Playing against fellow finalist Croatia in the group stage then overcoming Belgium, Spain, and now Portugal on their road to the semifinals, The Atlas Lions have been one of the game’s storylines

The only goal in the game was scored by Youssed En-Nesyri right before halftime while Morocco continued to defend its goal with a solid wall of players ready to curb the Portuguese attacks.

The Amazigh flag of the Amazigh people who represent most of Morocco being waived in Qatar.

Morocco will face the winner of England-France on Wednesday and has now become Africa’s first World Cup semifinals.

The Atlas Lions have already defeated European giants Belgium, Spain, and Portugal at this World Cup, as well as holding Croatia to a goalless tie in their first game.

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Suln Wussan, the name of the released single and album literally means “there are still more days coming”. The song itself is a message of hope and positivity considering the covid-19 global crisis we are living nowadays.

“I have been working on the song over the past six months and it is about longing for more better days coming ahead meant to inspire and give hope to people looking toward a brighter tomorrow” said Imran when interviewed.

The song’s video is filmed at several locations in the South East of Morocco including Imran’s birthplace Mellab which is also the birthplace of the late singer Mbark Oularbi, member of the band Saghrou Band. Imran’s music expresses voices of Amazigh youth and advocates and promotes Amazigh culture, poetry, and music. Imran has previously performed songs such as Iwa Ruh, Tena Righ , and he also made a cover of Igahrminew, a song by Mallal.

“When I first started my career back in 2018. I began with Ahidous 1 performances but I added a modern touch to it by playing with guitar and other instruments and that is makes my style unique. I am a music lover, throughout my childhood, I listened to different music styles and got inspired by them, so I always had that dream to be a musician. I want to add my own touch and contribution to Amazigh music and bring it into the international scene” said Imarn.

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Imarn expressed that he saw a big increase in popularity of Amazigh culture fueled by social media and modern technology and is happy the culture and its rich heritage is getting the attention it deserves.

His songs can be found on all platforms including YouTube, Spotify and Apple Music. The full album can also be purchased on a CD via direct contact with his management team on Instagram as well as on Facebook.

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“I am honored to receive this award; it’s the fruit of a lot of hard work and perseverance. It motivates me to continue my Ph.D. studies,” said Bochra.

Before Bochra Laghssais moved to Spain to continue her masters’ studies, she completed her bachelor’s in English Studies at Cadi Ayyad University in Marrakech, which included a semester abroad with the Erasmus+ mobility program at the University of West Bohemia in the Czech Republic.

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Besides studying, Bochra is storyteller, writer, researcher, and advocate for girl’s education and women’s empowerment. She has worked with Project Soar, a nonprofit in Morocco, as coordinator and mentor to support girl’s schooling and empowerment. In addition to collaborations as a counterpart with U.S. Peace Corps Volunteers in many projects on youth development, Bochra was part of the Michelle Obama initiative Let Girls Learn, through which she was invited to represent Moroccan girls’ education at the White House in 2016.

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When we asked her to whom she would dedicate this achievement, she replied: “I dedicated this prize to my mother and grandmothers who never went to school yet know the value of and fought for my education. My heart is overflowing with gratitude for their love, sacrifice, determination, beauty, and legacy.”

Follow Bochra Laghssais on Twitter: @BLaghssais

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To celebrate the moment, Munir El Haddadi, of Rif origins, who took part in second half of the game, has made a special appearance by carrying the Amazigh flag during the celebration to represent and promote his identity and culture.

A gesture that sparked controversy in Morocco and angered many of so called ‘Moroccan nationalists’ including various media, who described the act as; “an incomprehensible attitude which cannot, under any circumstances, be accepted or forgiven.”

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El haddadi’s behavior has made headline news on most Moroccan news websites such Hibapress.com, who commented that,  “as Moroccans, we were very proud and honored that three of our own were crowned European champions of Europe league cup, but what ruined our joy is this “incomprehensible attitude” by Munir El Haddadi who preferred to brandish the Amazigh flag instead of Morocco one, to celebrate the victory.”

Same site added that, “Munir El Haddadi is free to show pride to any symbols he wants, however, he should have at least a little respect for the birth country of his both parents “.

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Hiba Press concluded their article that the Rif footballer “had the obvious opportunity to earn the heart of  Moroccan public, after he chose to play for Spain national team over Morocco, he may have succeeded in the Rif region or Amazigh part but not all Moroccans are Amazigh … Too bad. “.

President of Morocco’s Royal Football Federation, Fouzi Lekjaa, has congratulated the other two Moroccan who play for the Andalusian team Yassine Bounou and Youssef En-nesery, however, he never mentioned a word about Munir El Haddadi.

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On the other side, many Amazigh activists as well as several Amazigh media have cherished and loved the nice gesture by Munir; 

Munir El haddadi celebrating the Europa league cup win with an #Amazigh flag. pic.twitter.com/uiQRk5cL3M

— Zouhir • ⵣⵓⵁⵉⵔ (@zi_Arrif) August 21, 2020

Munir El Haddadi, l’ancien joueur du Barcelone et actuellement du FC Séville fête la victoire de son équipe à la finale de l'Europa league avec le drapeau amazigh. pic.twitter.com/estOhNt68P

— Berbère Télévision (@BerbereTV) August 21, 2020

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While the Spanish news media were focused to know and  inform their readers on the origins of the flag and what does it mean;

Azul, verde y amarilla son los colores de la bandera (no la roja y verde de Marruecos) con la que el sevillista Munir el Haddadi festeja la Liga Europa, pero…

¿Cuál es el origen y qué significado tiene esa bandera?
https://t.co/8kSwn4fryT #UEL #UELfinal

Ina Fassbender pic.twitter.com/IFvyrMNTdr

— EFE Deportes (@EFEdeportes) August 22, 2020

Ihssane ,34, came to the U.S. from Morocco at the age of 20 with nothing but a small suitcase and worked sub-minimum wage jobs to become the first person in her family to graduate from college. Following the 2008 financial crisis, her commitment to justice led her to take on the corrupt corporations as a Wall Street regulator at the Federal Reserve. 

“We need leaders who represent our diversity and our courage, who aren’t afraid to take on corrupt special interests and who know how to get it done.” Leckey said.

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The Amazigh American Community’s endorsement adds to a growing list of leaders and community organizations who support Leckey’s bid for Congress, including Congresswoman Ilhan Omar.

I am honored to receive @IlhanMN’s endorsement. Her courage and relentless fight on behalf of working families, people of color, immigrants and Muslims is an inspiration to me and millions of people across this country who are fighting to create an inclusive and just democracy.” Ihssane posted on her twitter page.

As Congresswoman, Ihssane is willing to fight to bring power back to working people, immigrant communities, communities of color, that guarantees justice and dignity for all. She has taken on powerful corporations as a Wall Street regulator and won’t accept a dollar from corporate PACs or lobbyists.

Ihssane resides in Brookline in Massachusetts with her daughter Nora, husband Sean and their dog Benji.

For more news about Ihsane’s race to the congress and if you can contribute to her campaign, please visit ihssane.org , “Like” her page on Facebook and follow her campaign on Twitter @ihssaneleckey.

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In this regard Reed Wester-Ebinghaus in Ancient History Encyclopedia argues:

“The Berbers have occupied North Africa, specifically the Maghreb, since the beginning of recorded history and until the Islamic conquests of the 8th century CE constituted the dominant ethnic group in the Saharan region.”

The Amazigh cultural revival was a highly decentralized social movement that evolved into its full force during the 1970s. Its complete roots stretch far back before North African independence from colonialism, all the way back to the invasion of Roman and Arab-speaking warriors in Berber regions, over the span of 2000 years; but for the purposes of the contemporary movement, the past 150 years suffice as its impetus.  Spurred by decades, if not centuries, of invasion and oppression, a Pan-Amazigh movement began to form around the desire to revive a largely undocumented yet present culture across North and Saharan Africa.

Amazigh identity

Amazigh identity is formed largely by its language awal, Tamazight. Language is the marker of all cultures, but particularly so with Amazigh civilization. Tamazight Is being recognized by both Morocco and Algeria as an official language in their respective constitutions. This recognition came about after a long period of denial from the governments and society about Tamazight and its connection to Amazigh identity. It ran into several issues. Besides the multiple dialects of Morocco and Algeria, Tamazight was unwritten in the recent past except among the Tuareg in the Sahara. 

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The first task of the officially recognized Amazigh cultural team in the government was the selection of an official alphabet for Tamazight in Morocco i.e. Tifinagh. Unfortunately, the language has interacted with Arabic for so many years that the two have intermixed. In 2005, a movement was started to teach Tamazight in Amazigh areas. This called for the creation of textbooks and a curriculum to be taught by teachers in Tamazight. Although the governmental ministries dragged their feet in this endeavor, Tamazight TV 8 was created as an Amazigh cultural channel. Clearly, language is a definitive element of Amazigh cultural identity in Morocco and the same applies in Algeria.

The next major defining aspect of Amazigh culture is land akkal. Land has been historically and culturally significant to the Amazigh people. Land conservation is taken very seriously and land ownership balances the fine line of being communal with private property. Additionally, disputes can arise over land ownership. However, a census taken in Morocco in 2014 was controversial to the Amazigh because of the composition of the population as well as Amazigh land location and territory. 

The land on which the Amazigh live extends all the way from Egypt to the Canary Islands. This land is called Tamazgha, and the Amazigh believe that it belongs to them. Thus, there are some issues surrounding Amazigh land today since it is such a large component of Amazigh identity and culture.

Another theme central to Amazigh identity is the idea of blood ddam. Family to the Amazigh represents cohesiveness of their culture. Solidarity with other Amazigh people denotes the recognition Amazigh feel in addition to a sense of belonging. Additionally, blood represents sacrifice in Amazigh culture. This sacrifice can represent the earning back of honor, repayment of other sorts, or recognition of significant events. The Amazigh believe that an issue is resolved only once sacrificial blood is spilled. As such, blood is a very important aspect of Amazigh identity and was used in the Amazigh cultural revival movement.

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Altogether, the Amazigh cultural revival movement called for a definition and recognition of the Amazigh culture. This movement drew upon the components of language, land, and blood to unite the Amazigh people. In terms of language, Tamazight was decided upon as the official language of the Amazigh people. Another identifying aspect of Amazigh culture is land. The Amazigh see land as central to their society and thus sought governmental protection for their lands. Finally, the cultural concept of blood brought them together for the cultural revival movement. United by blood, the Amazigh people sought governmental recognition of their lands and the official use of Tamazight in the Amazigh cultural revival movement.

On the issue of Amazigh struggle for recognition in Algeria, Amir Akef writes about this country’s recent official change of heart towards Amazigh culture in The Guardian, in a piece entitled: “Algeria proposes constitutional reform.” He first details the official recognition of the culture since 2002:

“Amazigh was granted “national language” status in 2002 and its recognition rewards the efforts of a long campaign hinging on the definition of Algeria’s national identity. In 1949 the issue triggered a serious crisis in the Algerian independence movement. The controversy was papered over when the war of independence started shortly afterwards, but resurfaced when independence was proclaimed in 1962. Hocine Aït Ahmed, one of the original leaders of the independence movement, advocated a democratic state guaranteeing political pluralism. But his ideas were soon thwarted by the authoritarian Pan-Arab credo that prevailed under presidents Ahmed Ben Bella (1963-65) and Houari Boumédiène (1965-1976).

The campaign in favour of the Amazigh language dovetailed naturally with the broader struggle for civil liberties, gaining fresh impetus in the 1980s with the Berber cultural movement. In the early 1990s the authorities grudgingly started to acknowledge its importance. “It took almost half a century, starting from the crisis in 1949, for the Algerian constitution [of 1996] to begin to draw up a more balanced, realistic map of the nation’s identity, though there is still a great deal of ambiguity,” the nationalist militant, then leader of the Algerian Communist party, Sadek Hadjeres, wrote in 1998.”

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And later on moves on to discuss the constitutional reform:

“The plans for constitutional reform include setting up an Algerian Academy of Berber Language, tasked with consolidating its new status as an official tongue. Supporters say it would put an end to a pointless source of division, giving rise to various political ills the country could well do without.”

Amazigh struggle for full recognition in Tamazgha

For decades, the Amazigh community has been trying to penetrate into relevant life and culture within North Africa. Their focus on language, land, and blood have had ties to the land and people for thousands of years. The unwritten culture they have built and passed down through generations has shaped every aspect of life. However, since the Arabs have controlled the region, they have historically been ostracized and ignored, being pushed aside while the dominant Arab culture and values have received all the credit and in the process marginalizing Amazigh freedom, standards, and lifestyle. Over the years the Amazigh cultural revolution has been met with obstacles, oppression, and ignorance while trying to gain recognition for their influence on culture and existence as an ethnic group. 

In the 1970s more and more Amazigh voices were being projected, arguing for less oppression, more rights, and acknowledgment of the Amazigh culture and ethnicity. These underground activists continued to gain support in the following years, finally breaking through in 1980 with the Amazigh Spring in Algeria: tafsut Imazighen. The Amazigh Spring created widespread awareness within the region. While it may have only been a “Spring” in Algeria, its influence did not go unnoticed in Morocco. The Spring sparked even stronger hope and strength within the Amazigh fight. Supporters of the Amazigh cause were fighting harder than ever for their voices to be heard, their history to be recognized, and their culture to be acknowledged. The flame continued to light the way for more activism in the years to come.

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In 1994, the Amazigh movement finally had some acknowledgment by those in power. During a protest on May Day, Amazigh supporters marched with a banner written in the Amazigh language. The activists were arrested and taken in by police. Such an act created outrage within all of Morocco. The media followed the trials and the situation closely, leading the movement to gain national support for Amazigh rights. The nation was finally starting to recognize the Amazigh community’s battle within the country. 

The beginning of the revival was in Algeria: tafsut Imazighen

Algeria in response to the aggressive Arabization efforts of the FLN regime which aimed to suppress the Amazigh identity by banning activities by Amazigh militants and the use of Tamazight and its variants, people voiced their discontent publicly.

In this context, many Imazighen in Algeria began to push boundaries in their respective fields in the late 1970’s. A primary example of this rests in the album “A Vava Inou Va “ that the late musician Hamid Cheriat, also known by his stage name Idir, produced in 1976, in the period leading up to the Kabylie Tafsut Imazighen. “A Vava Inou Va “ was the first internationally released album by an Amazigh musician in Tamazight, and this artistic creation led to the blossoming of Amazigh music throughout North Africa. The revival of Amazigh literature also coincides with the same period, and the demand that it created for a written medium for Tamazight aided the adoption of the Tuareg’s Tifinagh script and added legitimacy to the movement to recognize Tamazight as a national language in 2001 in Algeria and as an official language in Morocco in 2011.

On March 10, 1980, a conference at Mouloud Mammeri Hasnaoua University in Tizi-Ouzou featuring a Kabyle activist by the name of Mouloud Mammeri was suppressed and the pushback from Amazigh activists led to the mass arrests of its main players on April 20, 1980. Though the Algerian FLN government violently suppressed the strikes following from these events, and the movement did not succeed immediately, it became the critical rallying point for the formation of civil society organizations such as the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) and the Berber Cultural Movement (MCB), which both advocated for greater recognition and acceptance of a distinct Amazigh cultural and linguistic identity and the protection of Amazigh human and legal rights. Later, Tamazight was recognized as one of Algeria’s national languages and these developments also had the collateral effect of adding strength to the general push for the protection of human rights in Algeria. A second political push came during January 2011 as the Arab Spring pushed through the Middle East and North Africa, and this momentum strengthened the social, political and cultural institutions created by the first Tafsut Imazighen.

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Tamazight revival in Morocco

In response to the outpour of Amazigh support across the nation and the cries for more Amazigh rights, King Hassan II publicly spoke about the need to teach Tamazight in schools in a speech on August 20, 1994. He stated that the Tamazight language was important to Morocco’s past and culture. Within this speech, King Hassan II was the first Alouite king to finally acknowledge the Imazighen’s importance to Morocco and its development. 

In this regard, Karima Ziamari et Jan Jaap De Ruiter write :

« Le discours du Trône du 20 août 1994, à l’occasion de la fête de la Révolution du Roi et du Peuple, est considéré comme un tournant. Dans ce discours, le roi Hassan II annonçait, dans un certain sens, l’ouverture du pays aux trois variétés de berbère. Il se montrait favorable à l’enseignement de ces langues, et, immédiatement après ce discours, les stations TV et radio commençaient des bulletins d’information en tarifit, tamazight et tachelhit. »

However, the battle for rights and recognition still continued into the new century. In 2001 King Mohammed VI declared in his Royal Decree that it was finally time to support the Amazigh cause and therefore created the Institut Royal de la Culture Amazighe -IRCAM-. IRCAM was formed to increase awareness and support for the Amazigh around the country. It standardized the Amazigh language, agreeing to slowly integrate it into schools and the media. Not only did it officially aid the Berber cause, but it also raised even more national support, acknowledgement, and acceptance of the Amazigh identity as being a key player in shaping Moroccan culture. Even with its improvements there was still doubt unto how helpful IRCAM actually was. Some even argued that the organization only limited the Amazigh identity into a small box, not allowing for different forms and less common aspects to flourish. That being said, the main Amazigh movements agreed with the creation of IRCAM and its push for more recognition of Berber identity within Morocco.

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 While IRCAM agreed to promote the Amazigh culture through schools, the official start of Tamazight being taught in schools did not happen until 2005. The government’s promise was long overdue, being dragged out despite the King’s decree. Even with this, the language was only taught in Berber speaking areas. Nonetheless, the integration of Tamazight into public schools was a huge step for the Amazigh cultural revolution. With Tamazight came textbooks, curriculum, and teachers that all embodied the acceptance and promotion of Amazigh culture. 

As Amazigh cultural activism increased, their presence in the political sphere increased as well. Throughout the 2000’s multiple parties have attempted to form on the basis of their common Amazigh identity. Unfortunately, the government has shut those parties down due to illegality of formation of parties based on ethnicity — with Amazigh considered an ethnicity. Even so, there were ways around the ethnic clause. The Movement Populaire (MP) was formed in 1959 to represent the Amazigh, rural and poor Moroccans in parliament and act as a check to the Arabist Istiqlal Party which was hoping to take over power and become a unique party in Morocco, along the communist paradigm. With this in mind, the MP worked closely with Amazigh activists and has mobilized support for the Amazigh movement across the country, advocating for their cultural practices, rights, and recognition. The party have even gained a significant amount of seats in parliament, becoming a strong influence and legitimate party that has direct advocacy for the Amazigh cultural cause. 

Following the greater influence of the Amazigh in politics, an unlikely coalition formed between them and trade unions and the Islamists, in 2011, calling for greater rights, freedoms, and respect. The support for this coalition came to a peak on February 20, 2011 when the Amazigh were able to mobilize thousands of supporters to protest and rally for their cause. King Mohammed VI quickly responded to these outbreaks —afraid of what was happening across the region with the Arab Spring — and announced that a new constitution would be created. In this the Amazigh gained many rights, with more protections, cultural rights, and more regional governance. One of the biggest feats was that in the new ratified constitution, the Tamazigh language finally became an official language of Morocco. The support from other groups and by thousands of people in 2011 continued to aid the Amazigh in gaining the strength to no longer be pushed aside or ignored. Even to this day they are gaining more influence, credibility, and cultural rights.

From the early 1970s until present day, the Amazigh have vigorously fought for the freedom and recognition of their culture. The cultural revolution has proven that it will not back down until the Amazigh culture is fully recognized and cherished as one of the most important parts of Moroccan history.

Cultural revival is a grassroot movement

In Morocco, one could point to the recurring maltreatment by both the French and the Arab political powers as instigators (the unbalance created by the French Berber Dahir in 1930 and the opposition of the Arab-nationalist Istiqlal party providing merely two examples). Even though they were still legally prevented from identifying as Berber, a magazine defending Amazigh rights began circulating in the 1980s (named Tamazight). By 1991, thirty cultural associations were working in Morocco, each aiming to attain recognition of cultural rights for Amazigh people, their language, and culture.

The cultural revival can be described as a grassroots movement, as it developed on an individual and community level, gradually gaining more political influence and voice. As the cause gained national and international attention, North African governments have found it more difficult to ignore the calls. 

But in Morocco, the shift from grassroots activism to government backing may be stalling advancements. Many Amazigh activists feel that the adoption of the Tifinagh script over the Latin script is a subtle way of further separating Berber-ness from Arab-ness in contemporary Moroccan society (many of whom are taught to read and write French before Arabic). Meanwhile, the activists who support government involvement (referred to as makhzenisé by their former colleagues-in-arms), feel these might be small prices to pay for ultimate acceptance.

As far as political implications, the current situation is bittersweet. If states of North Africa want to achieve peace with their Berber populations, they need to not only accept the Berber culture as their own culture, but part of the greater countries’ culture as well. This overlapping identity is still a new idea that is just starting to take seed, and if the gap can be filled between government rhetoric and individual activism, acceptance and fair treatment can be achieved.

What good is it to have 
Freemen who sleep in this world of suffering 
Wake up, my people 
Straighten up, my people 
Confront the difficulties of your current situation 
A long road awaits you 
What good is it to have 
Freemen who sleep in this world of suffering…
My friends, my friends 
Never forget what 
We learned from our parents 
My friends, my friends 
Let us not forget this heritage 
That our parents have left us 
Let us keep it fondly 
This heritage is our identity. . .
Omara “Bombino” Moctar (Album: Nomad, 2013)

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Today, the official IRCAM is in full decline, over the years the Moroccan establishment has used it extensively to subdue the Amazigh and keep at bay the vociferous voices who call for full recognition of Tamazight cultural rights. It is mostly staffed by people from the Association Marocaine de Recherches et d’Echanges Culturels –AMREC-, who have from the very beginning been used as the Amazigh arm of the Moroccan establishment to further its own vision of Amazigh culture: obsequious and subservient. 

Since the recognition of the Amazigh language in the constitution of 2011 first in the Preamble:

A sovereign Muslim State, attached to its national unity and to its territorial integrity, the Kingdom of Morocco intends to preserve, in its plentitude and its diversity, its one and indivisible national identity. Its unity, is forged by the convergence of its Arab-Islamist, Berber [amazighe] and Saharan-Hassanic [saharo-hassanie] components, nourished and enriched by its African, Andalusian, Hebraic and Mediterranean influences [affluents]. The preeminence accorded to the Muslim religion in the national reference is consistent with [va de pair] the attachment of the Moroccan people to the values of openness, of moderation, of tolerance and of dialog for mutual understanding between all the cultures and the civilizations of the world. 

And also in Article 7:

Arabic is [demeure] the official language of the State. The State works for the protection and for the development of the Arabic language, as well as the promotion of its use. Likewise, Tamazight [Berber/amazighe] constitutes an official language of the State, being common patrimony of all Moroccans without exception. 

An organic law defines the process of implementation of the official character of this language, as well as the modalities of its integration into teaching and into the priority domains of public life, so that it may be permitted in time to fulfill its function as an official language.

Ircam was, ultimately, downsized and runs, at the time being, illegally without a governing board (Conseil d’Administration) and it seems that the Makhzen is violating flagrantly its own legislature for such institutions.

In an article entitled: « L’Institut royal de la culture amazighe (IRCAM) va-t-il disparaître? » Reda Zaireg of the Huffpost Maroc Argues :

Dans le projet de loi organique relative à l’amazighe, seules trois institutions sont évoquées dans le projet de loi : le Conseil supérieur de l’éducation, de la formation et de la recherche scientifique, le ministère de l’Education nationale ainsi que le Conseil national des langues et de la culture marocaine.

C’est dans l’escarcelle de ce dernier Conseil que l’IRCAM pourrait tomber. En effet, le projet de loi organique relative au Conseil national des langues et des cultures devrait doter ce dernier d’une super-compétence en la matière, et sera “chargé notamment de la protection et du développement des langues arabe et amazighe et des diverses expressions culturelles marocaines”, selon l’article 5 de la Constitution, qui dispose, aussi, que le Conseil “regroupe l’ensemble des institutions concernées par ces domaines”.

La possibilité que le Conseil national des langues et de la culture regroupe la totalité des institutions concernées par les langues et la culture semble déplaire au directeur de l’IRCAM Ahmed Boukous:

“Nous considérons que le Conseil national des langues et de la culture doit garder l’IRCAM en l’état avec ses missions, son statut, son règlement intérieur, ses moyens financiers, ses ressources humaines, si on veut que cette institution continue de faire le travail qu’elle fait, de manière tout à fait respectable depuis sa création”.

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Final word

To conclude, the importance of the recognition of Tamazight as a national language in Maghrebi states previously suppressing it is monumental, given that language is one of the primary tools that the governments and European colonial powers used in Arabization and development to stamp out Amazigh identity. In fact, all political movements to advocate the Amazigh nation can be traced back to language, be it through song, academic discussion, or literature. This ties directly with a primary tenant in the triage of Amazigh identity, language, and also with the importance of all aspects of oral literature in the transmission of Amazigh culture. Thus, the political movement of the Tafsut Imazighen has both propelled forward and gave birth to important cultural vestiges of the assertion of Amazigh identity, leading to the positive developments of the Royal Institute for Amazigh culture (IRCAM) in Morocco, the creation of Amazigh radio, news, and fine arts outlets in theater, literature, and dance and the full recognition of language and civilization in Algeria, as well. Incorporating Tamazight and other aspects of Amazigh identity has occurred since the first recorded colonization attempts by the Phoenicians, and it has survived in this way to the present day, and so it is important to celebrate the appreciation for Amazigh arts in popular culture today in tandem with positive political developments, because their interaction is dynamic.

Although Amazigh leadership can only be generalized, in most cases leaders regardless of position arose through a combination of group consensus and religious legitimacy and enforced their responsibilities through persuasion rather than force. The basis of Amazigh leadership is the different levels of the tribe, acting as the figurehead and protector for those lower in the hierarchy. In the leadership gaps where merely tribal allegiances cannot provide, namely in regions where tribes are living in shared environments, geographic leadership plays an important function. Acting within and between these two forms of leadership are religious leaders, who provide an alternate and potentially sacrosanct channel for decisions. With the coming of first the French and then an independent Morocco, external leadership structures have been forced into Amazigh regions, creating parallel but contesting centers of legitimacy.

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Tribal Leadership

The tribe could be said to be the glue that holds Amazigh society together, connecting members of the tribe permanently with certain shared interests, and at the forefront of every section of a tribe is the tribal leader, or amghar. Just as a tribe has a different purpose than a confederation, stemming from its size, composition, and organization, the leader of each level of tribal hierarchy is established and exercises his position depending on the level of the structure that he is in charge of. However, the responsibilities of a tribal leader can be generalized before continuing to the specific levels. Internally, the leader should act as a focal point for agreement and as a mediator. The leader is traditionally only a first among equals so his decision only carries weight because of his image—he would not have been chosen for the position if his constituent tribe members did not trust him—and because he is acting in the best interests of the tribe. Thus he needs to build consensus and hold dissenting units together. Stemming from his position, he also is an important intermediary between disputing parties, trying to leverage his importance to keep feuds from starting or growing and disrupting tribal life. Externally, his role is predominantly that as a figurehead of his group. This can exhibit itself in multiple circumstances: in daily life, when he might interact with passing tribes; in politics, when a sub-tribe leader will represent it in front of the tribe and a tribal leader in front of the confederacy; and in war, where the tribal leader is responsible for initiating, negotiating, and ending war.

Toward the lowest level of the tribal hierarchy is the tigemmi, or tent encampment, which might be composed of one or two dozen families (Venema and Mguild, 107). The leader of the tigemmi would most likely be the patriarch of the family and would probably acquire the position due to lineage and reputation. But due to its insignificant size, the encampment leader lacks most power except for guiding the lives of encampment members and acting as the tigemmi representative to the clan.

Sub-tribes, or taqbilt, are made up of extended families and in turn provide the actual human element upon which the larger, outward-facing tribe is based. The chief of the taqbilt, the amghar n-tmazirt, is elected in a rotation by all of the member families (Dunn, 69-70). Ideally, leadership would pass equally between each clan so if there were four clans to a taqbilt, then each would provide a leader once every four years to ensure that each is fairly represented and that no group gains unfair control. Elections consisted of the clan representatives, generally the patriarchs or wiser members of the family, going and electing a well-regarded representative from the clan whose turn it was to provide a leader, with the clan itself sitting out of voting to prevent feuds or pressure to vote a particular way. Once elected, the choice is ratified by the tribal leadership to convey authority and legitimacy.

The amghar n-tmazirt is largely responsible for appointing clan leaders and assisting in solving the daily affairs of those under him. He would also presumably help select which members of the taqbilt went on to represent it in tribal gathering. Yet because of his position of authority, between the more authoritative position of leader of the family and the more consequential leader of the tribe—for the taqbilt in itself did not have a noteworthy ability to play a role outside of its own affairs—the amghar n-tmazirt was only as powerful as his clans allowed him to be. At any

one time, his family would only compose a fraction of the total taqbilt and thus he could not force his opinion without widespread consensus. Because of the small size of his leadership base, he also could not exercise his power outside of the taqbilt.

The tribal level sees an important change in the leader’s responsibilities.

The amghar n-ufilla, or supreme chief, is elected relatively the same way as the taqbilt’s chief, with the position rotating between the sub-tribes to ensure an equal distribution of power (Dunn, 68-9). Similarly, just as the amghar n-tmazirt is only as powerful as his clans allowed him to be, so is the amghar n-ufilla. Coming from only one of several groups, the chief never has the sufficient power to cement his reign past the next election and is only retained for as long or short as desired. But a key difference is that the amghar n-ufilla was given broader powers than

leaders lower in the tribal hierarchy, even if he was in a position no more powerful than others. His duties include acting as mediator between different portions of the tribe and between disputing parties, being the figurehead of the tribe for relations with other tribes, coordinating the tribe’s migratory patterns, and organizing the tribe during times of war. However, one point in reference to the latter is that while the amghar n-ufilla would be in charge of preparing the tribe for war that did not necessarily mean he would assume the position of leader during that war. Such a position would probably be specially elected during a meeting in preparation for the fighting and would choose someone, the amghar n-ufilla or not, best seen for his warrior prowess. Such a leader would then immediately lose his power after his objectives have been fulfilled, in part because the warring tribal factions will fall apart, returning to their ordinary lives and looking to a return to a more egalitarian leadership structure.

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The basis for this greater range of powers is that the leader is no longer responsible solely for his “flock,” instead having to act as a point of coordination between the many units of the tribe with the units of other tribes to reduce the friction that will inevitably develop by living in close proximity with opposing interests. Additionally, what flock he does have would now be much larger as compared to the other leaders, thus creating more cases that he would have to mediate to prevent the tribe from shattering into feuding factions.

The highest level of the tribal structure, the confederation, is also perhaps the weakest position of leadership. The confederation is predominantly several tribes united under one banner in the name of defense against other Amazigh groups and invaders (Hagopian 1963, 71). Action on the part of the leader is utilized in times of war or resistance while the tribal leaders retain their autonomy in times of both war and peace. Any action on the part of the confederation would involve taking the opinions of each of the tribal representative’s views into account so what decisions did occur would have been bulky. Instead, it is likely that tribes continued to function as independent military units during the fighting, instead using the confederation’s leadership as a conduit for coordinating actions to their best effects. Consequently, the confederacy’s leadership, when or if there is any, functions on a very weak basis as a nature of its basic function as a vehicle for defense of common interests and little else.

Geographic Leadership

However, tribes do not live in complete isolation from one another; it would be unrealistic and unsustainable for each clan to live in a different hamlet and each tribe in a different valley. Multiple lineages might share the same valley or live in the same village because of business interests and patterns of migration and immigration, among other things. As a result, if leadership in Amazigh society was based solely on lineage, intertribal relations would be strangled by the need to coordinate everything through the amghar and life would not function smoothly. While hostilities will break out regardless of efforts, due in part to the vengeance nature of Amazigh tradition, geographic forms of leadership came to play an important intermediary role for situations where tribal leadership was not suitable.

At the basis of Amazigh geographic leadership is the jema’a, or council, of a village. The basis for the jema’a extends back to Roman times, when particular villages were permitted to elect councils of elders, seniors, who amongst themselves would pick a chief and handle the affairs of the village (Brett and Fentress, 63). The members of a jema’a are elected by men who are of free descent and capable of wielding a weapon (Venema and Mguild, 107-8). Once elected, members are primarily concerned with handling local disputes such as arguments over family, land, or business. Its duty, in essence, is to ensure the relative complacency of the village and to make sure that conflicts do not spread out of the village and into situations that cannot be controlled. Because the village as a social unit has no war-making purpose, village leaders are not responsible for organizing it for such, although they could presumably take charge during times the village is under attack. With this in mind, though, the jema’a largely functions as a mediator between the diverse residents of the village and are expected to maintain unity, not take control of events.

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Fulfilling the geographic equivalent of the tribal confederation is the leff. By definition, each region can only be composed of two leffs, or agglomerations of villages, of approximately equal capability. The purpose of the leff is to act as an alliance between the disparate units in times of conflict (Hagopian 1964, 48). If a dispute arose, the leaders of the leff would dispatch representatives in an attempt to find common ground. In better scenarios, a solution would be found and bloodshed over the matter could be avoided. If not, then the two sides come to war but should theoretically be better balanced to limit the total harm done by the matter.

A clear difference between tribal and geographic leadership is the entity responsible for providing it. In the tribe, the focus is on the individual. Councils come together to elect and guide the leader, but it is still the amghar, patriarch, or war leader who is imbued with the responsibilities for command. But in the case of geographic leadership, the entity involved is often a council or several people who are responsible for the overall leadership of the group—in the village, it’s the jema’a, and in the leff it is a group of representatives. The basis for this difference rests on who is being led. In the case of the tribe, all of its members are technically related and should share interests by nature of that bond. Thus, one leader is suitable because there should be no significant conflicts of interest or unrepresented views. But there are multiple interests present in a village or collection of villages, so it is not possible for one figure to fairly represent multiple, potentially irreconcilable views. As a result, having a council so that each lineage or each interest group can make its voice heard is necessary to bestow legitimacy upon the leadership. Both types of leadership have similar roles, namely solving disputes and acting as a focal point for interests and communications with other groups. Both also ultimately reserve most power from the leader, assuring that the leadership is still accountable to his or its constituents at all times.

Religious Leadership

Finally, both taking part in and bridging the gaps between tribal and geographic leadership is the marabout, or igurramen (sing. agurram), as a religious leader. The religious leader is the most versatile of the three types of leaders in that he can fulfill two positions at the same time, using them to reinforce the legitimacy of each other, or can choose to place himself above the fray of politics and take a special role that only a religious leader can fill. The igurramen cannot easily change roles by being neutral one day and a war leader the next; instead, he aligns himself as his predecessors traditionally have done. The ability of the religious leader to assume this multitude of roles stems from his baraka, which gives increased confidence in any decision he hands down to his followers and gives it more weight than the decision of a regular leader would carry.

By residing within another leadership structure, the igurramen can offer what other leaders can—being a figurehead and mediator—with what they cannot—divine authority. In the tribal structure, the agurram could become an amghar or an amghar’s counselor, achieving a prominent position in the tribal hierarchy (Hagopian 1964, 48-50). This is possible because some tribes have a maraboutic sub-tribe or clan within them. The agurram would be an ideal leader during war because he could bring God’s will to his faction, hopefully giving it an advantage over the other side. In geographical leadership, the agurram can become another member of the jema’a, adding weight to its judgments. In both cases, the agurram plays the standard role that the leader would but has an added authority to his decisions. Nevertheless, just like traditional leaders, the agurram is rarely able to accrue enough power to truly control those under his leadership. In some cases, his followers will splinter, leading to the rise of competitors and weakening his base.

However, it is also possible for the agurram to exist on the fringes of socio-political units, acting as a buffer between them. In its original sense, an agurram was someone who had renounced his attachments to society, removing himself from all traditional leadership structures (Brett and Fentress, 143). Instead, in the word of Brett and Fentress, it became his duty to maintain “equilibrium” in society using his unique position of not being tied to any particular interests. Like other leaders, the neutral agurram finds his primary responsibility in adjudicating disputes and dispensing advice. But as a source of stability, the agurram does not intervene immediately; instead, he waits until the issue has gone through standard tribal or geographic conciliators and only then, if the issue is brought to him, does he impart his judgment on the given case (Hagopian 1964, 48).

Additionally, while he can take part in conflicts that would fall within the normal boundaries of dispute resolution leadership, he also plays the special role of helping with issues that strain traditional methods, namely those between tribes or villages. While confederations and leffs do exist to address these issues, the confederation is established more for war-making than for peacekeeping, and the leff could be an unwieldy instrument between two untrustworthy sides. The agurram brings two aspects to these cases that other leaders cannot. The first is his baraka, which gives added pressure to accept his decision and presents a face-saving way to avoid a feud. The second is that as the agurram is unattached, and often resides on the fringes of societies, he is in a prime place, physically and mentally, to adjudicate between opposing sides. His territory would provide a neutral meeting place under a mediator who does not have a stake in either side.

Elements of Amazigh Leadership

There are three central characteristics that have been touched on during the exploration of these different leadership positions. To differing degrees, each tends to be guided by the Amazigh society’s emphasis on egalitarianism, persuasion, and religious legitimacy. Before continuing on to how traditional leadership structures have been affected by the coming of the French and the modern Moroccan government, it is beneficial to further analyze the effects of these features, which might not be inherent in all leadership positions but which nevertheless form the foundation for many.

Egalitarianism forms one of the bases of Amazigh social relations and such a belief extends up through the ranks of leadership. Egalitarianism manifests itself on leadership through the aversion of having a single strong leader. In the tribal structure, the leader is regularly changed and is guaranteed to represent only a portion of the group, preventing him from remaining beyond the time that he is elected to stay there. The leader is also treated as only the first among equals, restricting the voice and the image of the leader from overtaking those of his followers. According to one observation on the Aith Waryaghar, “The egalitarianism of individuals and of segments or groups acts as the effective check on the power aspirations of one and all” (Caton, 95). Similarly, the geographic hierarchy focuses on elections of multiple people to guarantee that a majority of voices are heard. There are no direct methods of power over the constituents of a jema’a and debate is accepted. The exception to egalitarianism is the agurram, for while baraka can be transferred, doing so often lays in the hands of the agurram himself. Thus, he cannot easily be dismissed or ignored because of the importance of his position in society. At the same time, it is possible for the agurram’s followers to break off and form a new, opposing zawiyya, and it is possible for the baraka of a agurram to be reasoned away for one reason or another, leaving a certain amount of fluidity in following and obeying him.

As a result of the egalitarianism, all three types of leaders are required to rely on their ability to persuade instead of using force. As established before, this is because none of the leadership positions is able to accumulate enough supporters to be able to force his will on others. But as a consequence of the inability to acquire force, Amazigh leadership had to define itself some other way or else it would contribute nothing to society. As evident from all three types of leadership, such a role was found as being a mediator, whether between individuals or villages, over who owns a cow or which tribe is in the wrong for their actions. The ability to persuade became the power for leaders that force is in many other societies (Caton, 80-1). It presents the way for them to influence those lower in the hierarchy while still maintaining the first element of egalitarianism.

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The third aspect that is prominent throughout Amazigh leadership structures is the importance of religious legitimacy in establishing authority. Central to this are the igurramen. The benefit from having baraka is evident through the ability of a agurram to potentially fill any of the three types of leadership. Religious legitimacy is an obvious prerequisite for religious leaders and having a tribe with either an agurram as leader or in one of the clans can give the tribe added confidence, but one structure in which religion’s role may not be immediately clear is in the jema’a. An agurram can belong as a member of the jema’a. More to the point, though, by having a combination of lineages present in the jema’a, it gains baraka and becomes a justified source for the village’s social order (Venema and Mguild, 108-9). In reality the basis for its actions still rests on consensus, but in the matter of justifying those decisions and accepting the jema’a’s role in daily affairs, religious legitimacy no doubt makes it more palatable to the population and gives it a sustained place in their lives.

Amazigh Leadership and Central Government Authority

Historically, the Sultan of Morocco always attempted to project his influence into the mountainous Amazigh regions, which have been categorized by modern scholars as the bled as-siba, or land of dissidence—as compared to the bled al-makhzan, or land of the government, composed of the rich plains which have sustained royal power for centuries. But while the Sultan was occasionally able to temporarily impose himself upon a region by using massive amounts of force, his power was only in the ability to collect taxes, and even that would disappear when he would inevitably have to withdraw his troops to pacify the next region. As a result, the Amazigh leadership structures have always remained independent, maintaining their traditional powers and roles.

Since the initiation of the French Protectorate in 1912, the traditional leadership structure began to be slowly but surely eroded. The French first worked to pacify the bled as-siba, which it accomplished only after approximately two decades of using superior numbers and weaponry against the Amazigh warriors. However, the very idea of the Protectorate was that Morocco would still largely be responsible for its own governance. Not wishing to strengthen the Sultan, who served as both a point of legitimacy and opposition to the French Protectorate, the French did not want to bring the newly pacified territories under his command. Doing such, in the view of the first French Resident-General, Marshal Hubert Lyautey, would unbalance the traditional power structure (Bidwell, 51). Thus, upon achieving supremacy, the French opted to impose indirect rule on the Amazigh, leaving the traditional structures intact as a vehicle for which to assist their rule. The elected position of the amghar was replaced by that of the French caid, who was nominated by the Sultan, imposing central control next to the traditional (Bidwell, 52). The French-appointed leaders retained their traditional tasks but had to have decisions approved by the French (Gellner, 240-2). The leaders took on the positions of local representatives of France, carrying out its verdicts and acting as an information source who understood the natives. At the same time, the beginnings of an alternate power structure were evident through French outposts which also acted as mediator, cautionary measure, and a source of force when orders were not obeyed.

To a degree, such measures strengthened the traditional leadership position, giving it the ability to enforce its decisions through force. But it also destroyed the basic elements of Amazigh leadership. Egalitarianism is irrelevant if the French and the Sultan elect notables, persuasion is no longer necessary if weapons can be used instead, and religious legitimacy can be put into question if it is Christian foreigners who are behind the commands. As a result, while the face of leadership was strengthened, the actual institutions began to become irrelevant next to the new hierarchy.

With the independence of Morocco in 1956, the new Moroccan central government took control over the leadership structure that the French had instituted and began to seek to expand control further. At first, the government continued to select the caid from the local population, but the caid’s superiors were always Arab speakers from other regions (Venema and Mguild, 106). By the 1970s, even this had changed where the caid was now appointed from the outside, too, and disagreement between the caid and the locals could result in the intervention of higher authorities (115). The caid took on administrative tasks for the government, such as handling government registration (111), while the government sought to make courts rather than leaders the primary location for addressing disputes. An added complication for the Amazigh leadership is that new generations and outsiders had no respect for the traditional institutions; college educated youths might no longer see a point in supporting the amghar while migrants to a village might see the jema’a as being an unfair form of governance because it would not protect the Arab minority’s rights.

Conclusion

Regardless of whether the Amazigh leadership is tribal, geographical, religious, or some amalgamation in its basis, the pattern of Amazigh leadership is that all three rest on egalitarian ideals, the need to persuade rather than force followers, and the clout of religious legitimacy. Despite the numerous challenges to its existence, the traditional leadership structures do still exist to certain degrees. The Amazigh populace expects for its leadership, in whatever form, to protect its interests and to adjudicate its life. When the old hierarchy does this, it has been retained to the best of the population’s efforts. When it does not, namely in functions not historically filled by the traditional structure, the government has the ability to maneuver into the fold (Venema and Mguild, 104). Perhaps the weakest of the three leadership structures is the tribe: tribes may no longer be as of much importance, especially with the fragmentation of the family unit and migration out of the region, and confederations are largely antiquated because there is no longer a need for families to rely on each other for defense. But geographic and religious leadership are both still essential to Amazigh society. The roles that they once filled, primarily as mediators, advisers, and points of consensus, are still of consequence.

Follow Professor Mohamed CHTATOU on Twitter: @Ayurinu

Morocco is a country in which four principal languages – Moroccan Arabic, Amazigh, Literary Arabic and French – share the linguistic arena, but their socio-cultural status is worlds apart. That status is rooted in history insofar as historical facts (which feed into socio-cultural facts) have led to a situation in which Literary Arabic is more associated with men and Amazigh is more associated with women. For example, Literary Arabic has real and symbolic power in the religious, legal, political, administrative and media spheres, because of its status as the official language, the liturgical language and as the language of institutions, written knowledge and so-called ‘public’ affairs, in which men are better represented and have more voices and choices than women.

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Conversely, until very recently Amazigh was typically an oral language, a maternal language and consequently one that was inevitably associated with women, especially rural women, in view of the high rate of illiteracy among women and of mass emigration of men to the towns.Throughout Morocco’s modern history, the fate of Amazigh has been closely linked with the fate of women and it is no coincidence that Amazigh and women were pushed into the background during the years following independence, nor that the current sensitivity towards cultural and linguistic rights is matched by a new sensitivity towards women’s rights.

In these circumstances, the inclusion of Amazigh in Morocco’s educational fabric and an improvement in the status of women in the country can only be of benefit to Morocco’s democratization and overall development. This view is justified both because history confers an undeniable legitimacy on Amazigh in Morocco, and because Islam as a cultural identity is not based on ethnic identity, regardless of whether that is expressed in racial or linguistic terms, or both.The Muslim community does not discriminate among ethnic groups (which explains the use of Arabic by very different ethnic groups throughout the world). This position is further strengthened by the fact that multilingualism is a fundamental element in Moroccan culture, which was born first and foremost of the country’s complex history and its geographical position at the junction of two continents.

The learning and use of Amazigh is closely associated with women; the oral literature (which is mainly disseminated in Moroccan Arabic or in Amazigh) is deeply feminine.

Morocco’s history was and still is built by men and women, and that process is conveyed in both written and oral languages. Oral literature is a national heritage which conveys in its very nature the uniqueness of Moroccan culture. It is time to preserve and to promote this literature, which, while often anonymous, nonetheless constitutes a collective memory reaching beyond the bounds of formal knowledge.

This oral tradition draws on the realms of the wondrous in which women escape from their traditional roles, proving that women have a knowledge which is not always the prerogative of men. In folk tales, for instance, patriarchal laws are often overturned.

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Amazigh owes its survival first and foremost to women. In fact, its survival is an exception to the usual development of languages.We have here a language that is several millennia old, but which has never been the official language of a centralized state that might have determined its linguistic standards and conferred on it the validation of legal status; a language which has managed to co-exist with far more powerful languages, for example, Punic and Latin in the past, and Arabic, French, Spanish and English today. The standardization of Amazigh and its teaching go hand in hand today with the promotion of women – here once again we find the correlation between language and women.

Indeed, the promotion of Amazigh is a duty for all Moroccans towards a language which has, throughout its history, done much to unite the country in political and religious terms. At the same time, education and teaching also happen to be primary factors in the emancipation of women and their promotion in all areas. As well as playing a role in aiding both individual and collective awareness, education is an effective development tool, especially in the age of globalization.

The active participation of women in public affairs may enable the languages to be used equitably. Such participation could even change usage and attitudes towards the languages: it could demystify and reduce the gap between men and women as well as between the languages in use.

It cannot be said often enough that the promotion of ideas about the impact of education and language-teaching on the status of women is a historical duty, especially in a developing country. The purpose of this debate is to find a way to allow the ‘gender’ dimension to be taken into consideration in the sphere of education in order to reach the juridical and administrative levels.

In a nascent democracy such as Morocco, only a language policy that takes account of women’s socio-economic needs can be viable. It is true that the history of Moroccan languages may be told in different ways with different supporting arguments, but despite the heterogeneous nature of research fields and programs aimed at promoting women, language rights of Moroccan men and women are fundamental to all human rights. Moroccan women’s language rights rely on education as a tool for intellectual emancipation.Without it, women will remain on the edge of changing language policies and on the edge of the so-called ‘dominant’ languages in Morocco.

Moroccan women have preserved an entire heritage of oral literature, often anonymous since it belongs to the group, not the individual, as Chafik wrote in his work on Amazigh poetry. literature includes music, songs and dances, as well as stories, proverbs and riddles. The ancestral lifestyle of both men and women may be uncovered in this literature.

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The oral tradition is a feature of Moroccan culture: Amazigh songs, for instance, employ both the major classical techniques of monodic song and polyphony and allow us to appreciate a music which, although it has evolved a great deal since its origins, retains an authentic vigour. After surviving a long period of neglect, it was rediscovered in the 1990s, and today young people are reclaiming this heritage.

The soul of Amazigh is indisputably expressed through song and music, the two components of an oral literature which has for centuries been passed down from generation to generation by Amazigh women in the mountains of Morocco as well as across North Africa.

Through oral literature women have always inspired the greatest respect in their communities. History tells us that Amazigh women shared in decisions concerning family,inheritance rights and education. The work of men and women was clearly differentiated, but was always recognized as being of equal value. In ancient history, Amazigh women occupied an important place and sometimes were at the head of kingdoms.

Amazigh language has indeed survived to our day despite the fact that Amazigh has never been the official language of a centralized state, has not been sustained by a holy book, and has had to with stand far more politically powerful languages such as Phoenician, Punic, Latin and Arabic. Today, we owe the fact that Amazigh has survived and is officially recognized, to the commitment of women to cultural issues at stake in our societies.

UNESCO LIBRARY 2007

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Amazigh World News’ editorial views.

Government institutions on the other side, weren’t any better than public media networks, they have also ignored all the correspondence from the HAKA and many calls from Amazigh rights voices, and continued to release all awareness campaign and national alerts in relation to the outbreak of the novel coronavirus, aimed at stalling the fast-expanding virus in the country, with using only Arabic and French languages, in a nation with an illiteracy rate of 30% in people over the age of 15. 

Although the new 2011 Moroccan constitution included the Amazigh language as an official language of the country, a language that is spoken by an estimated 35 to 40 percent of Morocco’s population. But North African pan-Arab regimes, whether nationalist or Islamist, has long been hostile to the Amazigh language, perceived as a threat to national cohesion!

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This is what created the cohesion and continuity of the family, tribe and nation despite the weight of patriarchy, the hazards of life and historical upheavals. Whether urban or rural, women have managed to keep the thread unbroken, linking new generations to old and establishing a dialogue between the visible and invisible worlds, since women – although interested in change – never put at risk their cultural heritage and the mass of experience accumulated since the earliest times.

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Women are also naturally associated with artistic production, especially in the traditional sector. Pottery, weaving, decoration of walls and storage jars, embroidery and so on, are mainly created by women. Amazigh jewelry dates back to the most ancient times and constitutes some of the first North African artworks. Like Egyptian or Carthaginian women, the Amazigh woman first felt the need to fix her headgear firmly on her head, her garment on her shoulder and her flying haik on her body. That led her to use metal pins, which might be said to be the Amazigh woman’s first jewelry.Jewelry was born of a sense of ornament. Pins were transformed into pretty clasps, bracelets and brooches of various designs.

The most striking thing when you first see a woman from the Moroccan countryside is how simple and poor her clothing is compared with the lavishness of her jewelry: triangular clasps as wide as a hand on the chest, strong chains and several multi-coloured necklaces in which silver, coral, blue, yellow and green enamel, and amber form a majestic harmony. Moroccan towns transformed Amazigh jewelry by replacing silver with gold, and coral with diamonds. An Amazigh woman’s attire is dominated far more by her jewelry than by her clothing. Women succeeded in preserving Amazigh jewelry together with the memory of past times and civilizations.

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The knowledge of women is revealed above all in divinatory and therapeutic practices.Through their role as mothers and teachers, Amazigh women have preserved the secrets of divinatory and therapeutic practices from the dawn of time. Those practices arose from ancestral traditions that began in the Capsian Neolithic age and were enriched through the centuries by Mesopotamian, Egyptian, Greek, Roman, Jewish,Arabic and other contributions. It must be emphasized that these practices reveal just as much intellectual competence as any book knowledge.

In additional to physical work, women’s knowledge includes intellectual production. In that regard, we have in Morocco what is called the other history, non-official history, written by women. I am a member of a North African research group whose mission is to delve into history to resurrect women’s voices and locate them on the chessboard of history, so as to highlight their contribution to the construction of North Africa.An anthology entitled Women Writers of Africa will be published in 2008 as a result of this work.

The variety, depth and wealth of the (oral and written) texts that we have assembled, of the voices speaking in the first person, is overwhelming. The roads traveled by the authors bear the imprint of that female knowledge. They demonstrate an extraordinary mastery both of bodily events and biographical rites and of truly female ways of thinking. It remains for us to highlight the themes of Moroccan women writers,themes which are in direct relationship with Moroccan reality. The intention is to focus attention on these writings as powerful documents that bear witness to their time and to the society that produced them.

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UNESCO 2007