerance of women having leadership roles in society, something that Islam does not share.

The Amazigh experience historically under Arab rule, resembles that of a ‘Dhimmi’ a term reserved for non-Muslim religious minorities, living under Islamic rule, who had to pay a special tax due to their differences and were also barred from holding public offices. Today in minority politics in the Middle East, the term dhimmi is often used to refer to politicians of minority backgrounds that collaborate or appease Islamists in favor of immediate security concerns and an acceptance of the unjust reality imposed.

In the Western half of North Africa, the Amazigh people hold a popular majority, according to the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, there are approximately forty million Amazigh speakers worldwide. In the Amazigh community, there is a wide spectrum range of social identity expressions based on the level of Arabization within their families and communities. While Amazigh people may not be a minority in their native land, they are certainly a minority when considering the broader Arab environment.

The plight of defending the rights of minorities, and defenseless civilians struggling for their rights to speak freely, worship freely, and be themselves, is righteous, a cause which the Amazigh people may have the numbers to hold together for generations, for both themselves and their neighboring peoples in struggle for indigenous liberation.

Critics have voiced concerns over the Moroccan government’s relentless focus on Arabization, highlighting the neglect of the Amazigh language in educational and cultural programs. Despite its status as an official language and a vital component of Moroccan heritage, Amazigh continues to be sidelined, raising questions about the state’s priorities and its commitment to linguistic diversity.

The decision to prioritize Arabic instruction for the Moroccan diaspora has ignited debate over the government’s motivations and ideological underpinnings. Some argue that the emphasis on Arabization overlooks the linguistic and cultural realities of Moroccans living abroad, many of whom predominantly speak Amazigh or European languages.

Moreover, critics contend that the state’s fixation on Arabic proficiency as a prerequisite for patriotism and belonging to the homeland is misguided. They assert that Amazigh, with its rich cultural heritage and widespread use among Moroccan expatriates, deserves equal recognition and support in educational initiatives.

The controversy underscores broader issues surrounding language policy and cultural identity in Morocco. Despite the constitutional recognition of Amazigh as an official language, its implementation has been slow, with regulatory laws lagging behind. This delay reflects deeper tensions within Moroccan society regarding the recognition and promotion of linguistic diversity.

Advocates for Amazigh language and culture argue that its preservation is crucial not only for the Moroccan diaspora but also for fostering a more inclusive and pluralistic society within Morocco itself. They emphasize the importance of teaching Amazigh civilization and history to diaspora youth, highlighting its role in promoting tolerance, openness, and moderation.

Amidst calls for greater respect for linguistic and cultural rights, concerns have been raised about the implications of the government’s Arabization policy. Some fear that marginalizing Amazigh language and culture could exacerbate feelings of alienation and disenfranchisement among Moroccan expatriates, hindering efforts to foster a sense of belonging and identity.

As the debate intensifies, stakeholders urge the Moroccan government to reevaluate its language policies and take meaningful steps towards recognizing and promoting linguistic diversity. By embracing Amazigh language and culture alongside Arabic, Morocco can reaffirm its commitment to inclusivity, tolerance, and respect for all its citizens, both at home and abroad.

Document;

In 1963, a deep-rooted conflict between the Tuaregs and Mali began to unfold. Before 1960, when Mali celebrated its independence, over 300 Imuhagh tribal chiefs petitioned France to either maintain their autonomy or recognize their independence. Their plea fell on deaf ears, and

soon after, the Malian government began imposing heavy taxes on Tuareg herders and executing suspected rebels.
The 1980s brought with them a severe famine that nudged many Tuaregs to migrate, and a significant number found themselves under the Libyan flag, receiving military training from Khadafi. However, sensing his ulterior motives, they defected, armed with weapons and a determination to establish independence for Azawad (Northern Mali) and l’Aîr-Azawagh (Northern Niger).

This situation captured international attention, with countries like France already exploiting resources. Meanwhile, Libya and Algeria closely watched the developments, concerned about the impact on their portions of Tuareg territories. The Tuaregs were colloquially described as “the Kurds of Africa,” highlighting their intricate geopolitical significance in the region.

In the early 1990s in Azawad, the MPLA(The Popular Movement For Liberation of Azawad), under the leadership of Iyad Aghali, attacked the town of Menaka in Mali. This assault provoked a retaliation from the Malian army. After the Malian government lost many battles, a series of peace talks and agreements ensued but were inadequately enforced, leading to more insurgencies and divisions among Tuareg factions. Algeria played a pivotal role in shaping the trajectory of the Tuareg rebellion, initially causing divisions within the Tuareg groups and later advocating unification.

Another rebellion emerged in 2006, centered on autonomy for Tuareg regions and the non-enforcement of previous accords – this time led by Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, a well known Tuareg leader. Another peace agreement was signed with Mali, but also not implemented.
The strife persisted as a new generation in Azawad felt overlooked and threatened by the emergence of Al-Qaida in their territory. By 2010, Tuareg youth established the MNA (Mouvement National de l’Azawad), a pacific, secular movement advocating autonomy from Mali. However, actions by the Malian government against the MNA led to the formation of an armed faction, the MNLA – le Mouvement National de Liberation de l’Azawad).

In 2012, hostilities broke out between the MNLA and the Malian authorities. During this period, Iyyad Ag Aghali, previously secular person, affiliated with the Tuareg cause for autonomy, founded the religious group Anssar-iddin, deviating from his earlier secular views because the MNLA would not let him lead as a result of his failure in 1990s rebellions.

The 2012 conflict in Mali originated when the MNLA tried to negotiate with Mali from November through January but Mali would not accept autonomy for Azawad. The MNLA attacked Adjelhock, a crucial Malian military base. This assault intensified tensions and instigated violence against Tuareg civilians in Bamako, Mali’s capital, causing many to flee. These escalating tensions contributed to a coup d’état in March 2012. Subsequently, the MNLA seized control of major cities but also pockets that had sleeping cells of Al-Qaida factions that existed since 2006. In addition, ideological rifts arose between the MNLA and Ansar-Din,a jihadist group, concerning their vision for the region: MNLA wants a secular Amazigh state and Ansar-Din wants Shari’a law.

This conflict witnessed the MNLA’s endeavors to free Azawad from Mali and introduce a secular interim government with Gao being it is capital and declaring independence on April 6th, 2012.

By January 2013, various extremist factions, including Al-Qaida, Mujao, and Ansar-Din, sought dominion over all of Mali and kicked out MNLA in big cities. This situation compelled the Malian government to request assistance from France, leading to a military intervention.

When the French helped Mali take over big cities like Timbuktu, and Gao, many civilians Amazigh were executed. As a result of these execution, and the Azawad forces presence in Kidal, France refused to help Mali take over Kidal because they considered it as an internal conflict and the MNLA is not a terrorist organization, but a movement seeking freedom for its people.

In the summer of 2013, a peace agreements talks were initiated, and Mali supposed to meet with the MNLA in a neutral place to continue negotiating, but that did not happen – they spent 8 months preparing to take over Azawad.
Tensions lingered that led to a battle between the MNLA and the Malian government, culminating in the May 21, 2014, battle where the MNLA pushed out Mali outside of most Azawad cities and reclaimed significant territory.

Following Azawad’s military triumph in the battle on May 21, 2014, Mali called for a ceasefire. Algeria prominently mediated peace discussions between Mali and the MNLA. However, the MNLA perceived these talks as imposed. The peace accord was eventually signed but was seen as insufficient in granting genuine autonomy to Azawad.
The role of terrorism in the region is multifaceted. While religious motivations are frequently cited, geopolitical, and resource-centered motives are also evident in the context of Azawad. Countries like Algeria express interest in Azawad’s natural resources, and leaders in Mali, Niger, strategically exploit the presence of terrorist entities for both financial and political benefits.

Though the peace agreement did not fully align with Azawad’s interests, a glimmer of hope emerged in 2015 when the Tuaregs of Azawad signed a peace treaty with the Malian government. However, this calm was fleeting.
Eight years after the agreement, with support from the Wagner Group (a Russian private security firm), Mali attempted to retake Azawad, contravening the terms of the peace treaty.

In September 2023, Mali even proceeded to sign a pact with Burkina Faso and Niger to collectively reclaim Azawad. The combined forces of these three countries, along with the Wagner Group, inflicted civilian casualties in Azawad each time they were defeated by Azawad forces.

The Liptako Gourma agreement, signed by Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, propelled many of the Amazigh of Azawagh-Air (Niger) to ally with Azawad forces in their struggle against the combined Sahel forces.

The battle for Azawad represents the nearest approach to an Amazigh state in today’s world. A pressing question arises: when will other Amazigh youths support Azawadians, both intellectually and financially, in their quest to establish a secular nation?

In 1963, when Abreibon was a young boy, his father, an innocent civilian, suffered a brutal execution before his eyes at the hands of the oppressive Malian junta, led by Modibo Keita. This horrific event left an indelible mark on Abreibon, instilling within him a deep sense of justice and an unwavering determination to ensure that such injustices would not befall his people in the future.

Tragically, more than six decades later, history seems to be repeating itself. Another junta has emerged in Mali, raising concerns and fears among the Amazigh community in Azawad. This time, the junta finds an ally in the form of the Wagner Group, a powerful and shadowy private military organization, which further threatens the stability and sovereignty of Azawad, Abreibon’s cherished homeland.

Despite enduring more than four rebellions and participating in three peace agreements between Azawad and the central Malian government, the situation has only grown more complex. The neighboring countries of Niger and Burkina Faso, both of which occupy parts of the ancestral Amazigh territory, have lent their support to Mali, adding to the challenges faced by the Amazigh people.

Yet, Abreibon Ag Alhabib remains undeterred. He courageously steps onto the front lines once again, ready to defend the homeland and the rights of his people. For those who may question his unwavering commitment, it’s essential to remember that heroism knows no borders or nationalities. Just as a Ukrainian would stand their ground in the face of a Russian invasion, so too does Abreibon defend Azawad, a land that has been a part of his heritage for generations.

Abreibon is not simply a leader; he is a paragon of courage and resilience. His dedication to the cause is unwavering, and no amount of political maneuvering or external influence can deter him from assuming his rightful position on the front lines. In this turbulent and challenging time, Abreibon Ag Alhabib serves as a testament to the enduring spirit of the Amazigh people and their unwavering commitment to the principles of justice, freedom, and self-determination.

As the world watches, we must brace ourselves, for the indomitable Abreibon Ag Alhabib is here to redefine the true essence of heroism, showing us that in the face of adversity, the human spirit can rise above and shine as a beacon of hope, resilience, and unwavering determination.

Statement:

The Tuareg Diaspora in the United States of America unequivocally denounces the recent coup d’état in Niger. This act significantly undermines the pillars of democratic governance and poses substantial risks to the stability of the entire region.

Following this, the junta in Niger, in collaboration with the juntas of Burkina Faso and Mali, ratified the “Charter of Liptako-Gourma Establishing the Alliance of Sahel States.” Contrary to advancing democratic ideals, this accord openly opposes the rights and interests of the Tuareg people and other nomadic communities. Such a move represents a glaring violation of principles of justice, equality, and human rights. Actions of this nature perpetuate divisions, intensify mistrust, and pave the way for heightened conflicts within the region. It’s essential to highlight the subsequent events:

Breach of Peace Accords: Mali’s continuous and evident disregard for the 2015 peace agreement with the Azawad Movements. The Algiers peace agreement intended to serve as a beacon of hope to diminish the prolonged conflict between Mali and Azawad. However, the withdrawal of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) upon Mali’s insistence led to a surge in violence against civilians by the combined forces of Wagner-Russia/Mali and Islamists.

• Violation of Ceasefire Commitments: Mali’s repeated breaches of ceasefire agreements, which exacerbate ongoing clashes and elevate regional tensions.
•  Engagement with the Wagner-Russia Group: The Malian junta’s engagement with the Wagner Group, implicated in several civilian massacres, notably targeting the Tuaregs and other nomadic communities historically marginalized.
•  Lack of Inclusive Governance: Mali’s continued neglect in fostering inclusive governance, especially in northern regions, thereby depriving the Azawad community of essential political participation.
• Alarming is the inclination of the military regimes in Niger and Burkina Faso to adopt Mali’s misguided approach, inadvertently creating a hospitable environment for extremist factions to thrive.

We, the Tuareg Diaspora in the United States, hereby declare:

• Unwavering solidarity with the people of Azawad, Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso in their pursuit of democracy and freedom against coup perpetrators and Islamist terrorists
•  We urge the juntas of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso to restore constitutional order and to decisively cut ties with the Wagner-Russia Group.
• We further appeal to the international community, with emphasis on the Biden administration, to intensify its scrutiny of ongoing and potential human rights abuses in the Sahel region perpetrated by Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso against pastoralist communities.

Tuareg Diaspora in the United States of America

In both instances, Moroccan television channels chose to use Modern Standard Arabic to communicate with earthquake survivors, despite their primary language being Amazigh. This language barrier caused immense difficulties for survivors, who struggled to express their feelings and help needed.

The use of Arabic in these situations led to survivors searching for appropriate words, often resulting in muddled and confusing statements. Even local government officials, doctors, and nurses were affected, responding in Arabic despite potentially never using the language before. This miscommunication hindered the transmission of crucial information during live broadcasts.

The choice to interview survivors in Arabic only added to their trauma, as they grappled with a language they were not proficient in. In such distressing situations like this, survivors should be allowed to express themselves in their mother tongue, as it is the most genuine and heartfelt way to convey their experiences.

The insistence on using Arabic rather than Amazigh, the language spoken by the majority of survivors, during earthquake coverage has led to significant communication challenges, adding unnecessary layers of difficulty for those already suffering.

An example from the Al Hoceima earthquake coverage illustrates the issue, where a survivor attempted to express gratitude but ended up conveying a different message due to his limited Arabic skills. This language barrier has unfortunately repeated itself in the recent Al Houz earthquake coverage.

While these channels emphasized solidarity in providing material support like shelter, food, clothing, and medical treatment, they overlooked the importance of psychological and moral support. True solidarity and intimacy in offering condolences should involve speaking the survivors’ language and dialect to make them feel a genuine connection.

The difference in survivors’ responses to questions in Arabic versus Amazigh was striking. Those questioned in Arabic appeared anxious and confused, while those who spoke in Amazigh did so naturally and confidently, without communication barriers.

Foreign Arabic channels, like Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, were not exempt from this issue, as they also primarily used Arabic in their coverage. However, this was partly due to the perception of Morocco as an Arab country, which they believed would be understood by the local population.

Surprisingly, little has changed in terms of language communication from the 2004 Al Hoceima earthquake to the 2023 al Houz earthquake. Despite Amazigh being recognized as an official language since the 2011 constitution, media coverage, especially concerning communication with residents, hasn’t reflected this change. The absence of Amazigh in these situations may highlight its imitation and appropriation rather than genuine recognition.

Contrary to claims that Arabic is the protector of Islam, the presence of Islam among Amazigh speakers, as evidenced in the aftermath of the earthquake, is strong. Mosques are widespread, indicating a deep-rooted connection with Islam. This connection is maintained through the Amazigh language, which preserves authentic Moroccan Islam and protects it from extremist tendencies.

In conclusion, the language barrier created during this earthquake coverage had unintended negative effects on the survivors, has led to significant communication challenges, adding unnecessary layers of difficulty for those already suffering during times of crisis.

The MENA Category: Oversimplifying Complexity

The MENA category lumps together countries with vastly different histories, cultures, and languages, which diminishes the rich diversity within the region. By grouping North Africa with the Middle East, indigenous North Africans are often overlooked, leading to their erasure. North African countries, such as Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, and Egypt, have distinct cultural and historical backgrounds that should be recognized and respected and have a majority of Amazigh populations.

Erasure of Indigenous North Africans

One of the significant consequences of the MENA category is the erasure of indigenous North Africans. These populations, which include the Amazigh people, have inhabited North Africa for thousands of years and have distinct identities, languages, and cultures. However, by grouping North Africa with the Middle East, the focus tends to shift towards Arab cultures and language, overshadowing the rich heritage of the indigenous peoples. This erasure perpetuates a cycle of cultural marginalization and fosters a limited understanding of the region.

Additionally, it chops the African continent further perpetuating the legacies of imperialism and colonization. The Amazigh are in Mali, Niger, Sudan and a MENA category divides Tamazgha or North Africa from the African continent and cultures.

Misinformation and Legacy of Colonization

The MENA category also perpetuates misinformation and reinforces a legacy of colonization. Historically, the categorization of the region as “Middle East” and “North Africa” has been rooted in Western colonial perspectives, focusing on the strategic interests of colonial powers. This legacy continues to impact perceptions and misrepresentations of the region today.

The relationship between the Arab and Amazigh people is indeed complex

It is important to note that the relationship between Arab and the Amazigh people is very complex. Arab culture has been promoted and maintained by the political and social structures that have historically been in place. Arab rulers and elites often held positions of power and influence, and Arab culture was often associated with status and privilege. This historical context has contributed to the prominence of Arab culture in various spheres though a minority as the Amazigh are a majority in North Africa. Furthermore, the Middle East itself is diverse ethnically.
In past years, there has been a growing resurgence of revitalization of Amazigh culture and identity led by the Amazigh movement.

Moving forward with the categorization of MENA promotes Arab culture at the expense of Amazigh cultural revitalization efforts, as historical and political power dynamics have often marginalized the native Amazigh culture in favor of the Arabization agenda. This is reflects exclusivity and will ignite ongoing conflicts.

Moving Towards Inclusion: The Need of two separate categories

To address the harmful consequences of the MENA category, an alternative approach is to adopt the solution of two different categories. By separating the Middle East and North Africa into two distinct categories, we can foster inclusivity and provide a more accurate representation of each region. This recognizes the unique identities of both the Arab people and the Amazigh people of North Africans.

Embracing the two categories allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the cultural, linguistic, and historical diversity within each region. It also acknowledges the distinct experiences and struggles of indigenous North Africans and does not chop Africa.

In conclusion, the MENA category’s harmful effects on indigenous North Africans cannot be overlooked. By separating the category and adopting a one category for each region, we can foster a more inclusive and accurate representation of the region. This approach avoids erasure, acknowledges diverse identities, and challenges the legacy of colonization. It is crucial to move away from broad categorizations and work towards an understanding that respects and celebrates the unique cultures and histories of all the peoples of each region.

There are several reasons why some Amazigh people do not like to be referred to as Berbers. One reason is that the term “Berber” has a controversial history. It is thought to have originated from the Greek word “barbaros,” which means “barbarian” or “uncivilized.” The Romans later used the term to refer to the Amazigh people, and it has been used by outsiders to describe the Amazigh ever since. As a result, many Amazigh people feel that the term “Berber” carries negative connotations and is a way for outsiders to label and stigmatize them.

Another reason some Amazigh people prefer to be called Amazigh is that the term “Berber” does not fully capture the diversity and complexity of their culture. The Amazigh people are a diverse group with a rich and varied history, language, and culture. They have a long tradition of oral storytelling, music, and dance, and their culture is deeply intertwined with the landscapes and environments in which they live. The term “Berber” does not adequately reflect the diversity and complexity of this culture, and many Amazigh people feel that it is an oversimplification and misrepresentation of their identity.

In addition, some Amazigh people prefer to be called Amazigh because they feel that it is a more accurate and respectful way to refer to their identity. The term “Amazigh” is a self-proclaimed name that reflects the pride and dignity of the Amazigh people. It is a way for them to assert their identity and to reclaim their cultural heritage. By using the term “Amazigh,” members of this group are able to assert their autonomy and independence, and to resist the labels and stereotypes that have been imposed upon them by outsiders.

There are also political and historical reasons why some Amazigh people prefer to be called Amazigh. For many years, the Amazigh people have struggled to have their culture and rights recognized and respected by the governments of North Africa. In some countries, the use of the Tamazight language and the practice of Amazigh culture were suppressed and punished. In recent years, however, there has been a resurgence of Amazigh identity and pride, and many Amazigh people are working to preserve and promote their culture. By using the term “Amazigh,” they are able to assert their cultural and political autonomy and to demand recognition and respect for their rights.

Overall, it is important to respect the preferences of Amazigh people and to use the terms that they prefer to describe ourselves. While the term “Berber” is often used to refer to the Amazigh, many members of this group prefer to be called Amazigh, as it is a more accurate and respectful way to refer to their identity and culture. By using the term “Amazigh,” we can show our respect for the diversity and complexity of the group and their rich cultural heritage.

For decades, Morocco and Algeria’s relationship has been marked by hostility, and over the past few years, the level of verbal attacks has escalated to the point that there were actually concern these actions could escalate the conflict into military confrontation between the two powers. Morocco and Algeria’s land border has already been closed since 1994. Algerian airspace was closed to Moroccan flights, and Algeria refused to extend the contract for the gas pipeline, which transported gas to Spain through Morocco. 

What is the reason behind the animosity between the two neighboring countries? What are the implication of this conflict? And how can this Cold War come to an end?

Morocco and Algeria have a lot in common. While both countries share almost the same language, culture, and religion, we can longer pretend that the conflict is just between the two regimes, it is time to admit that this tension is influencing how people from both countries think about each-other. The new generations are being influenced by the propaganda and fake news from social media from both parties. While we can’t say that propaganda is  propagated by both governments but pro-government media on both sides routinely denigrate and mock other country’s major problems and focus on each other’s domestic failures and internal affairs. And while there are groups professing and promoting brotherly sentiments between both people it is obvious that this is changing as people from both sides accuse each other of stirring conflict. 

In 2019, the four nations of North Africa recently put aside their disagreements and joined forces in an effort to have the traditional Amazigh couscous recognized as a UNESCO world heritage dish.

How Does Algeria See The Conflict?

• Decades ago, the Moroccan King Hassan II made territorial claims in Algeria. In 1963, he launched a military invasion on the nation. As a result, hundreds of Algeria’s ill-equipped men were killed. Even though the war was short this conflict has had a lasting impact on Algeria’s military and political institutions.

• From Algeria’s perspective, The Moroccans are suspected of aiding organizations that Algeria just labeled as terrorists. These include the Islamist Rachad and the Amazigh separatist Movement for Kabylie’s Self-Determination (MAK) 

• For a long time Morocco claims what is referred to as Western Sahara as an integral part of its territory and In 1975 Morocco organized what it calls a Green March which resulted in its taking control over Western Shara. Something that resulted in another era of tensions and obviously reminded Algeria of Morocco invasion over a decade ago. The fear of Moroccan expansion became a significant element in Algeria’s decision to accept the independence of Western Sahara because Algiers believed it would help curb Moroccan irredentism, even though Morocco would drop its claims to areas in Algeria in 1972.

• Algeria and Algerians accuse and criticize Morocco’s established relations with Israel so the United States can support Morocco in its claim over “Western Sahara”. It is important to note that Algeria is hostile to Israel and does not have any diplomatic ties with the country. 

How Does Morocco See The Conflict?

• Morocco claims that “Western Sahara” has always been a part of Morocco and accuses Algeria of interfering in its internal affairs. Morocco also suspects that Algeria wants a window to the Atlantic Ocean and uses “Western Sahara” as an excuse to achieve its personal goals. 

• Algeria seeks to destabilize Morocco since it support the Polisario Front financially and militarily. The Polisario Front is an armed group that battled Morocco for sovereignty of Western Sahara from 1975 until 1991. 
• Morocco also blames Algeria for the conflict in the region since Algeria was the one that closed its borders, cut diplomatic ties with Morocco, closed its airspace and decided not to renew the gas pipeline agreement that transported gas to Spain through Morocco. 

• The United States’ recognition of Morocco’s soveinegty over Western Sahara has reignited the conflict between Morocco and Algeria. All these moves have angered Algeria, both because of its support for the Sahrawis and its hostility to Israel.
• Morocco accuses Algeria and Spain for aiding the leader of Polisario, someone Morocco consider a war criminal. 
• Algeria’s rulers continue to argue  that they support the right to self-determination while it continue to ignore the Kbayli region’s attempt to self determination.

The Problem In Simple Terms:

While the issue of Western Sahara may appear to be reason for the conflict, the true basis of the conflict is the competition for regional leadership in North Africa and an unsolved colonial-era land issue caused by both France and Spain. 

The Big Picture And Potential Risks:

Morocco and the United States enjoy strong economic and diplomatic relations in addition to Morocco being an old US ally. Morocco also has established relations with Israel. It is also worth noting that the relations between Morocco and Iran are non existent. Algeria on the other hand is Pro Russia, anti Israel and has cordial relations with Iran.

Why does Algeria’s friendly relations with Russia and Iran matter? It matters because the two countries (Russia and Iran) constitute a threat to both Israel and the United States which is something that is not good specifically for Algeria and North Africa in general as it possible for all four super powers ( The US, Russia, Israel and Iran) to race to to build military bases in North Africa. The equation then becomes; Russia, Iran and Algeria, Vs US, Israel, and Morocco. What some Moroccans fear is North Africa becoming another battle ground for all these military powers. 

How Does This Affect The Amazigh People From Both Sides?

Algerian and Moroccan people are so similar that it is impossible to tell them apart. However, political, and ideological differences between these “brotherly” countries have taken a toll on their relations. Recently, there have been a number of disputes on social media regarding Couscous, Architecture, and other issues regarding historical events. In response to Algeria’s soccer team new training outfit, which was introduced by the manufacturer Adidas last week, the Moroccan government has accused Algeria of “cultural appropriation.” 

The Moroccan government and Moroccans themselves argue that the geometric design imprinted in the Algerian outfit which is typical in Moroccan “Zellige” mosaics, represented cultural appropriation and accused Adidas of cultural theft.

Moroccans and Algerians are also fighting over Couscous and people from both sides claim that it is purely theirs. Disputes of over architectural sites and wether they their design and pattern is Moroccan or Algerian are trending on social media as well. 

Solution:

Whether a specific architecture is Moroccan or Algerian , whether Morocco has more rights to claim couscous, It seems that the only reason individuals from both sides argue about these issues is because they are Arabized. Couscous is neither Moroccan nor Algerian. We can also say it is both Moroccan and Algerian because Couscous is An ethnic Amazigh food. Since these aspects are Ethnically Amazigh, it is obvious that they would be found in most North African countries. Maybe when both countries go back to their roots and embrace their Amazigh identity, they won’t be fighting about whether something is Moroccan or Algerian because they will then know that it belongs to the Amazigh people.  The solution may be simplistic but one thing is undeniable, The troubled relationship Between Morocco and Algeria has prevented the region’s integration, which might have significant advantages for both parties.

The Algerian ruling elite has accused MAK for the devastating wildfires that killed at least 65 people in the Kabyle region, east of Algiers, last month which hit mostly Amazigh-speaking Kabyle provinces including Tizi Ouzou and Bejaia. MAK, whose leadership is based in France, has denied any involvement. “The recent crackdown on peaceful dissent follows a long-established pattern of efforts to silence and repress the Kabylian population.” said  Mr. Ferhat Mehenni, President of MAK.

In total, at least 40 activists are currently in detention in Algeria in connection with the peaceful movement, according to the National Committee for the Liberation of Detainees (CNLD), a local watchdog group.

These prosecutions are the latest in the Algerian authorities’ ongoing repression of rights defenders and targeting of journalists and prominent figures in MAK. However, this is the first time that terrorism-related charges are being used. Other charges include also “offending public bodies” and “defamation”, under articles 146 and 298 of the Penal Code.

In response, MAK have recently filed a complaint with the International Criminal Court (ICC) in relation to the systematic repression of Kabylians, which also highlights the acute failures of the Algerian authorities response to Covid-19 and the recent forest fires in the region which killed dozens.

Meanwhile, dozens of members from the Kabyle community living in diaspora and their counterpart supporter from the Amazigh community have held several rallies around the world including Paris and Montreal to denounce the ongoing crackdown on MAK activists and their supporters by Algerian authorities.

Algeria is ranked 146th out of 180 countries and territories on the Reporters Without Borders (RSF) World Press Freedom Index.